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FOREWORD 
This report has been prepared for the Strategic Analysis in Science and Technology Unit 
(SASTJ of the Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development of the 
Commission of the European Communities. SAST activities are part of the MONITOR 
Programme which aims to identify new directions and priorities for Community research and 
technological development (RTDJ policy and to help show more clearly the relationship 
between RTD policy and other Community policies. 
For questions already identified as of interest for the development of Community policy, 
SAST projects provide an investigation of the perspectives opened up by science and 
technology. SAST projects thus serve as an input to the process of policy formulation. In 
the case of the SAST project to which this report contributes, "The needs and possibilities 
for cooperation between selected advanced developing countries and the Community in the 
field of science and technology", the context of policy questions includes the evolving 
economic relations between the Community and these countries, the interest to the 
Community of promoting international cooperation in science and technology with various 
types of countries, and the Community's role in European science and technology. 
This report is one of a set of country studies carried out for the project. The set comprises 
the Republic of Korea, Thailand, other ASEAN countries, the People's Republic of China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico. An overall strategic review will also be available in 1992. 
It should be borne in mind in reading the country studies that the fieldwork on which they 
are based was carried out almost entirely in the country concerned. The points of view of 
European industrialists/researchers/policy makers were not explicitly sought for this part of 
the project. (They will be sought as part of the work for the overall strategic review.) 
SAST presents this report as a stimulus to reflection and debate within the European 
Community on the best strategies to adopt towards a group of increasingly important 
countries. It must be stressed, however, that the orientation and content of reports 
prepared for SAST cannot be taken as indicating the considered opinion of policy advisors 
within the Commission services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The prospects for collaboration in science and technology (S& T) between the European 
Community and India will be directly influenced by India's development experience and by 
the debates that have historically shaped the direction and orientation of the country's 
industrial advance. However, since independence, India's economic progress has been 
characterized by such a paradoxical combination of backwardness, gradualism and success 
that it is difficult to render a balanced assessment of past achievements, present prospects 
and future possibilities. 
Central to this conundrum is the fact that India's pursuit of development has always been 
beset by a fierce and deeply rooted conflict within and outside of the government over 
whether its priorities should focus on equity and the reduction of poverty or on the 
attainment of rapid industrialization. Even today these issues permeate policy discussions 
at the highest level of decision-making. However what has not been seriously questioned 
until recently by both sides in this debate is that central government should play a major 
role in controlling and directing the economy. This historical unanimity on the role of the 
state means that a wide variety of government-owned public sector organizations are 
deeply imbedded in the economy and now operate major industrial, infrastructural, cultural 
and service entities. 
On the industry front, privately owned firms operate widely but are excluded from a 
(diminishing) number of areas considered centrally important such as space and defense. 
The government exercises firm control (now being slowly loosened) over the import of 
equipment and inputs and over the incidence and nature of collaborative activities between 
foreign and Indian enterprises. Agricultural production is in private hands but major support 
industries such as irrigation and fertilizer are largely state operated. 
In many respects, an impressive share of the country's original social objectives have been 
met despite the constraints imposed by its size (800 million people), a per capita income 
of only $260, extraordinary cultural diversity and a degree of class and religious conflict 
that makes India one of the most inherently complex and difficult to manage societies in 
the world. 
In the 43 years since independence, India has retained its status as the world's largest, 
functioning democracy (a notable achievement in its own right) and attained measurable 
progress in the areas of health, food and energy production. The overall level of advance 
in human terms is readily discernible in the improvement of life expectancy at birth from 
46 years in 1971 to 57 years in 1988; a decline in the birth rate from 41 per 1000 in 1971 
to 32.2 per 1000 in 1986 and a drop in the death rate from 15.7 per 1000 in 1976 to 12.5 
per 1 000 in 1 986. 
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Likewise, there have been notable achievements in the industrial sector. A sustained and 
comprehensive planning effort has led to the development of broad array of heavy 
industries, a large degree of industrial self-sufficiency and ambitious high technology 
projects in the areas of nuclear energy, defense and space. A strong commitment to the 
creation of national scientific and engineering capabilities has lead the government to 
support a sizeable higher education system consisting of 157 universities and 5500 
colleges and a massive network of 1000 research institutions. 
However, alongside of these achievements, stand a number of glaring paradoxes. Without 
question the central difficulty is that the increases in income, wealth and well-being 
recorded over four decades of post-independence development are marred by the 
persistence of poverty afflicting almost half of the population concentrated in rural villages 
and burdened down by illiteracy, unemployment and extremely low incomes. In the eyes 
of many, this situation persists because of the overemphasis given to the pursuit of 
industrialization by government since independence. At the same time, blame for the poor 
record of GNP growth (less than 2 per cent yearly since 1950) that has allowed poverty 
to persist is laid at government's door because of its restrictive policies towards the 
productive sector. 
These contrasting dimensions of state involvement in India's economic successes and 
failures and the pervasive and contentious debate over the direction of Indian development 
are the basic parameters that will inevitably define both the nature of future S& T 
collaboration between India and the EC and the strategies that must be pursued to take 
advantage of these opportunities. Five themes derived from this will run through the whole 
of our analysis. 
First, the cumulative development of India's industrial infrastructure and the generation of 
a sizeable pool of well trained scientific and engineering resources constitute the central 
pillars around which EC-India S& T and industrial collaboration can be constructed. None 
of the other countries under study can offer, the combination of advantages that India 
possesses - a large pool of low cost, skilled manpower resources, engineering expertise and 
world-class scientists - all embedded in one of the potentially largest domestic markets in 
the world. 
Second, by virtue of the deep involvement of the government in S& T and advanced 
industry, any substantial projects must not only have government support but most 
probably extensive government participation as well. Given this, it was very encouraging 
that during the course of our interviews a sincere willingness emerged at the highest levels 
of government to explore the prospects for mutually beneficial collaboration between India 
and the EC. 
Third, there were clear signs on the part of the recently removed Janata government that 
it would carry forward the process of liberalization begun by the Congress Party 
government of Rajiv Gandhi. 1 The new Chandra Shekar government shold not diverge too 
far from this commitment. This should provide a favourable context for large scale EC 
collaboration. However, the industrial "successes" achieved during the 1980s (for 
example, record industrial growth rates and a sharp upsurge in manufactured exports) as 
a result of liberalization have had a double-edged effect. On the one hand they have 
1. This report was researched and prepared before the recent collapse of the Janata and Chandra Shekar 
governments, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the election of the Congress Party government. However, 
most if not all of its main conclusions remain valid. 
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strengthened the hand of the reformers and created a dynamic new group of entrepreneurs 
and managers in both the private and the public sector who would be the natural partners 
of this collaboration. 
At the same time, some of the perceived excesses of- the 1980s (by a 
consumption-oriented, urban middle class) and the resentment caused by the efforts of 
foreign actors to influence Indian industrial trade and commercial policy has sparked off 
another round of fierce and contentious debate centring around the recurrent themes of 
equity versus growth and the permissible role of outside interference, foreign capital and 
foreign technology in the economy. This struggle may, at times, slow down and hamper 
visible forward progress in developing collaboration and must always be taken note of by 
those developing and implementing the EC strategy in this area. 
Fourth, the large bulk of key decision makers within the government and the bureaucracy 
fiercely identify with the accomplishments of India since independence and attribute this 
to the policies of self-reliance and non-alignment that have been followed since 
independence. They do not see India's future success as being dependent upon the 
strengthening of economic or technological relations with any country or group of 
countries. Consequently, Indian policy makers, when publicly pressured to eliminate 
policies they feel have protected the economy from exploitation - as in the case of recent 
U.S. and EC pressure over the issue of IPR and access to national markets, resist strongly 
what they see as unwarranted outside interference in Indian affairs. This does not mean 
there are no ways around these issues but it does mean that if progress is to be achieved, 
it will best occur via interactions that take place at the sub-rosa level. 
Finally, the scale and diversity of the Indian S&T and industrial apparatus and the 
complexity of Indian policy making, suggest that while there are great gains to be had from 
collaboration, a good deal more groundwork has to be done before it will be possible to 
specify precise areas and modes of collaboration. In that regard, the process of 
consultation and communication initiated by the SAST project, has created an important 
and timely opportunity for the EC to pursue its objectives in this area. 
RESEARCH METHOD AND APPROACH 
This report is based on desk research and a series of personal interviews carried out in India 
during May and June 1990 with senior policy makers in government, key actors 
representing the private sector, senior academic observers and directors and researchers 
in research institutes. Because of the size and complexity of the Indian S& T system, the 
Indian S& T enterprise and the decision-making process that guides Indian S& T and 
industrial endeavours, it was not feasible to undertake a comprehensive coverage of all the 
key actors and institutions involved nor to explore in detail the specifics of possible 
collaborations. Instead, our research strategy concentrated on investing a good deal of 
effort in gaining access to and discussion with a select group of influential government 
officials whose positive endorsement and involvement will be critical for any further 
discussions between the EC and India over the matter of mutually beneficial S& T 
collaboration. 
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ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
This report is organized into two parts: 
Part I presents a strategic review of the prospects for EC/India S& T collaboration and 
assesses the problems to be overcome, the factors to be taken account of in devising a 
strategy, and recommendations for proceeding forward. 
Part II presents the "decision base" on the Indian economy an the Indian S&T situation. 
This consists of a background overview of the Indian economy and its recent performance; 
the thrust and focus of Indian industrial policy; the structure and functioning of the Indian 
S& T system and the S& T planning process; the structure of the S& T education and 
manpower situation; and an evaluation of Indian public and private sector R&D. 
A set of 7 annexes, based on the case study approach, use information gleaned from desk 
research and interviews to discuss aspects of the Indian S& T scene and the industrial 
sector that are relevant to our concerns and illustrate the different forces at work within 
India. 
Page iv - Sast Project 1 Report on India 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 . India and the European Community already have reasonably well developed scientific, 
industrial and trading links. This report argues that there is, however, ample scope 
to expand these links significantly via innovative forms of mutually beneficial S& T 
and industrial collaboration. 
2. India possesses a broader range of scientific and industrial strengths than other 
advanced developing countries. Harnessed properly, these could enhance 
Community scientific competencies, open up a wide array of new commercial 
opportunities for European firms and contribute significantly to India's own 
industrialization efforts. The Community is uniquely well placed to play a key 
facilitating role in bringing about the collaboration necessary to allow this to 
happen. 
3. Yet seizing these opportunities will require a concious strategy that takes account of 
the countervailing, contradictory and often confusing, political and economic forces 
that influence Indian policy towards collaboration with foreign firms and 
governments. 
4. Politically, the new minority Indian government has still to consolidate its position and 
remains vulnerable. It also faces short term economic constraints in the guise of 
a balance of payment crisis, a growing fiscal deficit and a sharp slow-down in 
industrial growth - all of which have recently forced the government to impose 
austerity measures including new controls on imports of non-essential items 
including capital goods and some intermediates. 
5. Such factors would inevitably create uncertainties for any efforts by the Community to 
pursue a deliberate strategy of achieving greater S& T and industrial collaboration. 
Moreover, the government's room for manoeuvre on this issue is further 
constrained by its cautious stance towards foreign investment and technology 
import borne of its opposition to the urban/consumption-oriented policies of the 
previous administration. 
6. Yet underlying these uncertainties there are reasons for optimism both in general and 
in relation to the prospects for collaboration. On the political front, the Indian 
bureaucracy is a powerful stabilizing force. Provided Community initiatives have the 
backing of key officials in the bureaucracy, agreements reached will go forward 
even if the government falls and new elections are called. 
7. Despite the short term economic constraints, Indian industry exhibits considerable 
strengths buoyed by a strong output and export performance over the last five 
years. This has been driven by the wide-ranging liberalization policies pursued by 
the previous government. These policies have fostered a new, more optimistic 
attitude on the part of Indian industrialists and foreign investors over future 
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prospects for the Indian economy. Surprisingly the new government seems 
committed to carrying forward the process of industrial liberalization. 
8. Because of liberalization, a new breed of technocrat-entrepreneurs have emerged in 
both the public and private sector who represent a flowering of industrial and 
technological dynamism and realism that is new on the Indian scene. Not being 
constrained by the restrictive practices and attitudes of the past. these individuals 
and their enterprises could act as competent partners for Community sponsored 
projects that incorporate European firms and involve both R&D and production. 
9. The Indian S&T system, though suffering many structural problems, also has 
considerable strengths. Some of its scientists are carrying out leading edge 
research in fields of interest to Europe. India also enjoys enviable depth in its pool 
of trained manpower in fields of applied technology such as engineering and 
software development. A third is the government's ability to relatively quickly 
marshal substantial resources and focus efforts on the pursuit of objectives in 
targeted areas. 
1 0. A variety of innovative proposals for S& T and industrial collaboration that go beyond 
current EC-India projects were proposed in the course of our interviews with senior 
policy makers, scientists and industrialists. These include straightforward science 
projects and Indian participation in the Framework programme, the deployment of 
Indian software engineers on European-oriented system software development 
projects, European participation in technology-intensive infrastructure projects in 
India and major new initiatives aimed at strengthening Indian industrial standards 
capabilities and its producer services sector. 
11 . There were, of course, reservations expressed over the prospects for greater EC-Indian 
collaboration partly on the grounds of principal and fears of exploitation and partly 
because of concerns that systemic incompatibilities between the corporate and 
bureaucratic cultures of both sides would frustrate any truly innovative projects. 
12. These reservations were far outweighed, however, by the strong expressions of 
interest from very senior policy makers in pursuing further discussions with the 
Community on the possibilities for enhanced and expanded S& T and industrial 
collaboration. 
13. Care needs to be taken in how the next steps are organized, particularly with regard 
to discussions that define the principal of "mutual benefit" on which the 
collaborations must be based. However, the prospects are favourable that the 
Community could act as a catalyst for opening up a new era of scientific, 
technological and industrial collaboration between the European Community and 
India that would be of great benefit to all parties. 
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Strategic Review 
1.1. FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS ENHANCING THE PROSPECTS FOR S& T 
COLLABORATION 
India is a country that cannot be understood from a distance. The secret to success in 
India, whether at the level of the individual or the enterprise, has always been a willingness 
to commit the considerable time, effort and resources required to understand the country 
and the Indian way. Yet despite the difficulties, the benefits gained from cultivating this 
understanding and forging strong links with India almost always outweigh the effort and 
resources invested at the outset. Considered from this perspective, a compelling case can 
be made for the European Commission to pursue the development of mutually beneficial 
S& T collaboration with India . 
For the Community and its member states, the potential gains arising from S& T and related 
industrial co-operation are tangible and significant. Certain aspects of India's S& T system 
and its industrial capabilities exhibit advantages that complement and extend those of the 
Community in directions not accessible via collaboration with virtually any other country. 
Take skilled manpower availability for example, where Europe faces a critical shortfall 
capable of undermining its efforts to remain competitive internationally. India's stock of 
trained S& T manpower is close to three million people of which perhaps one-tenth are 
directly employed on S&T related activities within the country. Given this, it is not 
surprising that India has substantial reservoirs of trained, low cost and underexploited ~& T 
manpower in fields such as fine mechanical engineering, software design and immunology 
that could be deployed on collaborative, large scale pre-competititive and near-market 
research projects. 
Other advantages to the Community and its member states from Indian S& T collaboration 
are concretely documented below such as gaining access to new markets both in India and 
in third countries, strengthening Europe's knowledge base in a variety of fields where Indian 
science is well advanced, the low cost sourcing of low volume, technology intensive 
components and European consortium participation in major Indian high tech infrastructure 
projects in transportation, communication and energy. The benefits to Europe of 
substantial industrial and S& T collaboration with India constitute a strong and visible 
economic logic for the development of these relationships. 
Of equal importance, there exists in India an overall favourable political and economic 
environment that will facilitate attaining agreement on collaborative S& T projects. On one 
side is the fact that S& T has always been accorded significance in the Indian context. For 
example, the government has supported the development of a large system of higher 
education (including universities, and technical colleges) capable of turning out 190,000 
S& T trained graduates annually while also operating a massive network of R&D 
laboratories, a number of which now operate at the frontiers of science in well supported 
and highly targeted research efforts. 
At quite another level, the Indian 'economy is not overwhelmed by economic crisis, as is the 
case with the other large market economies in the SAST project, Mexico and Brazil, whose 
governments will for some time be engaged in crisis management and be seriously 
constrained on the resource front. Of course, India has some very severe economic 
problems and faces considerable resource constraints but nowhere near the degree faced 
by these two countries. 
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Neither is there a contentious background of trade-related conflict with Europe in high 
technology areas as is the case with South Korea, Thailand and Brazil since the Indian 
government is not pursuing an export-oriented industrialization policy. High technology 
firms based in India (either local or foreign owned) do not now pose a serious competitive 
threat to European producers at home or in third markets. And while future competition 
is always a possibility, the focus of India's industrial efforts will for many years be primarily 
on the development of her domestic economy with her manufacturing firms inevitably being 
largely oriented towards meeting the needs of a home market consisting of nearly a billion 
people. 
Finally, and significantly, a strong willingness was expressed by senior policy makers during 
our interviews to take seriously the EC' s interest in collaboration and to further explore the 
possibilities of launching mutually beneficial S& T projects. This interest, and the fact that 
it was expressed openly and backed up by offers of immediate action (detailed below) 
represents a critical breakthrough in the Indian context. 
For such initiatives to move forward in India, they will have to have political backing both 
at the highest political level (i.e. from the Cabinet and Prime Minister) but more importantly 
among the senior bureacrats that compose the S& T policy making elite. This is because 
major collaborative S& T projects are intensely political issues in India that will inevitably stir 
up much critical comment in the press and therefore must be strongly supported by the 
government or they will be abandoned. Moreover because of the Indian government's 
direct participation in the S& T system any sizeable collaborative project will not only require 
the strong endorsement of the government but conceivably its direct participation as well. 
Page 4 - Sast Project 1 Report on India 
Strategic Review 
1.2. COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES WILL INFLUENCE THE DESIGN AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF S& T COLLABORATION PROJECTS WITH INDIA 
Despite these generally favourable background conditions, the way forward towards the 
design and implementation of substantive collaborative efforts will not be an easy one. 
Inevitably there exists a wide range of factors derived from Indian political and economic 
circumstances that must be taken account of by the Community in assessing realistically 
the specific prospects for collaboration and in devising a strategy for exploiting these. 
These are best understood in the Indian context as three sets of interlinked countervailing 
conditions that will impinge directly and indirectly upon the decision making process and 
in turn have implications for the Community's strategy for establishing S&T collaboration 
with India. 
1.2.1. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT 
UNDERPINNED BY A STABLE SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
The Janata Dal government unexpectedly elected in late 1989, after a quiet start, began 
to run into difficulties caused by its political makeup and the Hindu/Muslim religous divide 
that are eroding its authority and stability. These weaknesses arose mainly because the 
government was dependent for support upon both a fundamentalist right-wing religous 
party and parties of the left with both opposed to the previous government's liberal 
tendencies. 
Given the tempestuous and combustible nature of Indian politics, the Janata government's 
future was difficult to predict. When this report was being researched and the first draft 
prepared, there was great uncertainty as to whether that government could survive through 
the autumn and thus serve out its full term. In the event, the government fell to be 
replaced by an even more fragile government headed by Chandra Shekar. This government 
soon fell as well only to be replaced by a weak Congress party government whose future 
cannot be assured but who seems committed to picking up again the road to liberalization 
begun by previous Congress government." 
This uncertainty obviously poses some problems for the pursuit of Community S& T 
initiatives. However it is also the case that the Indian bureaucracy, as slow, cumbersome 
and obstructionist as it can be, is a powerful stabilizing force that has always ensured a 
certain degree of continuity in major programmes once they are agreed no matter what 
happens to the elected government. This is particularly true of the powerful S& T related 
ministries and departments since the development of India's S& T system has always 
enjoyed strong central government support at all levels. Consequently, even if the nnew 
government falls in the midst of negotiating with the Community, provided the process is 
secured by the backing of certain key senior S& T policy makers and advisers, such 
negotiations will go forward. 
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1.2.2. SHORT TERM ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
IMPRESSIVE INDUSTRIAL ADVANCE 
A number of problems are clouding the Indian economic picture in the short term. First, 
a fairly sizeable decline occured in industrial production in 1989 to 60 per cent of the 
previous year accompanied by significant overcapacity in some of the consumer durables 
sectors that had lead the earlier boom and by a 40 per cent fall in the rate of approval for 
foreign collaborations. Second a substantial fiscal deficit has developed approaching 4 per 
cent of GDP accompanied by an incipient balance of payments crisis which has seen 
reserves plummet to a level capable of sustaining less than two months worth of imports. 
This has lead recently to the imposition of austerity measures including a 1 5 per cent cut 
in imported components and raw materials and the reimposition of import controls on 32 
categories of non-essential equipment imports. 
Besides conceivably reinforcing the industrial slowdown reported above, these difficulties 
raise doubts about the prospects for any medium term projects with a high net import 
content as well as heightening criticisms of the pro-foreign investment and urban 
consumption-oriented policies followed by the previous Gandhi government that in turn 
places pressure on the present government not to go down the same path. 
Counterbalancing these slightly worrying short term trends is the underlying strength of the 
Indian industrial sector as demonstrated over the last ten years. During the latter part of 
the 1980s, industrial output expanded at nearly 9 per cent annually - over twice the pace 
of the previous twenty years. Manufactured exports grew 26 per cent annually between 
1987-1989 compared to just 1 per cent the previous decade, reaching a total of 
approximately $15 billion in 1988 of which the U.S. accounted for 19%, Japan 11 %, and 
the EC 24.7 per cent. They have maintained and even increased that level of performance 
recently recording a 33 per cent increase in the first four months of 1990 over the same 
period last year. 
Accompanying this improvement in output and exports, there was a 15 fold increase in the 
rate and scale of participation of foreign firms in local production through direct investment 
not only in traditional industries but in a number of high tech sectors such as electronics 
and fine chemicals. Within this there occured a significant deepening of the participation 
in India of firms from some European countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany 
- though Europe's overall share in this category of activity declined compared to that of the 
U.S. and Japan. 
While the above demonstrates that the confidence in India of foreign investors has grown 
significantly, there have been equally positive signs on the domestic front such as an order 
of magnitude increase over the last two years in the number of shareholders and in the 
amounts invested in domestic capital markets, substantive growth in aggregate private 
sector capital expenditure (by 34 per cent in 1989 over 1988), and a 55 per cent and 33 
per cent increase respectively over the same period in loan agreements and disbursements 
by development finance institutions. Indian industry still has a long way to go with regard 
to attaining the level of dynamism and competitiveness pressent in some of the other ADCs 
- but considerable progress has been made over the last decade. 
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1.2.3. THE PARTICULARLY INDIAN PROCESS OF "HASTENING 
SLOWLY" TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL LIBERALIZATION 
India's pursuit of development has always been beset by a fierce and deeply rooted conflict 
within and outside of the government over whether its priorities should focus on equity and 
the reduction of poverty or on the attainment of rapid industrialization via an open 
economy. Even today these issues permeate policy discussions at the highest level of 
decision-making due to the perceived excesses of the 1980s (by a consumption-oriented, 
urban middle class) and the resentment caused by the efforts of foreign actors (particularly 
the U.S. via Super 301 but also the EC) to influence Indian industrial trade and commercial 
policy. There is always the possibility that this antagonism could rebound against specific 
EC S& T initiatives. 
At the same time however, the moves toward liberalization which began in the 1970s but 
really started to bite in the mid-1980s during the Gandhi government, are deeply rooted in 
the convictions held by India's governing classes - both senior technocrats and advisors and 
the powerful economic elite - that India must now begin to move with reasonable dispatch 
toward greater openness in the industrial sphere. Thus the policy changes already made 
giving firms more freedom of action to enter and exit markets, favouring investment and 
exports and enhancing internal competitivenss are unlikely to be set aside. Indeed, much 
to the surprise of many observers it is now clear that the earlier Janata government 
intended to carry forward the process of greater liberalization further than was ever 
expected. 
This trend is demonstrated by the June 1990 announcement of a further easing of 
investment and technology imports restrictions removing an estimated 75 per cent of these 
deals from government control (moves that were heartily endorsed by the U.S. government 
and lead to the recent suspension of the 301 threat). Another example is that liberalization 
on the trade front (such as the proposed 30 per cent across the board reductions in tariffs) 
were being accompanied by moves towards greater openness within the domestic economy 
such as opening up further the steel and plastics sector to private investment and allowing 
state-owned firms to raise equity funds and assume 1 00 per cent autonomy. Despite the 
need to temporarily put the brakes ori imports in order to save foreign exchange, it looks 
likely the process will go further (despite the change in administration) - as is indicted by 
our interview findings that the government was looking closely at such treasured policies 
as the 40 per cent limit on foreign equity and continued state ownership of some 248 
production-oriented enterprises. 
In India, where commitments to self-reliance and determination to avoid the excesses of 
capitalism and TNCs are so deeply felt, such policies are bound to generate storms of 
protest from within and outside of the government. Because of this the pace of change 
will be deliberate and measured. The new government's room for radical change is clearly 
constrained by the antagonisms towards liberalization of its minority supporters - the 
protectionist left and the rural based right wing parties. In addition, our interviews showed 
clearly that despite their liberal leanings, government planners are deeply fearful of the 
catastrophic and destabilizing effects on the poor of a radical and wrenching shift towards 
an open economy such as they claim to be now witnessing in the case of Mexico and 
Brazil. 
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1.3. THE EMERGENCE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NEW WAVE OF 
EUROPEAN-INDIAN TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIAL 
COLLABORATIONS 
The largely positive assessment of trends in macro industrial performance and industrial 
policy given above suggests that a highly favourable climate may be emerging for the 
establishment of a greater European industrial involvement in India. Much of this can be 
traced to a change in the opinions and perceptions of national and foreign industrialists 
towards India as a "place to do business". The more open and competitive environment 
in local markets has lead to an increased awareness on the part of domestic industrialists 
of the need to upgrade quality and improve productivity (leading to an unexpected 
improvement in total factor productivity of 4.2 per cent during 1987-89 aher two decades 
of literal stagnation) coupled with greater demand for state-of-the-art imported and 
domestic technology (as opposed to repeated imports of current vintages) and a significant 
increase in R&D investment by the private sector. 
At the same time, even the relatively modest loosening of controls on foreign investment 
(with comparison to other advanced developing countries) lead to veritable avalanche of 
interest on the part of foreign investors in increasing their capital stake in India. True, the 
absolute levels of investment are much lower ($250 million in DFI) in India compared to 
$750 million to $1 .5 billion in Thailand and China in 1988. Nevertheless, the rush of 
foreign firms to establish facilities or expand their capacity during 1 985-1989 is a powerful 
indicator of the potential of the Indian economy to attract much greater levels of foreign 
investment in the future - provided, and this is very crucial in the Indian context, that the 
efforts of foreigners to establish an Indian presence are guided by a strategy based on a 
close reading not only of the operating conditions in India but of the politics and methods 
of doing business in India. 
Our interviews highlighted some of these factors while also identifying a number of micro 
level developments that could conceivably define the focus for some of these activities and 
that indicate parallel activities by other international actors that need to be monitored 
carefully. 
1.3.1. NEW AND OLD NODAL POINTS FOR TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE 
INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 
Indian industry has historically been the focus for much criticism on the grounds of its 
(protection-induced) inefficiency, poor quality and small scale. Not surprisingly, there was 
no shortage of such criticisms in our interviews and large parts of the industrial sector were 
dismissed for having mercantilist attitudes and a "kit culture" mentality towards 
manufacturing while also being totally uninterested in technological development as 
indicated by the derisory amounts invested in R&D (around 0. 7 per cent of sales on 
average} and the high percentages of reimports of same vintage technology. 
While the political objectives have considerable merit, the costs of India's defensive 
industrial policies in terms of low productivity, inefficienct use of resources, limited 
international competitiveness, fragmented industrial structures and technolgoical 
dependence have been very significant. Of this there can be no doubt. However, there is 
also no escaping the evidence that in the wake of moves toward liberalization, the Indian 
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industrial landscape is beginning to show evidence of the growth of significant flowerings 
of industrial and technological dynamism. Many of these exhibit the classic characteristics 
of the new type of small, flexible, technology-intensive industrial and service ventures that 
now flourish in the advanced countries. Well-managed Indian venture capital funds (which 
are a new feature of an already lively capital market) have already supported more than 
100 small, high tech start-ups led by young scientist-entrepreneurs. 
Most of these are performing well and promising above average returns while another 
300-400 such projects are already in the pipeline; 4 science parks/cities are now 
well-established (with good support infrastructure and on-site training and testing facilities) 
and are proving to be a successful breeding ground for entrepreneurial firms (foreign and 
domestic) seeking to exploit India's low cost high skilled manpower base; the more open 
atmosphere created by the initial round of reforms in the mid-1 980s stimulated the 
emergence of a large and visible number of service sector entrepreneurs who have built up 
large and highly successful activities by tapping into India's vastly unexploited service 
market; while the recent easing of industrial controls is widely expected to lead to another 
burst of small firm start-ups by entrepreneurs who under the old system were not able to 
wrangle a license. 
These glimmerings of an industrial renaissance are not restricted to small, start-up firms but 
encompass a number of the old style industrial enterprises in the private and public sector 
whom many observers had written off as dinosaurs doomed for extinction. For example, 
India boasts a number of integrated technology intensive public sector enterprises (in 
sectors as diverse as computers and electronics to railways and bridge building) who have 
over the last decade been allowed to act increasingly as private sector enterprises, 
competing for contracts at home and abroad. In the process, they have developed an 
impressive range of management and technical competencies that suggest they may be 
suitable partners for EC S& T projects that incorporate European firms and involve both R&D 
and production. 
Similarly, some of the large industrial houses have been stirred out of their lethargy to enter 
new dynamic sectors such as IT and services as well as forming strategic development, 
production and marketing partnerships with foreign firms seeking to penetrate Indian and 
third country markets on the basis of the advantages conferred by scale economies. 
Moreover, many of the long established Indian industrial firms (domestic and foreign), 
particularly in the engineering sector, have begun to embrace the tenets of Japanese 
approaches to quality, management and production. Some of these efforts have registered 
surprisingly good results taken note of by other firms - a demonstration process that could 
soon lead Indian industry into the same frenzied adoption of these practices that is currently 
transforming industry and comeptition in Europe and the U.S. 
Finally, a large variety of Indian firms again in the engineering sector (broadly defined) but 
also in more traditional sectors (from garments to perfumes) have begun to establish a wide 
array of export-oriented technology and production linkups with foreign firms. These 
involve the use of low cost but relatively high-skilled manufacturing labour (combined with 
a significant advacned engineering input) to produce products/components for export on 
a subcontracting basis and to third countries - such a development indicates that Indian 
producers are gaining the reputation for export quality and reliability that has always eluded 
them in the past. Recently some of these firms have begun to transform their dependent 
link with foreign firms into an independent relationship where the benefits of collaboration 
flow in both directions. 
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It is possible to dismiss these developments as "exotic" exceptions sustained by the 
hothouse conditions of the 1980s consumer lead boom that won't survive into the 1990s 
with the economy under the tutelage of a left-leaning agriculturally oriented, minority 
government. However, we believe these features can also be interpreted as signposts 
indicating both the future direction and character of a slowly transforming Indian industrial 
sector and flagging areas where European industry could use Community sponsored 
collaborative projects to cultivate a privileged presence in the more dynamic sectors of the 
Indian economy. Much more needs to be done on the Indian side to further enhance these 
developments through loosening of restrictive policies - the Community can play a valuable 
role here. 
1.3.2. U.S. AND JAPANESE FIRMS BEGIN TO INCREASE THEIR LEVELS 
OF ACTIVITY WITH SUPPORT FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Unlike the Asian NICs and second tier countries, India has never been a battleground in the 
global competitive war between Europe, Japan and the U.S. This is still the case. 
Recently, however there are signs that Japanese and the U.S. firms have begun to 
increase the tempo of their involvement while Europe, with the exception of West Germany 
has been flagging a bit. For example, the rate of both U.S. and Japanese DFI and 
collaborations increased markedly during the 1 985-89 period while the European share 
declined - a pattern also reflected in the trading arena in technology intensive sectors such 
as non-electricial and electrical machinery. 
In both cases, the public sector has supported these efforts, directly and indirectly through 
a variety of measures. For example, in the case of the U.S. despite a recent chilling of 
offical relations over differences in the treatment of IPR, the U.S. government through 
various agencies has funded an average of 200 or more co-operative S& T programmes with 
some industrial content every year since 1985 while also providing more than $50 million 
over that period to support high tech joint ventures between Indian and and U.S. firms. 
With a total trade of more than $5 billion including a substantial share of India's high 
technology imports and software exports, the U.S. effort, which has also recently begun 
to include well supported trade missions, is broad based and generally successful. 
Japan on the other hand has been a relatively late starter in the cultivation of India, with 
Japanese industry being heavily deterred prior to the mid 1980s by India's poor reputation 
for industrial quality and discipline. However in the last few years, India has been 
particularly eager to attract Japanese investors while Japanese firms have begun to 
respond positively - albeit largely on an experimental basis and much more focussed (on 
motor vehicles and electronics) than in the case of Europe or the U.S. 
The best known response has involved the twenty or so joint ventures and collaborative 
agreements that were launched at Indian government invitation in the motor vehicle and 
components sectors in the mid-1 980s including the famed Suzuki-Maruti initiative. The 
excellent productivity and quality performance of these joint ventures and the willingness 
of Japanese partners to reduce import content and expand exports looks likely to open the 
doors to further Japanese involvement. 
To that end, the government has established a "fast-track" approval process to expedite 
approvals of Indo-Japanese projects (a facility previously only open to West Germany). 
Indications are that approval willl soon be given to three major new initiatives - a Rs 1 
billion expansion of the Suzuki-Maruti car project (it will involve making 30,000 units a year 
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of a 1000 cc passenger car by 1991 in addition to the present 800 cc model); 
modernisation of the state owned liSCO steel plant which the Japanese will be allowed to 
carry out on a turnkey basis; and a series of joint venture/export oriented projects to make 
video cassette recorders in India. In addition there are expectations that a five year 
agreement signed in 1985 to bring Japanese electronics technology to India will be 
renewed in the near future as well. 
Interestingly, there are also signs of Japan and India being drawn closer together on the 
financial front with perhaps two thirds of India's commercial borrowings (much of it for the 
funding of major infrastructural projects) coming from Japan on very favourable and 
innovative terms. In addition, Japan is also seen as the main target for a second India Fund 
launched by Unit Trust of India following the 1986 U.S. fund organised in collaboration 
with Merrill and Lynch. 
While these steps can be seen from the Indian point of view as being part of a general 
strategy to tap Japanese savings surpluses, the experience of other Asian countries 
suggests that where Japanese concessionary financing goes first, Japanese DFI comes later 
in much greater amounts. The possibility that the growing financial links between India and 
Japan could be precursor to the same situation is reinforced by the vigourous lobbying 
efforts of the Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu during his recent trip to India when he argued 
that India should be prepared to accept greater flows of both technical assistance and 
Japanese DFI. This perhaps explains our finding that Japanesse development agencies 
have very eagerly responded to Indian requests for seminars and training projects 
concerned with introducing Indian managers and engineers to Japanese management 
practices. 
The Japanese, like the Americans and Europeans before them, have become adept at 
linking government funded technical assistance with the promotion of private sector 
interests particularly in Asia. It may be that this same strategy is slowly being deployed 
in India. If so these developments need to be watched closely lest European firms wake 
up one day in the not too distant future to find themselves struggling to make inroads into 
rapidly growing Indian markets for products and technology already dominated by the 
Japanese. 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 11 
Strategic Review 
1.4. THE FORMAL R&D SYSTEM IN INDIA: IDENTIFYING THE 
POCKETS OF EXCELLENCE AMIDST WIDESPREAD MEDIOCRITY 
The Indian public sector S& T system is a massive and complex enterprise. On the 
educational side, there now exists a university and college based system of higher 
education that consists of 157 universities and 5500 colleges. These institutions annually 
turn out an additional 190,000 or so trained personnel (3500 with S&T Ph.Ds) to add to 
the country's existing stock of S& T manpower of nearly 3 million people. Out of this stock 
of trained people, an estimated 275,000 are engaged in productive employment utilizing 
their skills, and 90,000 work directly in R&D activities - the eighth largest number of R&D 
staff in the world. 
When speaking about R&D in India, one must inevitably deal principally with government 
supported R&D. In 1988, the Indian government invested approximately $2 billions in state 
supported R&D activities. This accounts for nearly 90 per cent of all R&D expenditure in 
the economy and is equivalent to approximately 1.2 per cent of GNP and the level of 
expenditure has increased at 1 2 per cent annually since Independence. This level of 
support is second only to South Korea among developing countries and while falling far 
short of developed country R&D expenditure it is indicative of the measure of backing that 
the government has consistently been prepared to give to S& T activities. 
The allocation of national resources to S& T activities has a formal and informal dimension. 
Formally, S&T and R&D expenditure is decided by the Planning Commission at the 
beginning of each plan period on the basis of submissions and negotiations by the major 
S& T agencies and the relevant socio-econmic ministries (health, agriculture, energy, 
industry, etc). Informally, there is a powerful group of elite civil servants, eminent 
scientists and industrialists and advisors to the government who combine together in 
different configurations depending on the circumstances and who are capable of pushing 
through agreement on and funding of ad hoc S& T programmes of some considerable 
significance. 
The policy making and operational structure is very complex with the power and influence 
of different ministries, departments and commissions with S& T interests often ebbing and 
flowing depending on the issues, the political power of the minister or secretary, and the 
complexion of the government. Formally and still in practice, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology is the most important nodal point from the EC perspective and it encompasses 
two departments who play a particularly crucial role in directing the S& T system - the 
Department of Science and Technology, which is the premierS& T policy making body and 
the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, which is the focal institution for 
government efforts to stimulate innovation in industry and is also responsible for the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) whose forty laboratories constitute the 
core group of industry-oriented R&D centres in India 
There are numerous other agencies and departments whose activities have a strong S& T 
component and who play very important roles in policy making and R&D resource allocation 
within their particular sphere of interest. Among the most significant of these are the three 
defence related departments (the Defence Research and Development Organization and the 
Departments of Atomic Energy and Space) as well as the departments of biotechnology, 
electronics, environment, non-conventional energy and ocean development. 
All of the above operate their own networks of R&D laboratories as do the socio-econmic 
ministries and the state governments. In total, the Indian central government, through all 
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its ministries and departments probably supports 1 000 R&D labs with the state 
governments supporting another 300 - though these are almost all oriented towards 
agriculture R&D. 
The range of activities, strengths and weaknesses of an S& T system of this scale obviously 
cannot be easily summarized. However, our interview findings indicated that the following 
dimensions of the public sector S& T situation in India are particularly important from the 
perspective of this project. 
1.4.1. A SUBSTANTIAL INDUSTRIAL R&D SYSTEM SUFFERING FROM 
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES 
Despite the size and scope of the public sector R&D system, and the continual support of 
the Indian government to the development of Indian science, there is a widespread 
consensus outside of the S& T community that, with some very important exceptions 
discussed below, the R&D system has failed to play a major role in the country's drive for 
self-sufficient industrialization. The evidence is strong for this view. CSIR and many of its 
associated labs have had relatively limited success in developing and transferring useful and 
commercially viable technologies to Indian industry. The R&D and technology development 
efforts of the leading S& T agencies, particularly in defense areas, have failed to deliver on 
many of the objectives they set out to achieve. 
And underlying all of this is a distorted S& T educational system where effort has been 
concentrated on building up truly impressive centers of excellence in teaching and R&D 
(such as the seven urban universities, the five Indian Institutes of Technology and the 
Indian Institute of Science) at the expense of adequate investment and support for the large 
rump of inferior universities and colleges scattered throughout the country where the 
education and research on offer are of dubious quality. 
There have been numerous examinations of these problems and numerous attempts to 
increase the industrial relevance of the R&D carried out by the public sector - the latest of 
which involves requiring CSIR labs to generate a fixed percentage of their income from 
external, contractual, sources. There are signs of change and improvement in the direction 
of greater relevance within the R&D system. However, considerable pessimism was 
expressed in some of our interviews that the marginal tinkering usually propose~ as a 
solution to its problems will never produce the sort of fundamental overhaul in attitudes and 
and behaviour (from within the R&D community and on the part of industry) needed to 
create a dynamic, R&D system that is integrated with and driven by the short and long 
term needs of industry. 
Clearly, this situation remains one of considerable concern for Indian science policy and for 
the government. However, an assessment of the implications for SAST concerns of the 
parlous condition of the Indian industrial R&D system needs to be balanced by the 
additional evidence and insight generated by our interviews into the considerable but very 
specific strengths of the Indian R&D system. 
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1.4.2. POCKETS OF UNEXPLOITED EXCELLENCE OFFERING 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATIVE R&D IN BASIC SCIENCE 
AND APPLIED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
While the gloomy assessment noted above largely originates from observers and analysts 
operating outside the formal S&T system, not surprisingly, those inside the system have 
a very different view and were able to provide equally convincing evidence of areas and 
fields where Indian basic and applied science was on par with any in the world. Apart from 
its impressive and well known capabilities in non-conventional energy, physics and space 
research, software and biotechnology (as noted below) India has, for example, world class 
credentials in natural resource assessment involving ground and air observation and 
extending to highly sophisticated satellite-based remote sensing, pattern recognition and 
imagery construction. 
Another example of Indian R&D competencies can be found in the field of oceanography 
research where both its research vesssels and its oceanography research institutions are 
at the forefront of international research techniques and findings and these have lead to 
numerous international collaborations with West Germany, the U.S. and other countries. 
There are also fields where Indian labs have demonstrated that their work and skills are not 
only industrially relevant but internationally competitive. For example, the wind testing and 
model building capabilities at the National Aeronautical Laboratory as well as its instrument 
fabrication skills have allowed it to win a number of internationally tendered contract in 
these areas. The National Chemical Laboratory has recently made major breakthroughs in 
catalyst technology that have lead to joint ventures and lucrative licensing agreements· with 
international firms. 
To be truly complete, a cataloguing of India's strengths in applied R&D and technology 
development would have to include the many technologies successfully developed and 
adapted by the R&D system but not adequately or properly commercialized by labs 
themselves nor picked up on by Indian or international industry. There are, however, far 
too many to even list here. And beyond these accomplishments in applied R&D, we need 
hardly identify those areas of pure and theoretical science (such as astrophysics and 
particle physics; pure and applied mathematics; surface studies and fast kinetics; and even 
superconductivity) where India has a global reputation. 
This broad spread of Indian science capabilities is further attested to by its standing in the 
international science publishing sweepstakes. Recent reviews in Scientometrics (volume 
16, 1989) rank India in 8th place among all countries in terms of published papers; they 
also demonstrate that there is hardly any major field of science where Indian scientists do 
not publish in significant numbers and that Indian science capabilities are clustered in 
research fields where other developing country scientists are hardly represented such as 
biochemistry, physics, chemistry and chemical physics. 
The above discussion provides ample confirmation (not really required by those scientists 
who know the Indian science scene) of the (selective) strengths of Indian science. There 
can be little doubt that these capabilities are wider and deeper than in any of the other 
SAST countries. With formal S& T international collaborative agreements with more than 
40 countries and many hundreds more individual collaborative projects, it is clear that the 
competence of Indian science is recognized in Europe and elsewhere. 
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However, our interviews did generate indications that there were many more prospects for 
R&D collaboration than are currently being explored, that these could be of a form and 
focus likely to be of much greater substance and significance than those currently 
underway and that the EC could possibly help to unlock these possibilities - provided, that 
is, that the steps taken to do this do not run foul of the myriad array of bureaucratic 
obstacles and deeprooted sensitivities towards international collaboration that already exist 
within India. This is an issue we come back to below and in the rest of the paper. 
1.4.3. THE INDIAN CAPABILITY OF CHANNELING R&D RESOURCES 
INTO TARGETED AREAS 
One of the great strengths of the Indian S& T planning system and its combination of formal 
and informal decision-making and resource allocation mechanisms is that it is capable of 
fairly quickly channeling significant resources towards fields or problem areas deemed to 
be of national importance. This has most recently been done via the identification of what 
are called "thrust areas" for R&D, product development and skill creation in fields such as 
fusion research, new materials, parallel computing and digital switching. A good example 
of this approach at work can be seen in the efforts of the Indian government to create 
substantial national capabilities in the field of biotechnology. 
On the basis of recommendations of an independent advisory board, a variety of actions 
have been taken since 1985 that have greatly accelerated India's movement towards the 
forefront of biotechnology R&D. The most important of these was the creation of a 
separate Department of Biotechnology with independent funding, policy making and 
co-ordination responsibilities and a mandate to focus on three main sets of activities: 
(i) directing and supporting national R&D projects focussed on 9 separate basic 
research topics and a number of "mission mode" projects involving applied R&D; 
(ii) manpower creation via the provision of financial and technical support for "model" 
systems of world class post-graduate and post-doctoral teaching in 20 selected 
universities and institutions; and 
(iii) infrastructure creation that involved the provision of financial support to existing 
institutions to upgrade their research facilities to world class standards; while at the 
same time creating entirely new institutions with specific research and training 
mandates. 
In addition to the activities of the DBT, both the DST and the CSIR, increased 
substantively their allocation of resources to biotechnology R&D projects and to 
strengthening institutions carrying out biotechnology related research. For example, the 
CSIR increased resources going to the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology and it is 
now recognized as one of the best equipped biotechnology laboratories in the world, 
staffed by 150 Ph. D. researchers distributed into eleven multidisciplinary groups. 
Similarly, the ICMR established the the National lnsitute of Immunology which in a few 
short years of work has generated commercially significant breakthroughs in a number of 
areas such as embryobiotechnology, the production of vaccines for controlling human and 
animal fertility, diagnostic kits for amoebic liver abcess, brucellosis, and typhoid, and a DNA 
probe for M. tuberculosis. 
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It is still relatively early days and there is much to be done particularly compared to the 
scale of India's needs and problems where biotechnology will have an impact. But as a 
result of the focussed efforts of the government, India has begun to generate skilled 
manpower resources on a substantial scale; is close to world standards in several specific 
fields; and is gradually laying down an impressive research infrastructure. 
This example not only highlights biotechnology as a possible area of EC collaboration but 
also indicates the capacity of the Indian government to respond substantively to calls for 
targeted R&D and other activities provided it is convinced of the national value of taking 
such actions. 
1.4.4. A DEEPROOTED COMMITTMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INDIGENOUS S&T CAPABILITIES IN INDIA THAT MUST BE 
RESPECTED 
A critical dimension of the Indian science policy scene is the strong nationalist sentiments 
of the science establishment and of the elite group of advisors and policy makers who 
direct the Indian S& T enterprise. While accepting India's S& T weaknesses - particularly 
when compared to developed country performance, this group is fiercely proud of what 
India has accomplished in S& T and they remain genuinely committed to the ideal of Indian 
self-reliance. They do not blindly embrace autarchy but accept the costs associated with 
the long struggle to build an independent scientific and technological competence free of 
what they see as a debilitating and humiliating dependence on foreign sources of 
knowledge and technology. 
What came across clearly in the interviews is that, rightly or wrongly, these perceptions 
directly influence policy decisions at the highest levels of government vis a whole range of 
S& T related issues - from the choice of sectors that should be opened to DFI and the 
participation of private capital to whether or not to respond positively to EC proposals for 
international S& T collaboration based on "mutual benefit". 
These beliefs explain Indian sensitivities and intransigence over such issues as intellectual 
property rights where the pressure placed upon India to modify its position in bilateral and 
multilateral forums by the U.S. and the Community was, and still is, deeply resented; or 
even more specifically why the Indian government is sharply critical of the blatant efforts 
by TNCs from the U.S. and Europe to hire away India's most skilled S& T personnel so that 
they are lost to the country forever. They also underlie why India appears to be moving 
relatively slowly towards liberalization in the industrial sphere. 
The Indian science policy elite wears its national pride boldly and, in our opinion, with 
considerable justification given the positive effect of Indian S& T accomplishments on the 
national character. Such attitudes go to the heart of the nation's strong sense of 
self-esteem and identity. For that reason alone they should be respected. However, and 
more than that, these perceptions must be taken careful account of in the development of 
any strategy to foster S&T collaboration between the EC and India. 
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1.5. SOME CAUTIONARY VIEWPOINTS ON THE VALUE AND 
FEASIBILITY OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL S& T COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND INDIA 
Two of the major objectives of the SAST project were to explore in practical terms the 
degree and nature of interest in India among leading policy makers, industrialists and 
scientists in pursuing mutually beneficial S& T collaboration with the EC; and to identify the 
areas or fields where such collaboration might take place and the modalities that might be 
followed. Unquestionably there was a favouable reaction overall among those interviewed 
to the prospects of greater collaboration and a number of useful ideas and proposals were 
put forward as to the areas where this might take place and the possible mechanisms for 
achieving such collaboration. 
However before discussing these in the next section, we want to highlight briefly some of 
the more critical viewpoints and qualifications put forward regarding the issue of 
collaboration during the interviews and uncovered in the course of our research. We felt 
it might be useful to summarize these views both because coming as they do from senior 
figures in the S& T community, they need to be taken seriously and also because they 
actually provide to the Community insights as to how it might proceed in India that are as 
valuable (if not more so) than the more positive responses recorded in the next section. 
The cautionary observations put forward with any consistency across the interviewees fall 
into both a general category regarding the problems of international S& T and industrial 
collaboration and a more specific subset of concerns relating to EC and European 
involvement in such collaborations. They can be encapsulated into the following five 
points. 
1.5.1. INTERNATIONAL S&T COLLABORATIONS HAVE BEEN LESS THAN 
SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF A LACK OF COMMITTMENT TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL BENEFIT 
India currently participates in 40 or so international collaborative agreements which involve 
hundreds of different activities, most of which center on exchange of scientists, travel 
visits, seminars, etc. Quite a few of these agreements, and certainly those with the leading 
S& T countries emphasize mutual benefit as a criteria for project selection. 
While this seems to represent a significant Indian committment, the net effect of this 
considerable experience with international S& T collaboration is that the Indian government, 
in sharp contrast to China, does not look to such collaborations as a main element in its 
domestic S&T programme. The existence of agreements is seen as a necessary part of 
normal political relations between states. And to certain parts of the science community, 
such agreements are very useful as additional sources of knowledge, contacts and 
resources for R&D and training in non-contentious areas. 
They are, however, considered by senior policy makers to be of little strategic interest - in 
the developmental rather than the defense-related meaning of the word. They therefore 
do not attract either the resources or political attention of the more mainstream S& T 
initiatives discusssed above such as the technology missions or the implementation of the 
mission mode R&D programmes. 
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Perhaps underpining this view, considerable scepticism was voiced about the real gains 
likely to flow to India from its participation in "mutually beneficial" collaborative schemes. 
Past experience suggested that the initiative for establishing mutually beneficial S& T 
collaboration almost always came from the side of the developed country and that the 
meaning of mutual benefit was almost always defined according to the perceptions of the 
developed country - rather than emerging out of a joint consideration of what it meant in 
principle and more importantly in practice. 
This problem is illustrated by the recent rejection by two European countries (with whom 
India has bilateral agreements) of Indian requests for joint R&D projects in fields that the 
countries felt "were not really open to co-operation despite previous committments that 
they were". While it was accepted that excluding certain areas from R&D co-operation 
was legitimate, the original principles of mutual benefit on which the agreements were 
signed were clearly not being adhered to. 
Moreover it was felt that mutual benefit was retained as a guiding principle often only as 
long as it suited the wider political interests of the developed country partner. This is what 
happened recently when severe restrictions were placed on the scope of projects 
undertaken within the the U.S. STI framework after India and the U.S. clashed over issues 
of IPR and the U.S. threatened widespread retailiation under Super 301. The sensitivities 
of the Indian S& T community have been deeply aroused by this experience. 
From the Indian perspective, both sorts of situation have inevitably lead to a one-way flow 
of the benefits away from India. The U.S. STI initiative is now very much viewed in this 
light. Expectations were voiced that recent EC proposals for India to collaborate on R&D 
in certain areas of tropical agriculture, health and weather forecasting would lead in the 
same direction. India has the expertise in these fields which it would be pleased to share 
- but the way the projects were proposed made it clear they were primarily designed to 
contribute to the strengthening of EC commercial capabilities while using India as a testing 
ground. 
Thus in the perception of some, there were question marks over the committment of the 
Community to go beyond the statement of platitudes about developing projects of genuine 
mutual benefit doubts and its ability to actually deliver. A few doubted that the problems 
would be overcome. Others were prepared to give the Community the benefit of the doubt 
and were willing to examine the actual actions taken for evidence of its true intentions. 
1.5.2. AVOID A DIRECT CONFRONTATION OVER MATTERS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PERCEIVED BIASES IN 
INDIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
The question of India's position on intellectual property rights is extremely sensitive at the 
present time. This is because the Indian government has just gone through a tense period 
waiting to see whether U.S. threats to impose unilateral trade sanctions because of this 
issue would be carried out. This has not happened for the moment, partly so the U.S. 
claims, because it was mollified by the recent changes announced in India's industrial policy 
and partly because it wants to see the outcome of current multilateral negotiations on the 
issue. The indian government denies it was responding to any such pressures but 
nevertheless is under very considerable pressure from all sides not to be seen to succumb 
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to what it considers is totally unwarranted and unjustifiable outside interference on either 
IPR or industrial and trade policy more generally. 
As with India's defensive industrial policies, the economic costs of its restrictive approach 
to IPR now far outweigh any benefits gained. Technological dependence and its related 
effects is increased not decreased by overly restrictive IPR policies. However this is an 
issue of politics and not economics and the Indian perspective differs strongly on this from 
our own and that of the Community. Vis a vis EC concerns on this front, our interview 
findings suggest that any attempt to visibly link progress on IPR and other similar issues 
directly with agreement on any major proposals for S& T collaboration could be a major 
tactical error. 
If there is pressure within the EC to engage India over this issue, then more might be 
accomplished at a "sub rosa" level via quiet diplomacy. It needs to be remembered that 
it is very rare for major policy shifts to be denoted in India by the passage of legislation. 
There have for example only been three major pieces of legislation regarding foreign 
investment and technology transfer since Independence. Yet since that time, real 
government policy, as opposed to its publicly stated position, has varied enormously 
depending on circumstances and the mix of pressures confronting the government of the 
moment. It is an understanding of this very "Indian" process of policy making and 
implementation that should guide EC strategy on this issue rather than the politics of 
confrontation favoured by the U.S. 
1.5.3. EC PROJECTS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO OPEN UP INDIAN 
CONSUMER GOODS SECTOR TO EUROPEAN DFI NOR CREATE A 
CONDUIT FOR EXTRACTING INDIAN S& T MANPOWER 
Though there were good prospects perceived by some for the promotion of industrial 
collaboration with a high S& T component, strong words of warning were directed against 
the "choice" of sectors where the EC might seek to facilitate the setting up of such 
collaborative projects. The basic message was that there was little chance that either 
straightforward DFI projects or EC sponsored S& T collaborative proposals would go forward 
if they were aimed at the urban consumer goods sectors on which so much foreign interest 
was presently concentrated. Foreign firms would not be allowed to cream off the higher 
value added segments of the market for luxury consumer items. The consumer-oriented 
excesses of the last administration when a deliberate policy of promoting urban 
consumption and DFI in this sector would not be repeated. 
In a similar vein, it was made clear that though there were prospects for EC-India 
collaboration that took advantage of India's surplus manpower, these proposals should 
steer away from collaborative mechanisms set up primarily to permanently siphon off to 
Europe trained Indian S& T manpower in order to overcome European skill constraints. This 
had already been blatantly attempted by some countries and similar proposals from the EC 
would not be favourably received. 
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1.5.4. THE MISMATCH IN CORPORATE CULTURES AND WEAK INDIAN 
R&D CAPABILITIES WOULD DOOM MOST COLLABORATIVE 
EFFORTS 
There was also a view expressed that the weakness of Indian industrial R&D capabilities 
and the general mismatch in corporate cultures would not be conducive at all to the 
successful establishment of major new R&D collaborations between private sector firms 
under the rubric of Community sponsored projects. 
The rationale behind this position was that if S& T collaboration was going to lead to 
genuine mutual benefit then this had to come from the commercial application of the 
knowledge generated. For this to happen it was felt that there had to be much greater 
corporate synergy between Europe and India, particularly on the R&D front, then there is 
today. India's corporate R&D sector was very weak and offered no advantages to Europe; 
while European firms, primarily interested in penetrating India's domestic markets with 
unchanged products, had shown very little interest in starting local R&D activities. 
Under current conditions, there did not appear to these observers to be any real prospects 
of closing this gap in perceptions and expectations. Considerable doubts were voiced by 
a few interviewees as to whether the Community was really in a position to foster or 
facilitate the development of closer corporate R&D synergies between Europe and India. 
It was felt in some quarters that the pursuit of this objective was best left entirely to 
private actors. 
1.5.5. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EC AND INDIAN BUREAUCRACIES 
WOULD LOWER SUBSTANTIALLY THE PROSPECTS FOR 
ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION 
Serious disquiet was voiced over the possibilitiy of any successful projects arising out of 
attempts by the EC and Indian bureacracies to establish new programmes of S& T 
collaboration. From inside the Indian government came expressions of unhappiness over 
the unwieldiness and relative ineffectiveness of the joint commission mechanism for 
generating truly useful S& T projects. In the case of the EC-India joint commission, 
insufficient political importance was attached to the S& T component and so inadequate 
funds were allocated and little effort was made by the Indian side to advance projects 
quickly. 
In parallel there was a negative perception of the degree of interest on the part of the 
Community officials to promote genuine collaboration - though the aid aspect of the 
relationship worked reasonably well and the importance of trying to cope with commercial 
relations within the joint commission mechanism was given a high priority. Negotiations 
with multilateral agencies over technical assistance projects were viewed as being much 
more tortuous and time consuming than those with bilateral agencies - the experience with 
the EC to date had confirmed those perceptions. 
From outside the government, the shortcomings of the Indian bureaucracy were widely 
acknowledged. And, we should stress, these criticisms are echoed with considerable 
legitmacy from within the European Commission as well. Moreover, doubt was expressed 
at the ability of either the Indian or the EC bureaucracy to provide the flexible adminsitrative 
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framework necessary to facilitate the sort of innovative co-operative S& T projects 
envisioned by SAST. Considerable evidence was provided (not solely related to the EC but 
also to member state and Indian bureaucracies) of unnecessary delays caused to project 
implementation due to bureaucratic obstructions and procedural delays. This was viewed 
as inevitable if bureaucracies were involved and not specific to the Community. 
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1.6. DIVERGENT BUT WIDE-RANGING PROPOSALS FOR S&T AND 
INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND 
INDIA 
Within the generally positive response among most interviewees towards the prospects of 
greater S&T collaboration with the Community, two strands of opinion emerged and need 
to be noted. The first, emanating mainly from the more senior policy makers was that 
while it was certainly possible to identify general areas where collaboration might occur and 
the modalities it might take, it was far too early to be thinking in such specifics. 
Existing linkages with the EC were felt to be too limited to be built upon as yet since the 
Community is simply not a major player either in the field of industrial or S& T relations. 
Also they felt that there were a variety of questions and confusions that needed to be 
addressed first before proceeding to specifics. It was necessary to do this not primarily to 
resolve outstanding differences between the two sides, but rather because interchange 
over these issues· would be a means of building up confidence between the two sides. 
One set of general concerns that could be addressed in this way were anxieties over the 
implications of 1992 and the developments in Eastern Europe for Community policies and 
relations with India. Questions were raised about the impact of these developments on 
EC-India aid flows, about market access for Indian products to "Fortress Europe" and about 
the possible negative effects on the level of future investments by European companies in 
India caused by a diversion of their attention to Eastern Europe. 
At a level relating specifically to the issue of S& T collaborations there was a degree of 
caution with regards to the Community's underlying objectives in pursuing this initiative. 
This is where concerns were raised about the Community's interpretation of "mutual 
benefit" and the range of areas and activities where it was prepared to collaborate. Finally 
there were also fears that accesss to European big science projects and EC labs would be 
made even more difficult because of the pressure to allow in scientists from Eastern 
Europe. 
These concerns did not diminish this group's interest in collaboratioh. But it was felt that 
at this stage, it was far more important to concentrate on the process of building 
confidence and understanding between the Community and India rather than specifying 
individual projects. This process had begun with the round of consultations undertaken in 
the course of the SAST project but had to go much further. The implications for action 
raised by this group are reflected in more detail in the strategy discussion in Part I. 7. 
The industrialists and senior scientists consulted exhibited a much greater willingness to 
engage in concrete discussion about the specific areas for collaboration and the forms it 
might take. There was some caution in this group that it might be best to begin with 
collaborative efforts in non-controversial fields such as "pure" science, health and the 
environment. However, most saw ample opportunites for beneficial R&D collaboration in 
a wide range of fields - often linked into commercial production activities. 
Our fieldwork in India also generated recommendations and insights of a more general 
nature concerned with the identification of projects and possible collaborating actors and 
agencies within India. Below we present a selection of both general and specific proposals 
for collaboration that could be both expanded and more fully developed if necessary. 
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1.6.1. CAREFUL TARGETING OF PROJECT DESIGN IS REQUIRED 
Maintaining political support for such projects is critical in India and must be done carefully. 
Thus the projects developed need to be targeted in one of two directions. The first is to 
appeal to the progressive nationalist aspirations of the Indian middle class. Because of the 
dualistic and class nature of Indian society, such projects could either incorporate high tech 
elements (such as aerospace, professional electronics, advanced machine tools or new 
materials) or they could address the development needs of the bulk of the rural based 
population via a technology-centered approach. 
The second direction that could be taken would be to design projects that would find 
favour with the mainstream bureaucracy situated primarily in the sectoral (transports, 
communications, energy, steel, petrochemicals) and the socio-economic ministries (health, 
industry, agriculture etc.) These bureaucracies represent a stable constituency that, if 
brought onside, would be able to sustain support for collaboration through periods of 
political turmoil. There were many possibilities here but further preliminary contact with 
key figures in these ministries would be necessary to identify the most appropriate focus. 
1.6.2. LOOK FOR SPECIFIC COLLABORATORS AMONG THE NEW BREED 
OF TECHNOCRAT -ENTREPRENEURS 
If industrially-oriented R&D projects linked to production are an objective, look either to 
small scale, high tech entrepreneurs currently flocking towards venture capital funds for 
support or to joint sector (public-private) companies operating in engineering, information 
technology and bio-technology sectors. These are perceived as the only sectors with 
substantial R&D capabilities at the enterprise level outside of the CSIR R&D network where 
the firms are also managed aggressively by young competent technocrat-entrepreneurs. 
Such projects could be developed through the Investment Partners Scheme - which in India 
still needs to be activated, primarily because of delays on the Indian side. 
1.6.3. AVOID CONSUMER GOODS AND SEEK SYSTEMIC PROJECTS 
THAT HAVE AN AGRICULTURE AND/OR RURAL DIMENSION 
We have already noted the strong feelings of the government against further projects 
focussed on the urban consumer. However, it is also clear that powerful government 
support would be forthcoming if the collaboration proposals put forward were for projects 
or processes that meet rural needs and/or contributed to rural industrialization. There was 
a feeling that contrary to the opinion of foreigners that such projects could find a ready 
market either via government programmes or because the steady rise in rural incomes was 
in fact beginning to be felt in the market place. 
These projects could be based on imported high or low tech solutions but would need to 
involve both adaptive R&D and production in India. They would also need to take a 
systemic approach - be designed to take account of all aspects from raw materials 
procurement to distribution and distribution. Such projects could be tied to technology 
missions or mission mode projects in areas such as the provision of drinking water, rural 
communications or the development of the dairy industry. Alternatively they could be 
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linked into food processing activities (for domestic consumption or export) or environmental 
conservation activities linked to small scale industry. There were already examples of such 
projects involving foreign collaboration and more would be welcome. This was an area 
where aid funds could be used and where the Indian government would be also prepared 
to make a substantial contribution. 
1.6.4. BE PREPARED TO BE PATIENT AND TO MAKE A COMMITTMENT 
TO INDIA 
There is no quick and easy route to success in India. With all the best will in the world, 
things take time, the bureaucrats are frustrating and there are massive inefficiencies to be 
overcome. Unless foreigners are prepared to accept these operating conditions, and unless 
they are prepared to put their "heart" into the project and make a long term committment 
of time and resources, the prospects of success are limited. Those foreign companies who 
have made such a committment have been very sucessful (such as Siemens and 
Larson-Turbo)- those who have not, such as ICL or Phillips have found it far more difficult. 
Committment counts in India. That is why many Indians expect that once the Japanese, 
with their long term view of market and industry development, begin to take a serious 
commercial interest in India, as they are now doing, they will be highly successful. 
1.6.5. EUROPE-CENTERED HIGH TECH JOINT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Joint participation was proposed by Indian public sector "gateway" enterprises in large 
scale, Europe-oriented high tech development projects where low cost, highly skilled Indian 
manpower could be coupled with European technology and project management skills. 
Large system software development projects were the most obvious possibility. However, 
a similar approach could be used to other manpower-intensive high tech development 
projects in areas such as parallel processing, the development of "micro motor" technology, 
the development of engineering plastics, molecular modelling or protein engineering - all 
areas where India has already built up a significant manpower and knowledge base. 
An additional attractive element and boon to such projects would be if they could be used 
to entice back NRis from the U.S. who themselves would be major sources of absorbed 
technology - though to do this such projects would have to be operating absolutely at the 
frontiers of knowledge. 
1.6.6. SCIENCE-BASED DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROJECTS 
There are a range of science-intensive activities and projects underway in India where 
collaboration would be possible. For example, a major new radio astronomy project is being 
planned that will involve the design, fabrication and erection of the world's largest 
telescope. European scientists and instrument engineers could be involved in the joint 
development with India of this telescope and Europrean specialist producers could then 
undertake the supply of the many specialized parts not available in India nor likely to ever 
be produced there. 
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1.6.7. DOMESTIC IT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WITH EXPORT 
POTENTIAL 
There are many possibilities here. For example, a variety of remote communications 
projects are underway where India has developed specialist expertise in some areas but 
needs production technology and where jointly developed products could be exported to 
third countries. Areas of focus might include the development of low cost remote sensing 
and software image processing equipment, the development of low noise amplifiers; 
satellite system payload fabrication, and the development of advanced gyroscope 
technology and solar arrays. Software is another area. Canada is sponsoring a $15 million 
joint software development project focussing on the development of applications for 
railways, banks and other services to be marketed in India and Canada and exported to 
third countries. 
1.6.8. EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN TECHNOLOGY INTENSIVE 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN INDIA 
The Indian government has a large number of major infrastructure projects planned. These 
incorporate extensive high technology hardware, software systems and design elements 
where European participation might be possible in both applied R&D, design and supervision 
and component fabrication. These include the planned modernization of Bombay and Delhi 
airports, development of the inland waterways and port systems, and water and power 
provision where, for example, an integrated, computer-controlled hydro system is being 
planned involving 30-40 dams. Though overall supervison will be done by Indian 
companies, major opportunities exist for a European consortium to undertake joint control 
system development, engineering R&D and component production as well as backstopping 
Indian engineering firms on critical segments of overall project - though in making this offer 
the question was raised by the Indian side if Indian firms would then be allowed to tender 
for similar activities in Europe? 
1.6.9. NEW TECHNOLOGY-BASED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT WITH 
DOMESTIC AND EXPORT POTENTIAL 
A number of possibilities were identified for the joint development of a wide variety of 
products suitable for and demanded by the enormous Indian domestic market that would 
also have export possibilities. Among the products and processes identified were solar 
power technology, vaccines for communicable diseases, herbal medicines, biotechnology 
based fertilizers, and pollution control and monitoring equipment for traditional and small 
scale process industries. 
1.6.10. STRAIGHTFORWARD COLLABORATION IN SCIENCE 
There are a number of fields where India has world class scientists. In many of these 
areas, government is placing increasing pressure on Indian scientists to carry out relevant 
research and useful results. European collaboration on these projects would be valuable 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 25 
Strategic Review 
but they are not currently encompassed by EC and bilateral co-operative agreements. 2 
Such fields include nuclear physics, deep sea oceanography, heavy ion physics, plasma 
physics, surface studies, mathematical modelling and fast kinetics. 
1.6.11. CLOSER LINKS WITH CSIR LABS TO PROMOTE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF ON- THE-SHELF TECHNOLOGIES 
AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONTRACT RESEARCH 
CAPABILITIES 
Many CSIR labs have generated and are now generating many potentially commercially 
viable applications of technology in which Indian industry has taken little interest or is no 
prepared to support the necessary development work. There are opportunities here for 
collaboration between CSIR and the EC which would focus on the marketing and then 
development of these tecnologies on a worldwide basis. At the same time such a project 
could help advance the ability of CSIR labs to generate revenues in the future by 
strengthening their international competitiveness as contract R,D&D labs. 
1.6.12. COLLABORATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT SERVICES 
Though India has a well developed Bureau of Standards that is competent in conventional 
areas, it has weaknesses in other areas partly caused by lack of funds and by lack of 
government recognition of its importance. This means it is unable to carry out "R&D" on 
many high technology areas and it is struggling to stay in touch with global developments. 
There are, however, signs that government is now beginning to appreciate the importance 
of standards as the economy becomes more open and Indian firms are being placed under 
pressure to export. 
Standards is one of the areas covered by current EC-India industrial collaboration 
agreements and it was felt in India that this was a good and useful project. However, 
there was also concern that the project underway is too limited and has as yet failed to 
fully exploit opportunities for EC to play a major role in development of Indian standards. 
If it were to do so, this could have significant commercial implications for the future. There 
is thus great scope for a larger, more imaginative standards project bringing in private and 
public sector participation and having both an aid and technical assistance component and 
a commercially oriented component. Provided it was presented properly as a joint project 
not designed to "pressure" India in a particular standards direction, the prospects are good 
such a project would be strongly supported by the government. 
7 The Commission already supports a sizeable fellowship programme under which Indian scientists (40 for the 
1990-91 period) spend time working at EC laboratories; as well as 6 multipartner joint research projects in the 
fields of bio-technology, health and advanced materials. 
Page 26 - Sast Project 1 Report on India 
Strategic Review 
1.7. IMPLICATIONS FOR A COMUNITY STRATEGY TO DEVELOP 
INDUSTRIAL AND S& T COLLABORATION WITH INDIA 
Interviews carried out for the SAST project with senior policy makers, scientists and 
industrialists indicated a significant degree of general and specific interest in the possibility 
of establishing innovative industrial and S& T collaborative arrangements with the European 
Community. An interesting range of proposals was made as to the type of projects that 
might be feasible and the sectors, products and topics that could be the focus of these 
collaborative efforts. We now need to address ourselves to the issue of what steps the 
Community might next take in order to respond to this interest in collaboration on the 
Indian side. 3 
A key starting point to discuss these issues is to understand the motivations that lay behind 
India's interest in developing greater collaborative links with the Community. Importantly, 
it is not because attaining their industrial goals for the 1 990s depends critically on gaining 
access to European markets for their manufactured exports. Obviously India does want to 
maintain access on as favourable terms as possible since nearly one-third of its total trade 
is with Europe and the promotion of exports is a key objective of current government 
policy. But India is not pursuing an export-oriented industrialization strategy that depends 
critically on achieving expanded market share in Europe as is the case with South Korea 
and Thailand. This is undoubtedly why policy makers are still prepared to support a 
relatively more restrictive industrial policy and inefficient industrial structure than in those 
countries. 
Likewise, India is not seeking to counterbalance the pervasive presence of the Japanese 
within their economy as producers and as sources of finance and technology. Though 
recently Japan has begun to pay a bit more attention to "cultivating" India along similiar 
lines to what they have done in Thailand and the other ASEAN states, their presence is still 
very limited and narrowly confined to a few areas. Nor is India so saddled with a crippling 
foreign debt that it is unable to respond to any overtures which have financial expenditure 
implications as in the case of Brazil and Mexico. 
In that sense, India will be dealing with the EC' s proposals for collaboration from a position 
of strength rather than weakness. India's interest in collaboration instead arises because 
the country has now reached the point in its pursuit of self-reliant industrialization where 
it needs to substantially strengthen its S& T base - particularly in relation to the industrial 
and infrastructural sector and particularly in the areas of high technology where its 
capabilities are weakest except for certain pockets of expertise. And much more so than 
in the past, Indian policy makers in key positions outside of the S& T ministries (such as in 
the ministries of industry and commerce) are prepared to explore different methods of 
interacting with foreign sources of science and technology particularly if this interaction 
helps rather hinders the government's cautious movements towards greater openness and 
liberalization. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be borne in mind that Indian policy makers are increasingly 
determined to reduce the repetitive and debilitating dependence of much of Indian industry 
3 These proposals are by no means proposed as an alternative to the wide range of programmes and projects 
that the Commission currently supports within the context of its formal relationship with India. Indeed some of 
the proposals made parallel closedly programmes already underway. Our aim is to offer suggestions that will 
complement, strengthen and extend existing relationships. 
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on imports of outdated technology. They are slowly moving to the recognition that the 
best way to do this is via less not more restrictions. Likewise, though more open than 
previously to greater foreign participation in the economy, they are determined not to allow 
foreign firms to set up shop if their only aim is to produce non-essential consumer goods 
for the urban elite. Finally they are perhaps more aware than ever that in certain sectors 
and fields India has a set of S& T assets that gives it a competitive edge abroad as well 
proving attractive to foreign scientists and companies. 
India is clearly willing and anxious to explore the possibilities of greater S& T collaboration 
with the Community. But for reasons of past and recent history, culture and personality, 
and its record of S& T achievements and failures, India will only go forward towards greater 
collaboration on terms that it deems equitable to its own long term interests. 
Given this background, we want to conclude this report by putting forward the following 
six proposals for consideration by the Community in determining its strategy towards 
achieving greater S& T collaboration with India. 
I. 7 .1. CONTINUE INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH KEY S& T POLICY 
MAKERS ON THE POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR S& T 
COLLABORATION 
The SAST interviews with senior policy makers concentrated on a small number of key 
individuals and discussing the general issues involved. There are however many more 
individuals who have to be brought into the picture on an informal basis before moving 
forward to the next stage. This is necessary to weave an invisible web of support for the 
general thrust of this initiative within the Indian S& T policy community based on 
understanding and trust. 
This will not be an easy task if solely pursued on a formal basis. The informal nature of the 
SAST enquiries and past good relations between SRA and certain key individuals meant 
they were willing to listen and engage in an honest and critical discussion. The groundwork 
has now been laid for more direct contacts between the Community and senior people but 
the openings created have to be pursued carefully and diplomatically since once the 
Community is directly involved, a different set of rules of "engagement" will apply. 
1.7.2. CONTINUE GENERATING GREATER UNDERSTANDING WITHIN 
THE COMMUNITY OF THE INDIAN S&T/INDUSTRY SCENE AND 
THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
RELATING TO INNOVATIVE INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN 
S&T 
The main report identifies a number of the key institutions and decision-making nodal points 
within central government such as the Department of Science and Technology, the STAC 
committees in the main socio-economic ministries, the Departments of Electronics and 
Biotechnology, the Planning Commission, and the Committee on Technical Collaboration 
within the Ministry of Industry. 
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There is more to learn however since in recent years, a good deal of power and presence 
on the S& T scene has devolved to sectoral ministries and departments such as the 
Ministries of Steel, Power, and Transportation as well as to public sector "gateway" 
corporations such as Engineers India and the Computer Maintenance Corporation and 
increasingly even to state governments and state joint sector companies. Better 
understanding is needed of how these relatively new players fit into the overall picture. 
Along the same lines, because of the advent of a new and as yet unstable, minority 
government, the individuals and groupings vested with power in the S& T area are still 
emerging. They need first to be identified and then monitored closely to understand their 
relationship to the established technocrats who have long dominated S& T policy and 
practice. 
I. 7 .3. CLARIFY AND DEFINE THE MEANING OF MUTUAL BENEFIT 
THROUGH S& T COLLABORATION AND ESTABLISH THE ROOM 
FOR MANOEUVRE ENJOYED BY THE COMMUNITY IN RELATED 
AREAS 
As indicated above, some of the policymakers and senior scientists interviewed were, on 
occasion, quite sceptical about the real degree of mutual benefit that would arise from 
collaboration with the Community. This is an issue that will come up very early on in any 
substantive discussions with India - and with every other SAST country. While it cannot 
be finally settled in the case of specific countries except via mutual discussion with that 
country, it seems necessary that the Community debate and discuss this issue internally 
because its position on this issue will essentially determine the whole tenor of any 
subsequent collaborative arrangements that are agreed. Our sense at the present moment 
is that there are still significant differences between what the Community means by mutual 
benefit and what the SAST countries interpret this phrase to mean. 
Associated with this need to "clear the air" on certain points, there a series of other issues 
that may also need to be discussed internally in order to free up the channels of 
communication with India and other SAST countries. Among these questions are issues 
such as the scale of resources the Community itself would be prepared to commit to 
launching these initiatives; what would be the role of the member states; and how can 
ongoing EC-India S& T projects be accomodated in the new era of collaboration. 
In addition to the above the broader set of concerns raised about the wider implications of 
1 992 and developments in Eastern Europe for EC relations with India will also need to be 
discussed. The SAST project is clearly not in a position to address these issues but they 
will also need to be considered by the Community in sorting out its own position and 
strategy vis-~-vis collaboration with India. A means will then have to be found to 
collectively address these issues within the Indian context - ideally as part of the informal 
process of consultation and confidence building called for above. 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 29 
Strategic Review 
1.7.4. ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK FOR COLLABORATION VIA 
HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AND DETERMINING THE SPECIFICS 
THROUGH LOW KEY CONSULTATIONS 
In our discussions, while there was agreement on the value of proceeding further, there 
was a divergence of opinion on how best to proceed. 
One group argued that forward progress would only be achieved if there was first a 
minsterial level agreement on a statement of intent. It was felt that this would give the 
appropriate signals to the bureaucracy. Discussions were held with relevant officials to 
discuss the purpose of such a meeting, when it might take place and what the agenda 
would be. Our understanding is that the Government is therefore ready to respond now 
to an invitation from the Commission to hold such a meeting sometime in the near future. 
Another, equally influential group of senior policy makers interviewed felt that this was 
precisely the wrong manner in which to proceed and was the surest way to ensure that 
nothing of any substance would happen. Instructions from the Prime Minister's office to 
negotiate collaborative S& T agreements have been handed down many times before. Such 
agreements are usually concluded - but actual implementation is often resisted by a 
resentful bureaucracy and non-co-operative science community. 
An alternative strategy was put forward of setting up one or a few working groups 
composed of Indians and Europeans choosen for their expertise in particular sectors or 
fields to meet together over the next six months to a year to hammer out the details of 
specific projects that would capture the full and enthusiastic response of the bureaucracy 
and the scientific and industrial community. It was felt that these meetings would have to 
take place before the requisite ministerial meeting (giving official approval) and would serve 
to build the consensus and support necessary to carry the collaboration proposals through 
to success. 
Some mixture of the two approaches seems to make the most sense. This could be 
structured perhaps so that a working group can get together to discuss the initial terms of 
the broad framework agreement prior to a ministerial meeting. These preparatory meetings 
would be genuine joint working groups involving substantive interchange and debate over 
the tough questions of principle - such as the practical meaning of "mutual benefit"; how 
IPR questions would be dealt with; and the nature of government committment expected 
to let the projects go forward. The more detailed discussions on identifying specific project 
areas and modes of collaboration could then take place after the ministerial level meeting. 
However this issue is resolved, the critical point is that all agreements - preliminary and 
detailed - are reached via mutual discussion rather than by bureaucratic, adversarial 
negotiations over a fixed set of proposals as is usually the case. 
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I. 7 .5. ~ONSIDER THE NEED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF GOOD 
INTENTIONS 
Indian sqientists, much as those in countries such as China, South Korea and Brazil would 
very mu(:h like to be given greater access to European laboratories and be allowed to 
participate in European and Community sponsored multilateral projects such as EUREKA 
and tho~e covered by the Framework Programme. This is clearly a matter for internal 
discussi~n and decision making by the Community. However, it should be noted that 
opening 1UP such opportunities for collaboration to the Indians would certainly go a long 
way towards demonstrating the Community's committment to the principles of mutual 
benefit. This would help clear the way for the wider ranging forms of collaboration 
envisioned by the SAST project. 
I. 7 .6. EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP FLEXIBLE 
!INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR FUNDING AND MANAGING 
IEC-INDIAN S& T COLLABORATION 
Flexibility and responsiveness will necessarily be a key characteristic of any mechanism 
used to promote, finance and oversee the sort of innovative collaborative arrangements that 
the SAS1T project set out to explore. Strong arguments can be made for setting up a new 
institutional mechanism that would actually function outside of the existing bureaucratic 
structur.s in the Community and India. 
The lndi~n government and some of its senior bureaucrats have already seen the wisdom 
of such arrangements and have recently created flexible mechanisms (based on the concept 
of a sci~ntific society or association) to oversee international collaborative S& T projects 
with Frarce aand Canada. The Indo-French Center (total budget of $1 0 million from France 
and lndiCII) funds and oversees joint R&D projects but is completely independent of the DST. 
In the c~se of Canada, the software development project mentioned earlier is based on 
Canadian and Indian government funds, involves private firms in joint R&D on products ofor 
domestib and export markets, and is managed by an independent scientific association, the 
Centre fbr Technology Development in Karnataka. 
While th~se two mechanisms represent an administrative solution to the problems that arise 
from excessive bureaucratic control of bilateral technical assistance programmes, we do 
not kno-N if it is feasible or even permissible within the context of the EC. It does appear, 
howevet, to be an option worth pursuing both from the perspective of future arrangements 
with ln~ia and with the other SAST countries. Within this context, the new initiative to 
establis~ a "Business Forum" -run by the private sector via European and Indian chambers 
of commerce - could be an ideal mechanism for facilitating EC-Indian commercial links along 
the lines suggested above. 
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11.1. PRE-1985 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
THE BACKGROUND TO LIBERALIZATION 
Perceptiorjls of the overall performance of the Indian economy since independence differ 
widely, particularly regarding the pace of growth, variations over time and the contribution 
of differe~t sectors to the growth in national product. In terms of movements in real 
national income (net national product at factor cost measured at constant prices), the 
performar)ce has been neither spectacular nor dismal. In the post independence period as 
a whole, tlhe compound annual rate of growth of real net national product works out at 3.6 
per cent, 
1
a persistently middling rate of increase which has been termed "the Hindu rate 
of growt~". 4 
Given rapjd population growth, this suggests that the average annual rate of growth of GNP 
per capita over the period 1965-85 was at 1 . 7 per cent. This GNP growth rate is far less 
than what Indian economic planners had hoped for and is clearly substantially lower than 
most oth~r comparable developing countries. Indeed, as the gap in economic performance 
and in th~ underlying GNP growth rates between India and other advanced developing 
countries! grew ever wider during the 1970s, critics from both spectrums of economic 
opinion argued that this was evidence of the long term mismanagement of the economy 
and pressed increasingly loudly for fundamental change in policy. As we shall see this 
fundamental policy change did in fact begin to emerge in a coherent fashion in the 
mid-198Qs, having a major impact on industrial performance and marking the beginning of 
a signific.nt departure from previous policies. 
This cha~ge and the resultant impact on the economy has once again sparked off a fierce 
debate over the direction of development and the role of foreign firms whose outcome will 
directly ~ffect prospects for EC-India collaboration in the future. For this reason, it is 
worthwhile looking in a little more detail first, at the initial objectives of industrial policy and 
the mec~anisms used and then at the historical performance of industry and agriculture in 
order to provide an informed context for discussing the current period. 
11.1.2. !OBJECTIVES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE ATTAINMENT OF 
: SELF-RELIANCE 
The Indian economy at independence was characterized by features typical of a backward 
ex-colonial country. It was predominantly agrarian, with industry contributing about 1 5 per 
cent of ~ational income and less than 1 0 per cent of employment. Nearly 78 per cent of 
organize~ sector production consisted of traditional activities like textiles, food processing 
while CaPital goods and intermediates had still to be imported. Consequently manufactured 
I 
goods aqcounted for 85 per cent of India's imports. The principal aim of state policy was 
to achie~e rapid acceleration of industrial growth while also overcoming barriers to 
productiyitv increases characteristic of predominantly agrarian economies. 
4 How~ver between 1978fl9-1986/86, the rata of growth of NNP works out to 4.4 per cent. This figure also 
points to ~n additional increase in real par capita incomes of around 1 per cent a year. But the dynamism of the 
aggregate rguras conceals the distortions reflected by trends in sectoral growth rates. Between 1970 and 1985, 
while the $ontribution of the primary sector (agriculture and allied activities) to GOP at constant prices grew at 
2.6 per ce~t per year, that of the secondary sector (dominated by manufacturing) grew by 3.92 per cent annually. 
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Four initiatives were considered crucial. First, extensive protection was offered to 
manufacturing through an across the board increase in tariffs and the institution of 
quantitative restrictions on imports. Second, a massive increase in public investment to 
create infrastructure but also resulting, directly through purchases of commodities and 
indirectly through the creation of incomes, in a rapid growth of a protected home market. 
Third, a sharp increase in the rate of savings, accompanied by measures that would 
channel these funds to the state sector (taxation) as well as through mediation of the state 
financial institutions to the private sector. And finally, the introduction of a wide range of 
controls on capacity creation, production, industry entry and exit and prices which would 
ensure that these funds would be directed towards what were priority areas in the 
perception of the government. 6 
11.1.3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SELF-RELIANT INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The industrial strategy based on these initiatives produced an unprecedented spurt in 
industrialisation. A compound growth rate of 7.2 per cent in the index of industrial 
production between 1 948 and 1 966 was accompanied by a substantial diversification of 
the industrial sector away from traditional consumer goods in favour of the heavy industrial 
sector, in particular chemicals, machinery and engineering goods. The secular boom, 
however, came to an end in the mid 1 960s, after which the economy entered a period of 
stagnation. Between 1966 and 1975 the rate of growth of the industrial index registered 
a decline of 4 per cent with only a slight recovery to an average of 4.8 per cent during the 
ten-year period until 1985. 
Though there is much debate, two major sets of factors have allegedly been responsible 
for the sharp slow-down in the growth rate of the industrial economy during the 1 970s and 
early 1980s. The first in fact relates to the performance of the agriculture sector which 
in India, unlike the other SAST countries (with the exception of China), plays a major if not 
dominant role in the economy accounting in 1985 for 39 per cent of the net domestic 
product and involving 77 per cent of all Indians. Despite this importance, the overall 
performance of the sector between 1970 and 1985 was unimpressive with growth in 
output virtually stagnant and recording an absolute increase of only 4 percent in constant 
prices. 
In India's case, poor performance in the agricultural sector has major implications for the 
industry and by extension for the shape and thrust of economic and industrial policy. By 
serving as a source of livelihood for nearly two-thirds of the working population, agriculture 
constitutes a major source of demand for the products of the industry. Moreover, most of 
India's traditional industries like cotton and jute textiles, sugar, vegetable oils are 
agro-based, rendering their output directly dependent on agricultural performance and the 
consequent availability of agricultural inputs. Consequently, an indifferent performance in 
the agricultural sector acts as a severe drag on industrial growth. 
The second set of factors responsible for India's poor industrial performance relate to the 
nature of the post-independence industrialization process and more specifically to the 
'The theoretical underpinning's of the strategy that emphasised protection and public investment was provided 
by the Mahalanobis model. This argued that since the current world situation did not permit a rapid increase in 
exports, the only route to industrialisation was via the creation of an indigenous industrial sector (including capital 
goods) catering to the domestic market. 
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policies tollowed by a government firmly committed to state control of the economy. The 
weakne~s of the import substitution model followed by India is that by the mid-1970s the 
stimulus! for growth that had arisen from the protective regime followed by the government 
had exh~usted itself. Import substitution resulted in a once-for-all increase in output and 
once dotnestic markets were captured by indigenous producers, further growth depended 
on expa~sion of domestic demand which because of agricultural stagnation, was growing 
very slowly. 
The mai~stream critique of India's industrialization strategy. A much more substantive and 
in the epd, telling set of criticisms was levelled by critics both inside and outside the 
country lat the industrial policies and the system of control followed by the government 
over tha~ period. 8 While there were few who disagreed with the view that the strategy 
followed resulted in the creation of a rather large and diversified industrial sector, many 
argued that in return it had extracted too great a price in terms of high costs, technological 
obsolesdence and inefficiency. 
Leaving i aside the issues raised regarding direct state involvement in production, five 
elements of these criticisms should be mentioned here that directly related to the 
performance of privately owned industry: 
Rigid !investment licensing and controls on output and technology acquisition led to a 
state 1of permanent product shortages that inhibited competitive behaviour; 
- The l1igh import barriers created by widespread quantitative restrictions and high tariffs 
effectively isolated many Indian industries from technological developments and 
comp~titive pressures in the rest of the world; 7 
Rigidities created by the regulatory system constrained firms' abilities to enter new 
mark$ts and expand output thus further inhibiting competition, 8 as well as limiting 
their ~bility to restructure or close down; 
In many sectors, continued production by financially weak firms, held afloat by 
subsidies, undermined the viability of the more efficient enterprises that remained; 
8 For dample the World Bank was of the most persistent critics of Indian industrial strategy through the 1970s 
and most of the 1980s. 
7 Protection for the capital goods sector had meant that by the mid 1970s the share of indigenously produced 
machinery! in the total supply of capital goods stood at 85 per cent. But this rather diversified growth of the 
industry was accompanied by symptoms characteristic of inefficiency. For example an UNCTAD study relating 
to the period up to 1980 found that 53 per cent of the designs introduced into the Indian market were more than 
9 years ol~ abroad and only 12 percent were less than 5 years old. See UNCTAD, Capital Goods and Developing 
Countries,
1 
Geneva, 1985. Another point is that in an area characterized by substantial economies of scale Indian 
producers !operated with extremely small batch sizes. Finally, protection also resulted in high prices. For example, 
in the case of hydraulic excavators, prices in India were three times as high as those in the industrialised countries, 
where as prices in South Korea were only 1.5 times higher than international prices. See S. Jacobsson, 
"Governm~~tnt Policy and Performance of the Indian Engineering Industry", Mimeo, Dept of Industrial Management, 
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden, 1988. 
8 For example by restricting licences to MRTP companies government policies set up barriers to entry that 
ensure diiLtion of competition in markets that are often characterized by large investment, high levels of 
concentration and excess profits. 
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- Finally, the heavy indirect taxes on all stages of production had a cascading effect that 
raised domestic prices and limited firms' abilities to achieve scale economies. 
Substantive evidence can be marshalled to demonstrate how this regime of industrial 
control negatively affected the performance and competitiveness of Indian firms. The net 
conclusion of numerous studies is that in many industrial subsectors in the 1970s and early 
1980s, Indian firms were functioning with technology far removed from international best 
practice; their (permitted) volumes of output were well below levels where scale economies 
could be achieved; and not surprisingly performance in the area of productivity, efficiency 
and quality was significantly lower than international standards. 9 
It is also clear that policies pursued through the mid-1 980s contributed extensively to 
India's poor export performance during that period. Where one would have expected a 
country with the combination of entrepreneurial flair, skill, low wages and technology 
absorptive capacity of India to be a keen exporter (despite the lure of the domestic market), 
in fact just the opposite was the case. The lack of export incentives and the commitment 
to maintaining the rupee at an artificially high exchange rate created conditions where 
manufactured exports (which in the early 1980s accounted for about 70 per cent of India's 
total exports) grew on average less than 3 per cent annually in real terms between 1 980 
and 1986, and represented a small and, significantly, a declining share of industrial output, 
dropping from 7.2 per cent at the beginning of the decade to less than 5 per cent in 1985. 
We would add one important and positive qualification to this critique that must be borne 
in mind. Despite the negative effect of the policy environment on firm performance, Indian 
firms, even as far back as the 1970s, had a depth of engineering competence unmatched 
by any other developing country. Though this competence was for the most part badly 
underutilized, there is ample evidence documenting considerable engineering achievements 
across a wide range of sectors. These capacities remain intact today and form a sound 
foundation upon which European enterprises could build major collaborative ventures in 
engineering-intensive production activities. 
8 See for example A.V.Desei, "How they see us: Technology Suppliers' view of Indian Industry", Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol 20, Nos 45-47. 
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11.2. INPUSTRIAL ADVANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LIBERALIZATION: A 
NEW BEGINNING OR A FALSE DAWN 
Partly in ~esponse to this sustained barrage of critical analyses, (and partly in response to 
a crisis ill government revenues) 10 , the government of Rajiv Gandhi launched, in 1985, 
a major qverhaul of industry and financial policy aimed at stimulating domestic demand, 
encouraging a greater role for the private sector in the economy, enhancing domestic 
competitipn and strengthening the competitiveness and efficiency of Indian industry. 
Enshrine~ in the Seventh Plan (1985-1989), annual budgets, a new Long Term Fiscal Policy 
and a wh~le series of official policy statements, this "New Economic Policy" had essentially 
five elem~nts. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5} 
ReQulatory policy has been substantially liberalized across the board through the 
dismantling of many controls over prices, investment, production, capacity creation 
andl foreign collaboration and by opening up areas and sectors previously reserved for 
the ;public sector and small scale industries. 
Ta~ation policy was reformed via the simplification of and changes to income and 
corporate taxes, direct and indirect taxes (intended to stimulate consumer demand), 
val\118 added tax and taxes on small scale industry. 
ChcJnges in import policies were introduced that watered down quantitative 
restrictions and reduced tariffs providing domestic producers with wider access to 
ch~aper capital equipment, intermediates and technology, as well as pressurising 
ind~genous producers to reduce costs in the face of import competition. 
Exit barriers and controls on the closure of firms were eased, so that the process of 
restructuring industry is not hindered by the inability of private capital to abandon 
outdated plant and obsolete technologies. 
Fin~lly export policy and administration was fundamentally reformed via the adoption 
of ~ flexible and realistic exchange rate policy (resulting in a 30 per cent devaluation 
by 11989) and the streamlining of duty exemption and duty paying schemes. 
While th~re is considerable debate over whether these policy changes were fundamental 
or merely the first step on a long hard road, there is little doubt that in the post-1985 
period, there were significant developments in the performance of Indian industry and its 
relation to the outside world that should be reviewed here. On the one hand, they 
effectively define the broad direction of that performance for the future; and on the other, 
conflicts, arising from these developments will influence at least in the short term the 
direction! of industrial policy and indirectly the nature of any Indian response to major EC 
S& T initiatives. 
! 
Below -Me consider three sets of developments with particular relevance to our concerns 
- the pattern of industrial and economic growth during the 1980s and the underlying 
contribu~ion of industry; the chief characteristics of recent trends in Indian imports and 
exports ~f manufactures; and the main features of Indian technology collaborations and 
DFI. , 
10 Whic~h continues to the present time and has recently caused the new government to impose sharp cutbacks 
on government expenditure and imports. 
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11.2.1. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL 
PERFORMANCE DURING THE 1980S 
The macro statistics show clearly that Indian industry developed quite strongly during the 
1980s, with the 1985-1989 period being particularly favourable. During the 1980s, the 
economy grew at average annual rate of 5 per cent, nearly twice as high as the historical 
average while it appears that the industrial sector was the driving force behind this 
performance. During the 1980 - 1988 period, industrial production grew at a compound 
rate of 7.6 per cent compared to 4.2 per cent between 1971 and 1979. The improvement 
over the last four years is even more marked as shown by Table 1 which shows that 
industrial growth rates over the 1985-1989 period averaged nearly 9 per cent compared 
to 5 per cent for the 1981-84 period. The positive picture of strong domestic growth was 
reflected also in the rate of growth of manufactured exports which during the three year 
period between 1 987 and 1 989 averaged an annual increase of 26 per cent compared to 
just 1 per cent p.a. during 1980-1984. 
TABLE 1 : Annual percentage rates of growth of GOP 
and industrjal output, 1981·1989 
GOP Industrial output 
1981/2 6.0 7.5 
1982/3 2.4 2.5 
1983/4 8.0 6.8 
1984/5 3.6 8.5 
1985/6 5.1 8.3 
1986/7 3.2 9.2 
1987/8 3.0 7.4 
1988/9 9.0 9.7 
Source : Adapted from UNIDO (1989), New Sources of Industrial 
Growth, Vienna 
As we will document later, this encouraging industrial performance has been accompanied 
by significant changes in the perceptions and attitudes of foreign and domestic 
industrialists and many outside analysts regarding the future prospects for the Indian 
economy and some such as the World Bank are cautiously optimistic about the prospects 
for Indian industrial development for the first time in nearly 25 years. At the same time, 
numerous observers have noted the emergence of a dynamic class of Indian entrepreneurs 
and technocrats who seem determined to play a major role in transforming Indian industry 
and making it capable of playing a full part on the world stage in the 21st century. 
Our interviews identified a number of examples of progressive developments little noticed 
by the outside world such as the recent launching of high tech development projects 
funded by venture capital and the emergence of progressive public sector enterprises 
operating in engineering and technology intensive sectors capable of tackling large scale 
projects at a level of competence equal to many European firms. 
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Howeve~, as is so often the case where Indian economic performance is concerned, closer 
examination of the underlying trends and determinants of India's industrial renaissance and 
its overall effects on the economy reveals a number of problems with the interpretation that 
the 198$-1 989 period marked the movement of the Indian economy onto a new growth 
path. 
There is,;for example, considerable evidence that the industrial growth recorded during the 
last half of the 1 980s was largely driven by a rising demand for consumer durables. This 
is show11 in Table 2 which documents the strong spurt in growth in this segment between 
1981 an~ 1987; and Table 3 which compares the growth rates of different segments of 
the maniiJfacturing sector and shows little growth in the mass consumption segments of 
food and! textiles, a decline in capital goods and transport equipment and an enormous rise 
in electrical machinery and appliances - the segment that encompasses consumer durables. 
To a larqe extent, it now appears that this consumer-led boom was driven by increased 
governm~nt expenditure in its current account 1 1 and paid for by an increase in the 
balance of payments deficit as is shown clearly by Table 4. 
Serious questions have been raised by a number of analysts (and in our interviews) about 
the medium term implications of a continuation of this government-financed, demand-led 
industrial regeneration for the balance of payments, for the future role of foreign capital, 
for the ¢apacity of the economy to sustain its most recent rate of expansion and in 
particular with reference to the deleterious effect it could have on growth in agricultural 
incomes iand on the overall direction of India's development. 12 
These is$ues, the public debate they have sparked and the government's recent response 
form an ~mportant backdrop to our discussion in Part One of the strategic options open to 
the Community (and indeed to European industry in general) in seeking to develop S& T and 
industrial collaboration with India. 
·TABlE 2: Annual rates 9f growth of output in 
consumer= duhtbles, 1981-1987 
1981/2 10.9 
1982/3 9.1 
1983/4 16.1 
1984/5 21.6 
1985/6 18.7 
1986/7 19.5 
Source: Compiled from The Economic Survey, 1986-87, 
Government of India 
11 The ~ix-fold increase in current account deficit financing between 1983-84 to 1986-87 was allied to growing 
expenditur~ on public administration and defense. This helped increase middle and upper middle incomes which 
in turn sustained the demand for consumer durables and luxuries. This is unlike earlier years when the diversion 
of public r~venues to investment purposes resulted in direct demand for plant and equipment. Another allied effect 
of the incr.ase in public expenditure was a substantial growth of 5.82 per cent in the contribution of the service 
sector to the growth in GOP. 
12 See tor example C.T.Kurien, "Indian Economy in the 1980s and on to the 1990s", Economic and Political 
Weekly. A~ril15, 1989. Vol20, Nos 45-47 .(1989)and P.Balakrishnan, "Economic Consequences of Rajiv Gandhi". 
Economic l!nd Po!itica! Weekly, February 10, 1990. 
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TABLE 3 ~ AnnuaJ growth- of manufacturing output by 
industry grouping 198()..1985 to 1984-1 989 
1980-1 to 1984-5 to 
1984-5 1988-9 
(%) (%) 
Food products 4.7 5.5 
Cotton textiles 0.6 1.3 
Chemicals 9.3 13.1 
Basic metal products 1.8 9.7 
Machinery and machine tools 6.3 5.8 
Electrical machinery apparatus 10.4 23.9 
and appliances 
Transport equipment and parts 7.1 6.8 
Total manufacturing 5.7 8.9 
Source: P. Balakrishnan, "The Economic Consequences of Rajiv 
Gandhi", Economic and Political Weekly. 2/10/90, Table 1. 
TABLE 4 ~ Balance of payments and externat debt, 1980-1988 
BTG I CA 
Crores Rs 
1980/1 
-7808.3 -1656.6 
1982/3 -9813.1 -2296.4 
1985/6 -11521.9 -5927.3 
1986/7 -11272.2 -5830.0 
1987/8 -6292.6 
Source: Adapted from Balakrishnan (1990), Table 5, op.cit. 
BTG = balance of trade on government account; 
CA = current account balance 
CA/Y = balance on current account as share of GNP 
CA/Y 
% 
1.35 
1.45 
2.55 
2.25 
2.16 
11.2.2. RECENT TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATION AND 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Historically, despite the government's long term commitment to support of the formal S& T 
system, Indian industry has always relied on imported technology as its main source of 
technological change. The extent of this dependence is shown by the fact that in 1988 
more than 75 per cent of electronic items, 70 per cent of agricultural machinery, 65 per 
cent of transport machinery and 35 per cent of all drugs and pharmaceuticals made in the 
country were products of foreign collaboration. 13 
13 Even more significantly, about 80 per cent of the foreign collaborations have been renewed between two 
and five times, and 20 per cent six times or more. These repetitive foreign collaborations indicate the generally 
low level of absorption and high dependence on foreign technology often noted in India. 
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Throug~ 1964 there was a consistent inflow of DFI and technical collaborations, with DFI 
slowing1markedly after 1964 due to a downturn in the economy. Up until1974, equity 
particip~tion by foreign firms was allowed partly because of the inflow of foreign exchange 
it brought and partly because of pressures exerted by foreign governments. 14 This 
position I was abruptly altered by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 that required 
foreign .ubsidiaries to reduce their equity holdings to below 40 per cent, though there were 
exceptiqns for export oriented firms and in some specified items. This law and the 
self-suflticiency anti-TNC rhetoric that characterized Indian policy through the whole decade 
had a variety of negative effects on the attitude of foreign firms towards DFI in India. 
The nurilber of new investment projects involving foreign equity remained low through the 
decade.l Some foreign firms already in India, including a number of U.S. firms, left outright 
while o~hers maintained their presence but reduced the level of their • commitment• to the 
country! and their affiliates. Nevertheless, firms from a number of European countries, most 
notably i the Federal Republic of Germany, continued to invest in new projects while also 
building: up their existing investments. This behaviour has had the important beneficial 
effect qf deeply imbedding these companies in the Indian economy and legitimizing their 
continu~d and conceivably expanded presence in the 1990s. 16 
Howev~r, in line with the general trends towards greater openness, the government has 
signific.ntly liberalized policy pertaining to foreign financial participation and technology 
collabo~ation since the early 1980s. For example, 1 00 per cent foreign equity holding was 
allowe~ in the case of units producing exclusively for export while a number of sectors 
such as motor vehicles, motorcycles and components were selectively opened up to DFI. 
Betwee~ 1985-1989 further steps were taken to water down controls on foreign 
investment: 
- an irjcrease in the threshold of assets for the purpose of defining a 'large' undertaking 
requ,ring registration under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act. 
- an e~pansion of the list of industries in which investment can be made or expansion 
und~rtaken without clearance under the MRTP Act while special emphasis has been 
placfd on the need to establish capacities at economic scales of production; 
I 
- the concept of 'broadbanding' was introduced in several industries so as to provide 
flexil:>ility to adjust product mix within the overall licensed capacity. 
- fore~gn equity participation in existing Indian companies in high technology areas is now 
per~itted as well as in new ventures in preference to the outright purchase of 
technology; 
- in ac:Jdition there has been an increase in the permitted limit on royalty payments for high 
techlnology beyond the original ceiling of 5-8 per cent. 
Positiv~ upsurge in technology collaborations and foreign investments. The effect of this 
loosening of the bonds on foreign collaboration and investment were dramatic as is shown 
•• A !!'art of the massive food aid given by the USA under PL 480 was, for example, earmarked specifically for 
the use Qf American firms and resulted in a 220 per cent increase in the number of foreign collaborations approved 
by the grvernment over the relevant period. 
15 It ras consistently noted in our interviews that the form and substance of Indian-German collaboration in 
both the ;industrial and scientific fields was highly successful and constituted a good model for the EC to follow. 
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by Table 5. Between 1979 and 1980 alone, the number of arms length collaborations and 
projects involving foreign investment doubled from 267 overall to 526. From that point on 
through 1 988 the rate of growth new projects continued to increase both in terms of total 
number and, perhaps more significantly, in terms of the share of these involving foreign 
equity participation. By 1985, 900-1000 projects involving collaboration were being 
approved annually (compared to an average of 280 during 1977-1979) while an average 
of 22 per cent of those approved involved foreign equity participation compared to 12 per 
cent over 1976-1979. 
TABLE 5 : Foreign collaborations and investments approved 
Year Number of FC with %of FC with Total DFI Average FDI 
FC foreign foreign per case 
approved equity equity Rs'OOO 
1970 183 32 17.5 24.52 766.3 
1971 245 46 18.8 58.38 1269.1 
1972 257 36 14.0 62.27 1683.0 
1973 205 34 16.6 28.17 828.5 
1974 352 55 15.6 67.13 1220.5 
1975 277 40 14.4 32.05 801.2 
1976 282 39 13.8 72.69 1863.8 
1977 267 27 10.1 40.03 1482.6 
1978 307 44 14.3 94.06 2137.7 
1979 267 32 12.0 56.87 1777.2 
1980 526 73 13.9 89.24 1222.5 
1981 389 57 14.7 108.71 1907.2 
1982 590 113 19.2 628.06 5558.1 
1983 673 129 19.2 618.73 4796.4 
1984 752 151 20.1 1130.02 7483.6 
1985 1024 238 23.2 1260.66 5296.9 
1986 957 240 25.1 1069.52 4456.3 
1987 852 242 28.4 1077.05 4450.6 
1988 930 134 14.4 2395.12 9086.7 
TOTAL 12707 2530 19.9 8913.16 4387.9 
Source : India Investment Centra List of foreign collaboration approvals.; Government of India, Ministry 
of Industry, Secretariat of Industrial approvals 
Note : • These figures include the period January-June. 
The total and the per capita amounts invested by foreign firms also increased dramatically 
during the 1980s. Total annual investments more than doubled between 1978 and 1981 
and increased by more than tenfold by 1984, remaining at that level through the rest of the 
1980s and reaching a record (for India) of $250 million in 1989. The average investment 
cost per project grew four times in real terms between the 1976-1981 period and the 
1982-1988 period. Along with this rise in the inward flow of foreign capital, there was a 
sharp increase in the outward flow of technology payments by Indian firms. This is shown 
clearly in Tables 6 and 7 where there was nearly a fivefold rise in total payments between 
1979 and 1986. 
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Milllions 
10n---------------------------------------------, 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0~--~~--L--L~~~~--~~--~-L--~-L--L--L--LJ 
1970 1976 1978 1981 1983 1986 86 
- Series A 
Ye<:1r Profits Dividends Royalties Know-how Interest Total 
19JO 131.2 434.3 52.3 206.3 128.0 952.1 
19J1 99.4 388.7 58.6 121.3 807.0 1475.0 
19712 155.4 390.8 73.3 113.3 156.0 888.8 
19~3 219.1 375.1 62.1 140.8 162.7 959.8 
19~4 71.9 184.6 84.6 125.6 367.0 833.7 
197!5 203.6 248.4 104.9 236.6 256.6 1050.1 
19716 193.9 454.7 158.8 378.0 251.1 1436.5 
19717 101.3 680.1 195.0 281.4 227.0 1484.8 
19'l8 102.4 543.5 126.5 555.2 314.4 1642.0 
191!9 143.7 509.2 93.3 439.7 252.2 1438.1 
1980 121.0 559.2 88.8 1049.3 232.2 2050.5 
1981 121.6 589.2 159.9 2707.0 410.8 3988.5 
19~2 191.2 703.1 397.2 2505.8 802.3 4599.6 
1983 200.0 621.1 276.0 3148.9 815.1 5061.1 
1984 166.8 745.8 284.9 3006.0 1239.1 5442.6 
19~5 118.0 752.0 235.0 3679.0 2187.0 6971.0 
1986 106.0 855.0 401.0 3584.0 3189.0 8135.0 
I 
Sourcp : Government of India. Ministry of Industry, Secretariat of Industrial Approvals 
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Sectorwise and countrywise distribution. Tables 8 through 10 lay out the sectorwise and 
countrywise distribution of foreign collaboration and DFI both during the 1980s (till 1987) 
and across one year, 1987. Five general points should be noted. First in terms of country 
concentration, Europe's share of foreign collaborations in the 1 980s is clearly declining, 
explained for the most part by a decline in U.K. collaborations and a marked rise in 
collaborations with Japan, while the U.S. share stayed roughly constant. 
Second, during the 1980s, there is marked shift in the country ranking between foreign 
collaborations and DFI with Japan and the U.S. together accounting for 43.4 per cent of 
DFI projects compared to only 31 per cent of foreign collaborations compared to Europe's 
27.1 per cent of DFI and 47.2 per cent share of foreign collaborations with the differences 
again accounted partly for by a jump in the level of Japanese involvement and by German 
and U.K. preferences for foreign collaborations. 
Third, both the 1 981-1 987 aggregate and the 1 987 sectoral figures highlight the emphasis 
placed by foreign investors and Indian collaborators on strengthening domestic capabilities 
in technology intensive sectors such as electronics, chemicals and capital goods. 
Electronics in particular stands out because of the marked rise in its share of overall 
collaboration from 19 per cent during 1974-1980 and nearly 25 per cent over the 
1981-1987 period. 
Fourth, the 1987 figures demonstrate the relative overall strength of the U.S. and Europe 
as foreign investors and collaborators compared to the sector specific strengths of Japan 
and individual European countries. Of particular importance here is the pre-eminent position 
that has been attained by Germany as a source of technology and technical assistance to 
Indian enterprises. It is recognized by leading actors in both the public and the private 
sector as being far and away the most important European country to which India looks for 
technological and industrial collaboration. 
TABLE 8: Foreign collaborations 19S1-l987 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total % 
USA 85 109 135 143 229 203 217 1121 21.2 
Germany 74 110 129 132 187 188 154 974 18.4 
UK so 105 119 123 149 134 130 840 15.9 
Japan 27 51 58 78 111 111 82 518 9.8 
Italy 18 37 30 37 59 58 54 293 5.5 
France 23 28 40 38 63 40 43 275 5.2 
Switzer- 26 41 47 30 43 32 32 251 4_7 
land 
Sweden 11 15 15 14 32 30 20 137 2.6 
Nether- 9 13 13 14 18 24 30 114 2.2 
lands 
Others 36 79 87 131 150 140 148 771 14.5 
Total 389 588 673 740 1041 960 903 5294 100.0 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Secretariat of industrial approvals 
Finally, the value of DFI, though growing, is still very low compared both the size of the 
economy to the levels of direct foreign investment in countries such as Thailand, South 
Korea, Brazil, and China. These low absolute levels of DFI in India have undoubtedly been 
due to its historically restrictive policies towards foreign investment. Neither these 
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restrictive policies nor the reluctance of the foreign investment community is likely to 
change (iramaticafly in the short term. Nevertheless the rapid upsurge in investment in the 
1985-8$ period is a clear sign that given the right signals, Oft could grow substantially 
with m~or positive implications for India's future - particularly if some way can be found 
to harn~ss foreign investment and technology to the beneficial development of the rural 
market ~md technology intensive sectors simultaneously. 
! TABLE 9 ! Tot~J·.tor,ign collaboration$ ·by Se¢.tQr:::~:: 1987 tn\imb~r _of . 
! 
I 
I 
I 
. agreements) . ·:. ·, ·. . . .. ,.-::·· . .. . :<·_.::·: : · .
. ·.· 
.. 
... ·.·.· .. 
. .. 
.. 
Sector USA FRG UK Japan Others Total 
Electrical & 65 22 38 28 74 227 
Electronics 
Industrial 35 47 21 10 52 165 
machinery 
Chemical 37 23 15 11 52 138 
Mechanical 18 17 12 9 27 83 
engineering 
Others • 62 45 44 24 115 290 
Total 217 154 130 82 320** 903 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Secretariat of Industrial Approvals 
• Other sectors include transport (37), metallurgy (35), machine tools (24), and 
miscellaneous ( 1 68) 
• • Other countries include Italy (54), France (43), Switzerland (32), Netherlands (23) 
and Sweden (20) 
:TAB'E Hl"~ ·CotmtriWise_,~distribution otfQr:etei~::·::-_:;_:: 
·· · . :conabOtatioris~ tsS:t·tss·tl%·,:of:t®ir:: 
'_:. cottil>6raii®s) · · · ... ,_ ..... ,. · : 
USA 21.2 
FRG 18.4 
UK 15.9 
Japan 9.8 
France 5.2 
Italy 5.5 
Switzerland 4.7 
Sweden 2.6 
Netherlands 2.5 
Others 14.5 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Secretariat of 
Industrial Approvals 
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11.3. EVOLUTION OF INDIAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
The performance of India's science and technology structures is as paradoxical as that of 
the country's development experience in general. While there have been remarkable 
achievements in the fields of agricultural research, oceanography and biotechnology, 
nuclear and space technology, the performance is extremely uneven in other areas such as 
health and most importantly in relation to industry where, with notable exceptions, the 
formal S& T system has failed to live up to the early expectations that it would act as the 
main source of industrial technology for Indian industry. 
Nevertheless, from our perspective the Indian S& T system boasts a variety of uniquely 
positive attributes that distinguishes it from the other SAST countries and opens up a a 
range of possibilities for collaboration. These stem not just from the size of its network of 
educational and research institutes and the substantial reservoir of highly qualified 
manpower. They arise also from the existence of pockets of world class scientific 
research, a well-developed standards institution, and a variety of R&D and consulting 
institutions that are very effective technological gatekeepers due to their expertise in 
absorbing imported technology, developing their own and effectively transferring both to 
industry. Most importantly, there has been a perceptible shift in industry's willingness to 
finance its own R&D and in the re-orientation of the formal S& T system towards pursuing 
demand-led R&D that bodes well for the future given the enormous size and potential of 
India's human and institutional S&T resources. 
Creation of the S& T infrastructure. The first two decades following independence saw the 
establishment of a broadbased S& T infrastructure in education, research and supporting 
facilities. Most of the major government institutions including the Council on Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) came into existence during this period. No demands were placed 
on the S& T establishment to contribute directly to economic progress as all effort was 
directed at creating institutional and human assets. Industrial development took place 
through import of technology and scientific research went forward under the spirit of free 
enquiry and was undisturbed by economic successes and failures. Scientific leaders were 
given responsibility for formulating priorities and efforts to develop effective S& T policy 
instruments and mechanisms were very weak. 18 
Reappraisal of the unfettered expansion of the formal S& T system. For a variety of 
reasons, from the beginning of the 1970s, the emphasis began to shift towards an 
expectation that linkages between the research infrastructure and economic progress had 
to be strengthened and so science policy and plans were re-assessed and re-oriented. 17 
The National Committee on Science and Technology, set up in 1973, prepared for the first 
18 While formal science policy advisory structures existad, such as Scientific Advisory Committee to the 
Cabinet, with a mandate to advise the cabinet on scientific priorities and funding, the policies were based on the 
close relationship between the scientific elite and Nehru. Large organizations suches Department of Atomic Energy 
and several CSIR institutions came into existence without consideration of the SACC. W Morehouse, "Professional 
Estates as Political Actors : The Case of tho Indian Scientific Community", Philosophy and Social Action, vol 11, 
no 4, 1976, pp 61-95. 
17 The economic and political context of tho early 1970s was characterizad by severe balance of payments 
crisis following two wars with China and Pakistan and the effects of a severe three year drought that left the 
country vulnerable to international pressures. 
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time a plan for science and technology, and from that point on S& T plans became an 
integral ~art of the five year planning exercise. 
! 
On the industrial front several policy changes were made with regard to the import of 
technolo~y, the exclusion of foreign investment from certain sectors and the use of patents 
that influenced the utilization of domestic R&D capabilities. Thus research institutions 
focusse~ on ·import substitution• and directed their efforts into areas where foreign 
technolo~y would not be introduced. 18 Private industry began to set up R&D Jabs while 
the accu~ulating strengths of Indian engineering consultancy organizations began to be 
manifest: in greater bargaining power on the Indian side in negotiations over technology 
transfer. 1 
' 
The period also saw indigenous research being transformed into production in electronics, 
I 
drugs, p~sticides, chemicals and power generating equipment. New capabilities and 
institutional structures (in the shape of specialized R&D labs and government departments) 
were cr~ated in non-conventional energy, ocean resources, new materials, space 
applicati~ns, fast-breeder reactor technology, the environment and bio-technology. 
Science olic in he era of Libera liz ion. The thrust of S& T policy during the 1980s in 
part refl , cted the industrial/urban priorities of the Gandhi government that had lead to 
economic liberalization and in part reflected considerable optimism in the S& T capabilities 
of India, 
1
three and half decades after independence, to achieve major breakthroughs in the 
solution pf its most difficult development problems. 
The poJjcy therefore moved in three directions: increased investment in advanced 
technolofy in order to secure national capabilities for India in these areas; the direct 
harnessi g of the country's S& T capabilities to the solution of major socio-economic 
problem affecting the fundamental economic progress of the society; and the provision 
of a suijstantial boost to the role of the private sector in industrial development by 
strength~ning and encouraging the development of its R&D and S& T capabilities. 
I 
In line with the first thrust, major research programmes linked into development and 
producti~n were launched in areas such as biotechnology, new materials, parallel 
computi~g and digital switching. Case studies of the biotechnology research programme 
and the telecommunications technology development initiative are presented as annexes. 
Toward~ the second objective a number of •technology missions• were launched and 
pursued ~midst a great deal of fanfare in the middle of the decade. These •Missions• were 
in essence time-targeted technology development and deployment programmes involving 
activities which spanned R&D to the actual delivery of products and services to industry, 
governrnent and ordinary consumers. The •technology missions• related to drinking water, 
oil seeds, immunization, communications, literacy and dairy products. Unfortunately, 
despite itheir innovative approach and promising start, little has been heard of the 
T echnol~gy Missions since they were launched. We can only hope this innovative attempt 
to break ,away from the burden of past ineffective approaches to harnessing S& T to Indian 
developrrent has not been made a victim of the fickle Indian political process. 
18 Simultaneously several fiscal measures were introduced (but withdrawn in 1984) to promote in-house R&D 
in the ind~stry. Tax write-offs of 100 percent on capital investment for R&D from taxable income and 133 per 
cent for e~penditure on sponsored research were made available to the industry. These were withdrawn in 1984. 
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A related set of major S& T initiatives, launched quring the last half of the 1 980s and also 
in the mission "mode" but still surviving, focussed on a wide variety of problem areas from 
health to the establishment of networks of major technology intensive infrastructural 
facilities and supporting institutions. These include the creation of the Technology 
Information and Assessment and Forecasting Council and the Technology Development 
Fund; the setting up a national center for weather forecasting to aid farmers; the creation 
of a Natural Resources Data Management System and the development of a national 
system of data-base management support for decentralized socio-economic planning. 
A number of steps were also taken to further strengthen formal and informal links between 
the R&D system and industry. CSIR, whose industry related activities had been long and 
loudly criticised for their lack of relevance, was subjected to a major and highly critical 
review which recommended, along with a variety of other measures to build links with 
industry, that by 1992-93 one third of its revenue should be generated from sources other 
than budgetary support. 18 Though there is great scepticism within the industrial 
community and among outside observers as to whether CSIR institutes, given their 
structure and mentality, can ever hope to be a major source of technology for industry,20 
it is nevertheless the case that a number of CSIR' s R&D institutions have already made 
major strides towards this objective. In addition to these CSIR focussed efforts, Science 
and Technology Advisory Committees (STACs) were set up for all economic ministries to 
identify S& T needs at the sectoral level and to explore cross sectoral S& T linkages via an 
lntersectoral Science and Technology Advisory Committee. 
Finally in relation to the objective of strengthening industry's R&D and S&T capabilities the 
government introduced a number of policy changes and new initiatives. It brought in 
legislation and made policy changes intended to facilitate greater state financing of private 
sector technology development, including the provision of venture capital. It also launched 
five new programmes directly aimed at encouraging in-house R&D. As we shall see below 
these initiatives have had a significant impact on the scale and orientation of private sector 
R&D efforts. 
'I& Further measures adopted to build links between industry and CSIR include increased representation of 
industry on the governing board of the CSIR; encouraging more effective technology transfer through building 
engineering design capability and links with engineering design organizations; encouraging the institutions do carry 
out their own technology marketing end encouraging researchers to consult with industry by permitting to 
augment their incomes substantially. 
20 See for example v. Govindarajulu, Rlndia's S&T CapabilityR, Economic and Political Weekly, February 17, 
1990. 
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11.4. SCJENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA: INSTITUTIONAL 
SlfRUCTURE AND PLANNING MECHANISMS 
There is h~rdly any other developing country, and only a few developed countries, that can 
rival India lin the scale and spread of it scientific and educational institutional set-up. Since 
independ~nce, the institutional structure for education and scientific research expanded 
enormousJy to more than 1000 research institutions (Ris), 157 universities and 5500 
colleges. iThe number of in-house R&D units, both in the public and private sector is about 
1 000, an~ that of consultancy firms about 150. Out of a stock of nearly 3 million trained 
people, a'out 275,000 S& T personnel are economically active in S& T and by now some 
90,000 + : are directly engaged in R&D activities in various public and private sector R&D 
institutio~s. See Table 11. Though slightly dated, Table 12 shows this compares 
favourably in quantitative terms with advanced developing countries such as Korea, as well 
as some ~f the industrialized countries such as France and Germany. 
.. 
'• ·-··:··. . .. :-··.-·:· .. :.:. -·: ..- . ·.· ... · .. · . 
Number of 
R&D personnel 
A. Institutional sector 
Department of Atomic Energy 6062 
CSIR 6546 
DADO • 7950 
Indian Council of Agricultural 5403 
Research 
Department of Space • • 6827 
Indian Council of Medical 605 
Research 
Other ministries and agencies 6993 
State governments 18253 
B. Industrial Sector 
Public sector including joint 9511 
sector 
Private sector 17159 
TOTAL 85309 
Source: Government of India, Department of Science and Technology 
R&D Statistics, 1988-1987 
• 1982-1983; • • 1984-1985 data 
... :· 
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TABlE 12 :-Total R&D personnel in selected 
countries 
India (1986) 85,309 
Korea (1985) 41,473 
us (1985) 790,000 
France (1983) 92,682 
FAG (1981) 115,443 
Japan (1985) 381,282 
Source : Government of India, Department of Science and 
Technology, 1988 
The real volume of resources devoted to R&D multiplied fifty-fold between 1950 and 1986 
rising at an annual growth rate of some 12 per cent. As shown in Table 13, they amounted 
to a mere 0.02 per cent of GNP in 1950. The share was raised to 1.1 per cent in 1988, 
exceeded among developing countries only by South Korea. Tables 14 and 15 give some 
idea of the growth in S& T expenditure between 1951 and 1 988 and of the growth in 
infrastructural facilities between 1977 and 1 986. 
Obviously given a national enterprise of this scale, it is difficult if not impossible to 
comprehensively describe, summarize or analyze either verbally or statistically India's S& T 
system, institutional structures and resources. We have however, done our best in the 
discussion that follows concentrating first on the education system and manpower 
situation, then describing the organization and structure of the S& T system and concluding 
with a brief note on the S&T planning mechanism. 
TABLE 13 : Tr'ends in national expenditure oo S& T activities 
{million rupeesJ · 
Year ending S& T expenditure Percentage of GNP 
March 
1951 46.8 0.02 
1956 121.4 0.12 
1959 288.1 0.23 
1966 850.6 0.39 
1971 1733.7 0.47 
1976 3979.9 0.60 
1981 10034.5 0.66 
1986 22239.1 0.96 
1988 33035.1 1.10 
Source :Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, 
R&D statistics 1986-1987 
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TABLE 14 :Trends in the growth of S&T expenditure 
(million rupees) 
Five year plan period Total S&T Average per 
expenditure annum 
First (1955-60) 200 40 
Second (1960-65) 670 134 
Third ( 1 965-70) 1440 288 
Fourth (1970-75) 3750 750 
Fifth (1975-80) 13810 2762 
Sixth ( 1980-85) 37160 7432 
Seventh ( 1 985-90) 75350 15070 
Eighth * (1990-95) 100000 40000 
• Projected 
Source : Department of Science and Technology, R&D statistics 1986-87, 
R&D statistics 1986-87, New Delhi, 1988, p 38. See also The 
Hindu, September 4, 1989. 
TABU~ 15: Trends in the growth of S&T infrastructure in India 
~ 1977 
Unive~sities and Institutions of higher learning 1145 
Collegjes offering science and general 4317 
education 
Decision Base 
1986 
160 
5723 
Intake! of students 2432000 3571000 
Collegjes offering engineering courses 155 236 
Profe~sional and Technical colleges 272 320 
R&D ihstitutions under central and state 660 1150 
goven!tments 
ln-hol!se industrial R&D centres na 876 
' Stock:of trained S&T manpower 188000 2275000 
Econ~mically active S& T manpower 132000 
S& T rhanpower engaged in R&D 15000 
Source ;: Derived from Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, R&D 
! statistics, various years 
11.4.1. HIGHER EDUCATION FOR S&T AND THE STOCK AND 
!DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN S& T PERSONNEL 
I 
823000 
84000 
India be$Jan, at independence with 20 univers1t1es in major c1t1es and with a major 
commitment on the part of the leadership to rapidly expand the pool of trained manpower 
available! for tackling the enormous developmental challenges faced by the country. This 
number mrew to 160 in 1989 linked to about 5500 colleges. A policy of promoting centres 
of excell~mce has led to the creation of hierarchically placed academic institutions that vary 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 53 
Decision Base 
widely in quality. The 7 major city universities and their associated colleges as well as the 
five Indian Institutes of Technology (with a restricted curriculum focussed on science and 
engineering) and the Indian Institute of Science are of extremely high quality and involved 
in world class research and graduate training of scientists and engineers. On the other 
hand, many of the rural universities and particularly the isolated colleges far removed from 
urban centres are barely capable of giving adequate science and engineering training. 
In 1985, 5 million students were enrolled in higher education, surpassed only by the USA 
and USSR, taught by 200,000 faculty members. Of these 169,000 belong to engineering 
discipline, 133,000 in medicine, 48,000 in agriculture, 11,000 in veterinary sciences and 
astonishingly, 725,000 in sciences; in 1983-4, 3040 doctoral degrees (44 per cent of the 
total awarded) were granted in science and engineering. Table 16 shows the outturn of 
scientific and technical personnel from universities from 1947 to 1984. This figure in 1988 
stood at 194,500. 
TABLE 16 : Stock of scientific and technical personnel 1950~ 1980 lOOO's) 
Category 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1980 
Engineering & Technology 
(i) Degree 21.6 37.5 62.2 106.7 185.4 221.4 
(ii) Diploma 31.5 46.8 75.0 138.9 244.4 329.4 
Science 
(i) Post Graduates 16.0 28.0 47.7 85.7 139.2 217.5 
(ii) Graduates 60.0 102.9 165.6 261.5 420 750.3 
Agriculture 
(i) Post Graduates 1.0 2.0 3.7 7.7 13.5 96.5* 
(ii) Graduates 6.9 11.5 20.2 39.4 47.2 0.0 
Medicine 
(i) Degree 18.0 29.0 41.6 60.6 97.8 165.4 
(ii) Licentiate 33.0 35.0 34.0 31.0 27.0 2.2*. 
Note : During the year 1980, the number of B.Scs who were also B.Eds were estimated to be 166,000. 
Similar figures for the earlier years are not available. 
Including Graduates; 
Represents B.Sc (Nursing). Particulars regarding number of Licentiates not available. 
Source: Department of Science and Technology, Research&. Development Statistics 1986-87, New 
Delhi, 1988. 
Almost all the institutions are under the financial jurisdiction of the Indian states, though 
a number of those in large cities have been deemed "nationally important", including the 
IITs and liS, and therefore receive central funds. In addition to the support provided by the 
state governments, the University Grants Commission and the Department of Science and 
Technology are major central government supporters of science and engineering education 
annually giving between $1 00 and $1 20 million for this purpose with the majority going 
to the universities and teaching cum research institutions deemed to be of national 
importance. India's universities also carry out research (and account for approximately 9 
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per cent! of national R&D expenditure) and the capabilities in place in some university 
departm~nts are highly rated internationally if not given the same recognition nationally. 21 
I Not surprisingly, numerous analysts have identified a large number of problems with India's 
S& T edli.lcational system that need to be put right and can only be done so by the 
government and the system itself. One of the most important of these for our concerns 
is the ve!ry uneven nature of the educational facilities and opportunities offered leading to 
problem$ of uneven quality in the available human resources. This derives in large part due 
to the m~rginalisation of University education that has occurred over the last decade or so 
as resoulrces have been devoted to building up research institutions on the one hand and 
on the other by a policy of creating new teaching institutions outside the universities. 
Another, problem derives from the nature of expansion of engineering education. The 
number Of engineering colleges has increased from 155 in 1981 to 236 in 1985. However, 
we were told during interviews that a matter of grave concern is the mushrooming number 
of engin~ering colleges that are financed purely on the basis of capitation fees. Admission 
to these! colleges is not governed by merit but the capacity of the student to pay the fee. 
Teaching and curicula are also not regulated in these colleges. The consequences for the 
quality ~f the stock of technical manpower of this pattern of engineering education could 
be very serious. 
The lndi~n manpower scenario presents a complex picture: on the one hand educational 
institutions turn out a large number of students at various levels and on the other hand 
there an:l serious shortages of competent manpower to meet the growing requirements in 
certain specialized areas. For example, the education system produced a large number of 
graduate engineers but not enough technicians who take up shopfloor jobs. (The ratio is 
almost 11 to 1 in India, where as in developed countries it is 1 to 8). Moreover many of the 
engineer[ing graduates are either weak technically or find it difficult to adapt to shopfloor 
conditio~s because of the overly theoretical nature of their training. 
! 
General ~cience undergraduates who do not go on to graduate education often suffer from 
a similar! mismatch in their training and what is expected of them in the workplace. Those 
who do !go on to graduate training receive a generally high standard of training but still 
there ar~ serious gaps. For example many areas of software engineering and biotechnology 
are relatively well stocked but the skill base in new materials is very limited. As we shall 
see beldw such problems are exacerbated by the outward emigration of much talented 
manpower. 
The sto k and distribution of Indian S& T man ower. It is hardly surprising that given the 
size of he educational system (relative to the size of "modern" segment of India's 
economy) and the scale of the resources devoted annually to this purpose, India, more so 
than virtually any other country, has an unabsorbable surplus of trained S& T personnel. 
The stoJk of science and technology personnel, even when narrowly defined crossed 2. 7 
million i~ 1985 and is now certainly close to 3 million. Of these, some 275,000 are 
officially! estimated to be economically active, with at least 90,000 directly engaged in R&D 
activitie~ and placing India ninth among all countries in this respect. Table 17 gives the 
best estimates of the distribution of S& T personnel across activities. 
21 See ~he excellent discussion in F.A.Long, "Science, Technology and Industrial Development," Technology 
in Societv! Vol 10. 1988. of many of these points. 
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Category 1985 (000) 1990 (000) 
Stock of Economically Stock of Economically 
manpower active manpower active 
population population 
Engineering degree 372.6 324.2 454.4 395.3 
Engineering diploma 564.2 490.9 734.8 639.3 
Medical graduates 258.7 225.1 302.4 263.1 
Dental surgeons 9.5 8.3 12.0 10.4 
Nurses {B.Sc.) 3.7 307.0 5.5 5.4 
Agricultural gradu<!tes 133.3 1.4 162.8 127.0 
Vetennary graduates 28.3 24.6 33.4 29.1 
Science graduates 1138.3 887.9 1339.4 1044.7 
Science .post grads 350.3 273.2 419.7 327.4 
• B.Ed. (B.Sc.) 280.7 218.9 344.8 269.0. 
TOTAL 3139.6 2560 .. 8 3809.2 3110.7 
Estimated on the assumption that 25 per cent of Education Graduates would be with Science 
background. 
Source: Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan •. 1985-90 Vol 2. 
About 7 4 per cent of the R&D personnel work in S&. T agencies funded by government 
where as the private sector constitutes 26 per cent. Of the personnel engaged in R&D, 
44.4 per cent were from engineering and technology background, 37.7 per cent from the 
natural sciences, 1 2. 5 per cent from agricultural sciences, 2.9 per cent from social sciences 
and 2. 5 percent from the medical sciences. In regard to educational level about 16 per 
cent were Ph.D.'s., 29 per cent with post-graduate qualifications, 30 per cent with 
graduate and 25 per cent with diplomas. 
As we noted above in addition to the 3 million strong reservoir of trained personnel, every 
year India's higher education system turns out an additional 190,000 new entrants to the 
labour market who have had some form of S& T -related training (including, in 1986, 3500 
doctorates in S& T related fields). This vast and growing pool of human resources 
competes for a much smaller number of appropriate jobs - probably at an upper limit of 
400,000 existing places - within the economy that genuinely require some form of 
technical and scientific training. This oversupply creates a considerable number of 
problems for India not least of which is the seemingly unstoppable outward flow of trained 
Indians who choose to emigrate abroad. 
Astonishingly, many tens of thousands of these individuals, primarily the best and most 
highly trained , have left India and now reside and work in other countries, particularly the 
U.S. Many of the departing graduates are from elite institutions such as the IITs and the 
well equipped laboratories of India's seven leading universities (one interviewee claimed 
that over the last two years about 80 per cent of the Ph.D.'s. from the School of Life 
Sciences of the Jawaharlal Nehru University migrated to the US). 
The numbers already lost and the size of the annual flow, combined with the fact that 
these non-resident Indians (NRis) are highly concE!ntrated in some countries and sectors 
such as biotechnology and electronics in the U.S. (where they account for a significant 
share of ,111 senior level technical positions in the private sector), explains why the whole 
topic of "brain-drain• has again become an emotive and divisive issue in India to an extent 
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not foun1 in any other country. The scale of the problem and the reactions engendered 
among s~nior policy makers and scientists comes out particularly graphically in our 
discussioh of software exports from India in Part One. 
This unique manpower surplus situation creates both opportunities and problems for EC 
hopes of IS&T collaboration with India. On the one hand, this pool of trained manpower is 
clearly alh enormous, and enormously underutilized, resource that India could bring to 
collaborative S& T projects that are skilled manpower intensive in areas such as software 
where EY,ope has acknowledged skills shortfalls. At the same time, the negative publicity 
given to recent attempts by U.S. and European software firms to take advantage of the 
Indian skills surplus has sensitized policy makers towards the political pitfalls of such 
arrangements. 
11.4.2. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE INDIAN S& T SYSTEM 
Table 18! shows the organizational structure of the central government's S& T system that 
plans, suipports, carries out and integrates S& T with production. The government is the 
main so~rce of funds for R&D and related S&T, contributing 85 per cent of national S&T 
expenditilire. The prime minister has always been the official head of science and 
technolo~y and the Janata government had installed two leading scientists, Profs. MGK 
Menon arhd R Ramanna, who held senior positions in the previous government, as Ministers 
of State for Science and Technology and Defence respectively. 22 
A Ministrjy of Science and Technology was created in 1985 encompassing three majorS& T 
departments with direct responsibility for S& T - the Department of Science and 
Technol~gy, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Department of 
Biotechnplogy. The Department of Science and Technology, the premier administrative 
body for :the S& T system has responsibility for formulating policy guide-lines in S& T, the 
promotioh of new areas of S&T, S&T entrepreneurship development and international 
scientific! and technical affairs, including international S& T collaboration - though in the 
case of ~gricultural research this responsibility is vested with the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The Dep~rtment of Scientific and Industrial Research was created in 1985 to act as a focal 
point fo~ the government's efforts to promote greater innovative and R&D activity in 
industry.' DSIR administers a wide variety of support and incentive schemes to this end, 
most of lhem instituted within the last few years. 23 
DSIR is ~lso responsible for the CSIR whose network of forty laboratories constituted the 
core grolflp of industry-oriented R&D centres in India. As noted elsewhere, there is much 
criticism !of the CSIR and the relevance of a good deal of the work carried out in its 
22 Raii"! Gandhi as prima minister had three advisory mechanisms : the scientific adviser, the adviser for 
tachnolog~ missions, and an independent Science Advisory Council which replaced the earlier Scientific Advisory 
Committe~ to the Cabinet. The Janata Dal government which came to power in 1989 did not restore these three 
formal advjsory mechanisms and the structure and mechanisms for scientific advice remained ill defined. The 
position of1 the new government on this issue is not known. 
23 For a~ampla, five specific programmes to assist industrial R&D operated by the DSIR - the recognition of in· 
house R&P facilities; provision of import facilities for R&D activities; customs duty exemption; preferential 
treatment in licensing and fiscal incentives for scientific research. In addition it operates other schemes such as 
the Techncplogy Absorption and Adaptation Scheme, the Transfer and Trading in Technology Scheme and the 
Program on Promotion and Support to Consultancy Services. 
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TABLE 18 ~ Science and technology framework for central government 
SCIENTIFIC ADVISER 
PRIME SCIENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO PM MINISTER 
ADVISER ON 
TECHNOLOGY MISSION 
MINISTRIESIOEPARTMENTS/APEX BODIES 
WITH HIGH SCIENCE CONTENT 
DAE :Dept. of Atomic Energy 
DOS : Dept. of Space 
DOE : Dept. of Electronics 
DOEn : Dept. of Environment 
ONES : Dept. of Non-conventional Energy Sources 
DOD : Dept. of Ocean Development 
DBT : Dept. of Biotechnology 
DST: Dept. of Science & Technology 
DSIR : Dept. of Scientific and Industrial Research 
ICMR : Indian Council of Medical Research 
ICAR : Indian Council of Agricultural Research 
DRDO : Defence Research & Development Organ. 
CSIR : Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
UGC : University Grants Commission 
liT : Indian Institutes of Technology 
Univs : Universities 
laboratories - though in recent years some CSIR labs have made major strides in improving 
their links with industry. However, there is also no question that numbered among the 
CSIR resources are some outstanding human and institutional scientific capabilities that 
have not only contributed to Indian development but have also provided the basis for a 
wide ranging set of international collaborations with more than 40 countries. Moreover, 
there is conceivably a wealth of commercially valuable but still unexploited knowledge 
available in CSIR labs that, given their mandate to generate income, they may be willing 
to develop and commercialize in co-operation with European labs and firms. 
Councils similar to CSIR run research institutions under the control of other departments. 
The Indian Council of Agricultural Research which has a chain of 40 Jabs in agricultural and 
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animal husbandry research and the Indian Council of Medical Research which is the apex 
body for tormulating, coordinating and promoting biomedical research and has 18 R&D 
institutior1s under its control. 
Other de~artments with a strong S& T component to their activities who also support R&D 
laboratori~s are atomic energy, electronics, space, environment, non-conventional energy 
sources, focean development and education. The Department of Atomic Energy is 
responsib'e for R&D in the area of atomic energy and has under its control 1 2 R&D units 
of which five are focussed on basic research - Saha lnsitute of Nuclear Physics, the Tata 
Institute l:>f Fundamental Research, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira Gandhi 
Centre fot Atomic Research and the Centre for Advanced Technology. 
The Depairtment of Space is responsible for satellite communication and remote sensing 
program~es. The Department of Electronics is the executive wing of the electronics 
commissipn which deals with formulation of policies and programmes for the development 
of electrohics and also directs the implementation of such programmes. The Department 
of Enviror(lment is the focal point for planning, promotion and coordination of environment 
I 
programn!les. The Department of Ocean Development is entrusted with the responsibility 
of promo1ion of R&D, mapping the resources of EEZ, deep sea-bed mining, and Antarctic 
research. 1The Department of Non-conventional Energy Sources promotes utilization of solar 
energy arjd bio-gas plants. 
I 
In additidn there are several socio-economic departments such as health, agriculture, 
defence, I industry and communication which have major research establishments 
(numberiog over 1 00 and covering a diverse array of fields) as well as other components 
of S& T 'n their activities. For example, the Defence Research and Development 
Organiza~ion has a network of over forty laboratories covering a wide range of disciplines 
such as a~ronautics, gas turbines, instrumentation, material science, food, and armament. 
The Rese~rch Design and Standards Organization (RDSO) is connected to the Ministry of 
Railways~ the Telecommunication Research Centre to the Ministry of Communication, and 
the lndiar(l Statistical Institute to the Ministry of Planning. 
Finally, s~ate governments have also set up institutions primarily designed to meet the R&D 
needs of ftraditional sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, health, forestry, etc. 
In all th~ Indian central government, through its various ministries and departments, 
provides $upport to 1 000 laboratories while the state governments support another 300 
laboratori)es. In 1 986, 55 per cent of total S& T related expenditure went to the scientific 
departmehts while the S& T component of the socio-economic ministries accounted for 45 
per cent of the outlay. 
11.4.3. lHE S& T PLANNING MECHANISM 
Because ~ndia adopted early on a planning approach to development of its S& T system 
there is ar elaborate formal planning mechanism at the national and state level. S& T plans 
are prepared as part of the main five year plans with responsibility for preparation entrusted 
to the Planning Commission member in charge of S& T. Extensive consultations are 
undertak~n with agencies, individual experts and NGOs over priorities and allocations and 
ultimatelf this process results in a chapter on S& T in the plan document. Frequently as 
part of t~is process, specialized task forces are set up to consider actions necessary to 
tackle particular problems - for the Eighth Plan, fourteen task forces were established. 
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After the main document is prepared, individual S&T agencies then elaborate upon the 
parameters provided to prepare their own five year plans. These are submitted to the 
Planning Commission at the beginning of the plan period and then discussed annually. 
Simultaneously, state level S&T agencies also get involved with the planning process via 
the preparation of their own state-level S& T plans which are in turn discussed with the 
Planning Commission. The financial allocation for the S& T sector is finalized at Planning 
Commission level through a joint consultative process involving other members of the 
Commission representing other sectors and the Ministry of Finance. 
The national S& T plan and the S& T agency plans in effect provide the framework for 
programme and project planning at the level of individual institutions. These institutions 
at the start of the planning process make draft plans that are integrated by their parent 
agency as inputs to the process of preparing the national plan. The different working 
groups and task forces that actually prepare the plan are constructed so that all the 
relevant agencies and institutions have an opportunity to provide an input. 
Above we have only given the barest of outlines of the S& T planning process and have not 
entered at all into the myriad debates that have taken place over the years with reference 
to the effectiveness of the S& T planning process. One issue that always comes up is the 
existence of a parallel but informal decision making process regarding S& T plans and 
resource allocation. The existence of such a process has long been accepted as a 
necessary fact of life within the Indian context arising from the complex social and political 
pressures that influence the decision making process in science and technology. 
Thus, even though the formal mechanisms of science policy were institutionalised as early 
as the 1 950s, the effectiveness of these bodies throughout the last 40 years has always 
been constrained due to the problems of clarity of their position in the governmental 
hierarchy and the composition of their membership. Decisions are often taken not on the 
basis of the advice tendered to the political leadership by the official advisory bodies, but 
as a result of informal and tacit interactions between concerned individuals in the scientific 
community, the executive and the polity and independent of the formal national science 
policy apparatus. 24 
This issue is particularly important from our specific perspective Simply put, senior 
government officials and S& T policymakers within the Indian government have always 
found mechanisms to create a mandate and allocate resources to the pursuit of S& T related 
objectives that have emerged outside of the planning process as important (for whatever 
reasons) for the national interest. This is precisely what happened initially in relation to the 
technology missions and the major biotechnology and supercomputer R&D programmes that 
were launched on an ad-hoc basis. 
This is also what we expect could happen with any major S& T collaborative programmes 
that the EC might propose. Provided the political will is there, a way would be found to 
respond to the initiative on an ad-hoc basis and any steps taken in terms of resource or 
manpower allocation would ultimately be officially incorporated within the system. Thus 
the rather informal and sub-rosa process of fostering the political will necessary to support 
any initiatives is far more important in India than pursuing these via official procedures - a 
point that we take into consideration in our strategy discussion in Part I. 
14 For example see A. Parthasarathy, "Appearance and Reality in Two Decades of Science Policy", in A. 
Rahman and K.D.Sharma (eds) Science Policy Studies, 1974. 
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11.5. INDIAN R&D EXPENDITURE AND ALLOCATION: STRUCTURE AND 
RECENT TRENDS 
Over 85 per cent of India's R&D expenditure in 1986-87 was made by the government 
sector, while industry, public and private accounts for between 21 per cent and 25 per 
cent- a figure that could be closer to 30 per cent if contract research is accounted for. As 
Table 19 shows while public and private R&D investments have grown rapidly in real terms 
during the 1980s, government spending has grown much faster with a consequent 
reduction in the share of industrial R&D in the overall total. 
TABLE 19 : Public and private R&D expenditures {million rupees) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986-
87 
National total 7605 9407 12060 13811 17816 20688 26675 
' 
Central Govt. 5805 7219 9120 10533 14223 16541 21576 
State govts. 593 718 971 1199 1261 1628 1929 
Private sector 1207 147 1979 2078 2332 2519 3181 
Central Agencies 
of which 
CSIR 406 461 877 900 967 900 1104 
DOE 54 75 48 38 41 48 56 
Public sector 864 1078 1224 1617 1712 1986 237167 
Research Assons. 83 94 114 130 143 163 260 
Industrial R&D 2129 2416 3015 3600 3964 4432 5542 
Shares% 16 16 16 15 13 12 12 
Private 
sectorfTotal R&D 
lnd.fTotal R&D * 28 26 25 25 22 21 21 
Includes private and public enterprises and research associations. 
Source : Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, R&D statistics, various years 
Of the government expenditure on R&D, 92 per cent came from the central government, 
amounting to Rs 21580 million ( $1.726 billion) in 1986-87 and the r'est from the state 
governments. As shown by Table 20, 12 major agencies of the central government 
account for bulk of the central government R&D expenditure. The Defence Research and 
Development Organization alone accounts for 37.4 per cent of the expenditure by the major 
agencies. The three major defence agencies, DRDO, Department of Atomic Energy and the 
Department of Space account for 64.4 percent of the total for these agencies. Funding for 
medical research and research on the environment is surprisingly modest - as is the amount 
of money channelled through the Department of Electronics. However, here one has to 
keep in mind the predominant activities of the three leading agencies mentioned above 
since their R&D activities represent a key locus for high technology capabilities within the 
Indian scene. 
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TABLE 20 : R&D expenditures by major scientific agencies, 
1986-87 ($m) 
Defense Research & Development DRDO 
Organization 
Department of Atomic Energy DAE 
Department of Space DoS 
Council of Scientific & Industrial Research CSIR 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research I CAR 
Department of Science & Technology DST 
Department of Ocean Development DOD 
Department of Environment DoE 
Indian Council of Medical Research ICMR 
Dept of Non Conventional Energy Sources ONES 
Department of Electronics DoE 
Department of Biotechnology DBT 
Total 
Source : Government of India, Department of Science and Technology. 
R&D Statistics 1986-87, New Delhi 
518.6 
130.6 
243.7 
134.2 
128.1 
86.9 
9.5 
68.7 
33.8 
18.9 
4.4 
8.3 
1385.7 
The allocation of R&D resources for the three leading S& T agencies was half of the total 
in 1 958 and rose sharply to account for almost two-thirds in 1 987. During the same period 
the share of expenditure on the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research recorded a 
decline. Table 21 captures the changing pattern of R&D expenditure by major S&T agency. 
This data suggests a significant decline in the share of R&D expenditure accounted for by 
civilian research agencies possibly due to the rise in the number of S& T agencies putting 
in resource claims from the same source; or by a general shift in the government's national 
priorities from civilian research to military applications. 
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TABLE 21 :Changing pattern of distribution of R&D expenditure by major 
' 
S&T agency- 1958-1987 
S&T Agency Per Cent Distribution Change 
1958-59 1986-87 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) 41 9 -4.55 
Council of Scientific & Industrial 27 10 -2.7 
Research (CSIR) 
Indian Council for Agricultural 20 9 -2.22 
Research (ICAR) 
Indian Council for Medical Research 3 2 -1.5 
(ICMR) 
Defense Research and Development 8 37 +4.63 
organization (DROOl 
Department of Science and 1 6 +6.0 
Technology (DST) 
(1980-81) 
Department of Space (DOS) 13 18 + 1.39 
Department of Electronics (DOE) 1 1 
Department of environment (00En) 1 5 +5.0 
Department of Ocean Development - 1 + 1.0 
(000) 
Department of Non-conventional 1 1 
Energy (ONES) 
Department of Biotechnology - 1 +1.0 
Source: V. Govindarajulu, (1990) "India's S&T Capability", Economic and Political Weekly, 
February 17, 1990. Table 5. 
However, Tables 22 and 23 cast another light on this question of the distribution of R&D 
effort that suggest that India's S&T effort is moving in a positive overall direction. Table 
22 shows the distribution of R&D expenditure by field of science and demonstrates the 
growing concentration of resources on engineering and the natural sciences while Table 23, 
based on three year moving averages show a slight but significant shift towards applied 
and experimental research - both areas where India needs to strengthen its capabilities. 
Table 24 gives further information on the central government research effort by grouping 
expenditure for 1985 according to R&D programme area field of study of the major R&D 
programmes supported by central government for 1 985 and the numbers of R&D 
establishment associated with these programmes. These programmes spend 77 per cent 
of all government R&D funds through a variety of institutions and programmes with large 
bulk of the institutes involved in development work, particularly in the case of the CSIR 
labs. Some however, such as the leading R&D institutions operated by the Dept of Atomic 
Energy are principally involved in basic research. 
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TABLE 22 : Changing pattern of distribution of R&D 
expenditure by field of science 
S&T Field Percent distribution % change 
1984-85 1986-87 
Natural sciences 35 31 -1.13 
Engineering 44 49 + 1.12 
Medical sciences 5 5 + 1.00 
Agricultural 16 15 -1.07 
sciences 
Source : Govindarajulu, ( 1990) op cit. and Government of India, R&D 
statistics, 1984. 
TABLE 23 : Changing pattern of distribution of S& T expenditure 
in terms of research activity 198()..1987 
Research activity Percent distribution 
1980-81 
Basic research 20 
Applied research 26 
Experimental development 28 
Other activities 26 
Source : Govindarajulu, (1990) op cit. and Government of India, 
R&D statistics, 1984. 
1986-87 
14 
30 
32 
24 
TABLE 24 : leading government R&D programmes by field of 
research, 1985 
Research field R&D units Expenditure 
($m) 
Defense 
- DRDO 42 204.9 
- Defense production 10 52.5 
Total 257.4 
Agriculture 
-ICAR 41 119.2 
- State programmes 100 128.5 
Total 247.7 
DAE 12 194.2 
DOS 8 158.8 
CSIR 42 132.4 
DST 19 114.2 
Total 599.6 
TOTAL 1104.7 
Source : Adapted from F.Long, wScience, Technology and Industrial 
Development in lndiaw, Technology in Society, Vol.l 0, 1988,Table 4. 
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Again the predominance of the military and defense R&D interests of the state is well 
demonstrated in this table. What is important to note however is that all three are 
preoccupied with high technology development that is manifest in both the military research 
and the civilian research programmes (such as the well-known atomic energy and space 
programmes) that are sponsored by these agencies. It is here in the activities of these 
three sets of agencies and their R&D labs, whose activities are well hidden from public 
view, where India's true high tech capabilities particularly in electronics and 
communications are to be found. 
Apart from the major scientific agencies, the ministries of central government support 
research on a more or less sectoral basis. As shown in Table 25, the Ministries of 
Petroleum, Defence Production and Industry account for almost 50 per cent of the R&D 
expenditure of the central ministries and the top 1 0 spend 85 per cent of the total. The 
strength of these ministries within the Indian S& T scene has increased substantially in 
recent years to the point where they could occupy key nodal positions as far as the EC and 
future S&T collaborative initiatives are concerned. 
TABLE 25: R&D expenditure by Central 
Ministries/Departmentsf 1985 
Ministry/Department Expenditure ($m) 
Petroleum 59.4 
Defense production 52.5 
Industry (heavy industry) 41.0 
Communication 30.0 
Irrigation 20.9 
Steel 13.3 
Industry (Industrial 10.3 
development) 
Railways 10.2 
Commerce 9.2 
Chemicals and fertilizers 9.1 
Others • 46.6 
TOTAL 302.5 
Source : Adapted from Long, 1988, op.cit Table 3. 
11.5.1. R&D ACTIVITIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
In 1986-87, the Indian industrial sector (including both public and private sector 
enterprises) altogether spent 5551.7 million rupees on R&D ($440m). 26 This is an 
increase of 21 per cent on the figures for 1984-85 as shown in Table 26 and has probably 
25 It is difficult to arrive at accurate sectoral figures for industrial R&D expenditure in India, given the 
Department of Science and Technology practice of segregating data on institutional basis. DST provides figures 
of R&D expenditure by public and private sector industrial units but does not include the expenditure of 
government agencies such as the CSIR, Department of Space or the Department of Atomic Energy. Thus the DST 
figure for industrial R&D expenditure as 19.4 per cent of total national S& T expenditure is certainly an 
underestimation. 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 65 
Decision Base 
risen to close to $700m by 1989. In 1986, enterprises operating in 11 sectors accounted 
for 85.4 per cent of the total expenditure and within these, the expenditure is highly 
concentrated with about 36 per cer.t of the R&D units accountin~ f0r 4-7 :: ':r sent of the 
total expenditure. 
In terms of indusuial sectors there is a clear segmentation of R&D interests. The !:'ub!ic 
sector dominates electrical & electronics, defence, fuels, telecommunications and fertihzeis 
accounting for 53 per cent. of the total. The private sector activity is concentrated in 
chemicals, drugs, transport and textiles accounting for 47%. The most striking difference 
between the two is in the number of R&D units where the work is carried out with the 
private sector numbering 960 and the public sector only 95. 
TABLE 26 : R&D expenditures of by industry groups in public and private sector 
1986-87 
Industry group Public No of R&D as Private No of R&D Total 
sector Units %of sector Units as% R&D 
R&D STO* R&D of 
STO 
Elect.& 53.92 18 1.82 33.27 136 1.11 87.18 
Electronics 
Defense 42.98 5 8.59 - - - 42.98 
Industry 
Fuels 11.19 6 0.10 0.11 6 0.50 12.26 
Chemicals* • 9.21 8 1.08 52.69 152 1.45 62.16 
Metallurgical 24.38 17 0.24 8.29 35 0.31 32.67 
Drugs&Pharma 3.28 4 2.53 37.61 74 2.23 40.90 
Industrial 1.87 6 0.70 18.97 71 0.95 20.84 
mamchinery 
Telecom- 18.39 6 4.84 0.16 22 1.42 20.25 
munication 
Transportation 0.11 3 0.23 12.91 6 0.52 14.01 
Fertilizers 0.78 6 0.47 0.09 2 0.29 8.65 
Textiles 0.01 3 0.08 11.03 30 0.37 11.19 
Other groups 19.38 13 - 56.65 222 - 60.15 
Total 185.50 95 0.61 227.80 781 0.81 413.3 
• Sales turnover; • • Chemicals other than fertilizers 
Source : Compiled from Government of India, Department of Science and Technology, R&D statistics, 
1986-87, New Delhi, pp 21, 52-53. 
Though these figures suggest that there has been a recent improvement in the level of R&D 
activity and in the apparent commitment of some Indian enterprises to technology 
development, it has to be recognized that the overall level of R&D performance and 
commitment by the Indian (private and public) industrial sector leaves much to be desired. 
Although in-house research is concentrated in technology intensive sectors (electronics, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals and engineering goods were the focus of 775 of the 960 
recognized units), the levels of research expenditure are comparatively low - though the 
figures vary according to the source. Table 27 which provides some contrast with Japan 
and Korea shows that with the exception of pharmaceuticals, though there was an increase 
in technological "intensity" in some sectors, the average expenditure is still less than 1 per 
cent of sales. The DST survey of R&D expenditures shows that in 1986-87, found that 
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public sector firms spent only 0.6 per cent of their total sales turnover on R&D as against 
a corresponding figure of 0.8 per cent of the private sector. 
TABLE 27 : Research intensities of major industrial subsectors • of 
India, Korea and Japan 
Sector India Korea Japan 
1980 1987 1985 1985 
Drugs and pharmaceuticals 1.72 2.2 n.a. n.a. 
Industrial machinery 1.03 0.99 3.06 2.74 
Transportation 0.87 0.64 2.20 2.90 
Chemicals 0.87 1.45 0.96 3.79 
Electricals and electronics 0.72 1.11 4.12 5.10 
Cement and gypsum 0.61 0.45 n.a. n.a. 
Agricultural machinery 0.48 0.41 n.a. n.a. 
Rubber goods 0.44 0.32 n.a. n.a. 
Metallurgical industries 0.44 0.67 1.14 1.59 
• Defined as ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales 
Source : Government of India, Department of Science and Technology 
This macro evidence of a less than wholehearted approach to R&D is confirmed by 
numerous micro level studies showing that much of the R&D activity in the private sector 
in India is geared towards minor adaptations of the imported technology and quality control 
and not to become a source of technology for the firm. 28 If patents are taken as an 
indicator of the performance of the private sector R&D, a study of 500 Indian companies 
registered with DST showed that their share in the total number of Indian applications has 
declined over the period 1969-81. Amongst these firms, as many as two-thirds did not 
apply for a single patent. It was also found that while a reasonable number of multinational 
corporations were very active in carrying out adaptive R&D, five firms in fact accounted 
for almost half of the total foreign applications. This poor performance of Indian enterprises 
in the patenting sweepstakes is confirmed by Table 28. 
TABLE 28 : Number of applications for patents from persons in India and abroad·from 
1976 to 1986 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
India 1129 1342 1097 1124 1055 1159 1093 1135 1055 1001 999 
Foreign residents in 34 23 37 13 37 19 19 25 2 -
India 
Foreign residents 1833 1739 1736 1795 1888 1776 1877 1950 2065 2316 2527 
abroad 
Total 2996 3104 2870 2932 2980 2954 2989 3085 3145 3319 3526 
Source : Annual Report of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 1984-85 and 1985-86 
The above discussion of the macro figures shows that conduct of market driven R&D 
designed to secure a technology-based competitive advantage in the marketplace remains 
28 For example see A.V. Desai, •The origin and direction of industrial R&D in India·, Research Policy, No.9, 
1980. 
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one of India's major S&T weaknesses - despite the vast sea of technical skills and 
resources that surrounds its productive enterprises. This has been a long standing problem. 
Prior to the early 1970s, R&D by industry was minimal since virtually all technology needs 
were imported. At that point, the government instituted fiscal and financial incentives for 
firms to engage in R&D. Under these arrangements (withdrawn in 1984), firms with 
recognized R&D facilities were permitted to deduct 1 00 per cent of capital expenditures 
from taxable income. There was some response by firms to these incentives but by and 
large industrialists and managers continued to show little interest in genuine indigenous 
technology generation. 
The unfettered monopolistic advantages accorded them by protection combined with an 
isolated and unresponsive S& T system reinforced this disinterest in technology generation 
and maintained it across many sectors and firms throughout the 1970s. However during 
the 1980s, these conditions have changed and, as noted above the level of R&D activity 
has begun to measurably increase. 
These developments can be attributed to two broad sets of factors. First beginning in 1985 
with the establishment of the DSIR, the government launched a variety of new initiatives 
to promotion industrial innovation and to encourage firms to increase their own R&D efforts 
as well to be better users of the output of the formal S& T system. Though there are still 
many sceptics who claim that while Indian industry remains protected and regulated that 
these moves will have only marginal effects on firm attitudes to R&D, there is little question 
they have had some effect. This is evidenced by the fact that reported industrial R&D 
expenditures grew surprisingly rapidly at over 21 per cent p.a. in nominal terms between 
1977 and 1987 while over the same period the number of private sector firms with 
recognized in-house R&D units grew from 125 to 960. 
Secondly, it should be noted that many firms have registered R&D units primarily to take 
advantage of government tax incentives. And there are still many critics of the mercantilist 
attitude of the many Indian entrepreneurs who are still reluctant to invest in innovative 
effort. 27 However, there is also clear evidence that the rise in recorded R&D activities is 
genuinely indicative of the emergence of a new awareness among entrepreneurs and 
managers of the importance of innovation and technology as a determinant of competitive 
advantage. 
This is manifest both in the emergence of start-up high technology companies supported 
by venture capital groups, the widespread attention being given by the private sector to the 
pursuit of quality improvement and productivity gains through technical change and the 
successful commercialisation of a number of innovations generated via legitimate R&D in 
the private and public sector. We highlight a number of these examples in the case studies 
presented as annexes below. 
27 For example see "Technological Self-Reliance and Systemic Constraints", Economic and Political Weekly, 
June 11, 1988. 
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MUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT SUPPLY SECTOR 
ANNEX 2 - THE ELECTRONICS SECTOR IN JNDIA: CONTRASTING 
PROBLEMS AND .POSSIBILITIES FOR COLLABO-
RATION IN HARDWARE.AND SOFTWARE 
ANNEX 3 - INDIA'S GROWING STRENGTHS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN 
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ANNEX 4- VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVES· .li'·iiNDIA: CREATJNCfTHE 
RIGHT CONDITIONS FOR ·eNTREPRENEURIAL 
EXPANSION IN HIGH TECH 
ANNEX 5- INDIA-USA S&T RELATIONS~ LONG TERM NEGATIVE·SIDE 
EFFECTS FROM THE CONFLICT OVER INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ANNEX 6 - SOME ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ON NEW FORMS OF 
INDUSTRIAL DYNAMISM IN THE 
INDIAN CONTEXT 
ANNEX 7 - INDIAN'S FORMAL R&D SYSTEM: SELECTIVE 
EXCELLENCE AND THE PURSUIT 
OF SELF-RELIANCE 

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE INDIAN S& T SYSTEM AND INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO PROSPECTS FOR EC S& T 
COLLABORATION WITH INDIA 
In the annexes that follow, we present a very selective and more in-depth analysis of 
specific features and characteristics of the recent evolution of the Indian S& T system and 
the development of industry and agriculture that are directly relevant to our concerns. In 
the case of a country such as India, there are in fact far too many "critical" dimensions of 
the S& T and industrial systems and the contextual environment influencing the policy 
making process to be covered adequately in a report such as this. Consequently we have 
confined ourselves to dealing with issues on a case study basis where the research work 
carried out for the project has provided particular insights that might be useful in the 
formulation of the EC' s strategy towards developing further S& T co-operation with India. 

ANNEX 1 : TRANSFORMATION AND TURMOIL IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 
SUPPLY SECTOR 
Telecommunications in India is a political, industrial and technological battlefield that is a 
reflection of the same pressures for change that is driving the global transformation of the 
sector. By 1980, decades of underinvestment and public monopoly had resulted in a 
telecommunications system of appalling quality and very limited availability. Since then, 
internal and external pressures for liberalization, expansion and improvement have forced 
the government to introduce a variety of fiercely contested changes in market structure, 
institutional responsibility and regulatory policy. 
Among many developments these include attempts to streamline policy making (so far 
unsuccessful); the opening up of markets for EPABAX, telephones, teleprinters and cables 
to private producers using indigenous and imported technology; the slow dismantling of the 
previous monopoly on service provision exercised by the Ministry of Telecommunication 
via the spinning off of the Bombay and Delhi networks and the international network; and 
the permitted proliferation of a variety of dedicated networks in the public and the private 
sector such as Vikram, a public switched data network for medium and large business users 
in urban areas, the satellite based Remote Area Business Network doing the same for rural 
businesses, and lndonet providing computing facilities and data bases to remote users on 
leased lines. 
While all of these developments should be of interest to Europe, the changes most directly 
relevant to our concerns are taking place in the area of equipment supply. Here, an as yet 
unresolved struggle, has been taking place for the last decade between those advocating 
self-reliance and indigenous supply by the public sector (primarily the Department of 
Electronics and C-OOT) and those (primarily the Ministry of Telecommunications) whose 
main concern is to greatly expand supply whatever way possible even if this means 
allowing private production, using imported technology and inviting the direct participation 
of foreign capital. This is where we focus our attention in this note. 
International companies such as Alcatel of France, Siemens of West Germany, AT&T and 
Bell Labs of the U.S., Ericsson of Sweden and NEC and Fujitsu of Japan have long 
considered access to India's estimated $50 billion domestic telecommunications market as 
one of the most glittering prizes still to be won in the global telecommunications 
sweepstakes. They have concentrated on winning contracts to set up digital exchange 
production facilities as these offer the best way in but this segment has been virtually 
closed off to foreign collaboration for the last five years. However recent, heavily 
politicized, developments concerning the future of initiatives launched during the previous 
administration have created real possibilities that major new deals could be struck involving 
extensive foreign collaboration. To understand the implication of these developments for 
our concerns a little background is required. 
Initial reliance on outdated and overpriced imported technology. Indian Telephone 
Industries (ITI), the main public sector equipment producer commenced indigenous 
production of Strowger switching equipment in 1 951 even though it was clear that this 
would soon give way to a new generation of switches. ITI finally got around to the 
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production of crossbar switches in 1964 via a collaboration with Bell Telephone 
Manufacturing, Belgium only to discover the system was totally unsuited to Indian 
telephone usage pattern. Adaptive R&D was carried out but production of an indigenously 
designed crossbar system did not begin until 1 981 - during which time the world had made 
the transition from electro-mechanical to electronic switching. 28 
In 1979 the Sarin Committee recommended that future expansion of the network be on the 
basis of digital exchanges. In 1980, international tenders were invited for the supply of 
digital switching technology. What followed was a period of prolonged dithering by policy 
makers, fierce lobbying by the telecommunications multinationals from Europe, Japan and 
the U.S. and bureaucratic infighting. Finally the contract was awarded to CIT-Aicatel of 
France in a manner that effectively short-circuited the whole tendering process. The deal, 
which also included a sizeable technology transfer element, was part of a larger set of high 
technology transactions between France and India (brought about via prime ministerial 
agreement) that also involved Indian procurement of French enriched uranium, the purchase 
of Mirage fighters and, critically, a soft loan from the French government to finance the 
whole package. 
Despite the favourable loan terms, the way in which the deal was concluded caused great 
consternation among the more self-reliant minded members of the Indian S& T bureaucracy. 
This was greatly exacerbated when it emerged later that India had paid dearly both in terms 
of cost and technology for their French connection. Apparently the Indians paid over three 
times more for the Alcatel telecoms technology than did the Brazilians who, around the 
same time, had acquired similar exchange technology from Ericsson of Sweden. Further, 
the French E1 0-B system was considered (even by the French) to be less technologically 
advanced than the corresponding AXE system sold to the Brazilians.29 Alcatel still enjoys 
considerable support in India but bureaucracies have long memories and it may be that the 
negative aftereffects of the Alcatel deal have worked against the closing of other French 
high technology transactions in India ever since. Production of the first generation ( 1977) 
51 2 line E-1 OB Alcatel switching system is still being carried out under license by JTI at a 
500,000 lines p.a. plant in Uttar Pradesh. 30 
C-DOT and self-reliance. Alcatel' s opening into the Indian switching market was abruptly 
closed off in Sept. 1984, when a charismatic U.S. trained Indian electronics engineer, Sam 
Pitroda, convinced then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, he could develop an all Indian 
switching system within three years using Indian technology and components. This 
argument appealed to the perennial governmental objectives to achieve self-reliance and 
so Pitroda was given (relatively limited) funding by the government and told to go away and 
28 At the end of the adaptive R&D project BTM was called again to set up the Indian Cross Bar project at Rae 
Bareili. Production never stabilized at Rame Bareili and it is planned to phase out electro-mechanical exchanges 
by 1992. See Sunil Mani, "Technology Acquisition and Development : The Case of Telecom Switching 
Equipment", Economic and Political Weekly, November 25, 1989. 
29 See C. Brundenius and B. Goransson, The Quest for Technological Self-Reliance The Case of 
Telecommunications in India, Research Policy Institute, University of Lund, October, 1985. 
30 The Alcatel project has faced a wide variety of difficult start-up problems ranging from political obstruction 
by the bureaucracy to the need to overcome an almost total lack of infrastructure facilities. These difficulties have 
lasted throughout the life of the project so far and have prevented the plant from operating at full capacity. See 
J-P Vercruysse, "The Development of Telecommunications in India : Issues and Prospects", Mimeo, Center for 
the Study of New Media and Information Technology, Free University, Brussels, September 1989. 
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develop a wholly Indian exchange. 31 The government from that point forward effectively 
stopped all imports of switching components and all negotiations on further foreign 
involvement in component production and technology transfer. 
The Centre for Development of Telematics (C-OOT) to carry out the promised technology 
development. Staffed by 400 engineers, the mandate for C-OOT was to develop, within 
36 months with a budget of $36 million, a family of digital switching systems suited to 
Indian conditions and having commonality in hardware, software, packaging, 
documentation, installation and maintenance.32 The ultimate objective was to produce a 
digital Main Automatic Exchange (MAX) with a capacity of 16,000 lines ·and capable of 
handling integrated voice and data communications comparable to ISDN. 
C-OOT decided to follow a modular approach based on a basic EPABX module that would 
be the standard form from which the full family of exchanges would be developed. So far 
among the main C-OOT products released for testing and manufacture have been the 128 
PBX, a state of the art SPC switching system with 128 terminations (already in 
manufacture via 34 licensed contractors); a 128 RAX (rural automatic exchange) licensed 
to 27 manufacturers with 300,000 lines capacity; the C-OOT 512 MAX which is the base 
for the 16,000 line MAX and contains about 90 per cent of the hardware and software of 
the larger system; and still on test but expected to be released for production in 1991 
(some 2-3 years behind schedule) is the flagship of the first phase of the C-OOT mission, 
the C-OOT 16000 Port Exchange. 
Despite this lag on its most visible and important product, C-OOT has undoubtedly achieved 
a great deal both in terms of technology33 and its influence on industrial policy where for 
example it has demonstrated the validity of an entirely new approach to the organization 
of high tech R&D in lndia.34 However, controversies plagued this initiative from the start. 
These arose partly because of Pitroda's visible role as India's self-appointed technology 
messiah;36 partly because of the controversial ban on foreign collaboration and component 
imports; and partly because of C-OOT's delay in meeting its original timetable for the MAX 
exchange. 
31 From the Indian perspective (which is also a widely shared view elsewhere in developing countries) the 
rationale for self-reliance in telecommunication does not stem from the necessity to internalize production linkages 
within the economy since these are not really very significant. Rather they would argue that if a nation wants to 
establish and maintain a reliable telecommunication network, it has to internalize all the requisite know-how and 
expertise by designing and building one itself. This is partly because system maintenance is know-how intensive 
and, more importantly, its because network design has to be tailored to local requirements. For a clear statement 
of this position see Business World, ·c-OOT : A Report to the Nation•, 1 october, 1987. 
32 The system had to accept fluctuations in power supply, be tropicalised and be capable of functioning with 
very little maintenance. In addition, it would have to cope with a very high traffic rate : 20 BHCA per line in the 
cities and be non-blocking. 
33 For example by 1985, the C-OOT designed EPABX was being manufactured from 85% indigenously made 
components while the cost per line will be between Rs2000-2500 compared to Rs4000 to 5000 for EPABX's 
manufactured under foreign license. SeeK. Varma and S.Wadekar, •EPABX: Consumers call the tune, • Telematics 
India, December 1988. 
30 See the discussion in B.Bowonder (1990) ·oevelopment of Digital Switching Systems Technology : Case 
Study of C-OOT in India• Mimeo. Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad. 
35 Pitroda was also given responsibility for the Technology Missions (described earlier) as well as being 
appointed head of the newly formed Telecommunications Commission. He has now been effectively removed from 
those positions of responsibility. 
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As a result, in January 1990, an official enquiry into C-OOT and its performance was 
launched. 36 The report was highly critical of C-OOT on technical and administrative 
grounds. It claimed that the main exchange designed by C-OOT cannot stand up to Indian 
conditions37 , that it should be redesigned (which would take another three years) and that 
in the meantime ITI should establish two more 500,000 line factories based on an updated 
version of the Alcatel technology. 
Implications for foreign collaboration and Communitv initiatives. Interpreting the impact of 
this report and the current controversy on the future of C-OOT, Indian telecommunications 
equipment supply policy and ultimately on the prospects for EC support for European 
involvement in the Indian telecommunications supply industry is extremely difficult - even 
with the benefit of our interviews - because the events are so recent and because of the 
change in government. The technical critique of C-OOT has its supporters and opponents 
- with C-OOT supporters currently having the upper hand because of the demonstrated 
superiority of the C-OOT switch to the Alcatel switch. 38 
Similarly there are those who support and oppose the commission's recommendations for 
reopening negotiations with Alcatel (over which France has applied very considerable 
pressure) or with other foreign suppliers. Those opposed argue that to do so might appear 
to be going against the cherished rationale of self-reliance on which C-OOT was 
established. Further confusing the matter is the recent decision (January 1990) to grant 
a small ( $15 million) but significant contract to Ericsson of Sweden to supply four digital 
gateway AXE exchanges to handle all India's (still very poorly served) international 
telephone traffic. This could be interpreted to mean that Ericcson and not Alcatel or other 
European suppliers not has the inside track to larger switching deals in the near future. 
Quite the opposite may be true however since it is clear that ITI and other new domestic 
entrants have, in the last few years, been permitted to undertake foreign collaborations in 
switching and in other equipment segments where European suppliers are involved. For 
example: 
- As part of liberalizing the EPABAX market, technologies from three foreign companies 
(GTE-A TEA, OKI and Jeaumont-Schneider) are now under licensed production in direct 
competition to the C-OOT techoology; 
- ITI has a collaboration with FACE (an Alcatel subsidiary ) for manufacturing pushbutton 
telephone sets, while Ericsson and Siemens designs are also under licensed production; 
- The previous teleprinter monopoly of Hindustan Teleprinters has been broken and 
Siemens, among others, expects to be allowed to produce electronic machines in the 
near future; 
- ITI and Bharat Electrical are collaborating with NEC of Japan in the manufacture of 
microwave transmission systems (production beginning this year) as part of an Rs 8 
38 See Vercruysse (1989) op.cit. 
37 For example, to suit the Indian traffic requirements, the standard the C-OOT had to respond to was 10,000 
BHCA. An inter-departmental committee reported that system cannot handle more than 6000 BHCA. Interestingly, 
the TNC telecommunications firms interested in the Indian market all support this criticism- while C-OOT denies 
it. 
38 For example see Vercruysse (1989) op.cit. and Bowonder (1990) op.cit. 
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billion investment in transmission, while NEC also has a contract with DOT to import 
fibre optic equipment to link Delhi and Bombay and a 32,000 line equivalent of small 
exchanges; 
- NKT from Denmark is setting up a Rs 490 million fibre optic factory and R&D lab with 
ITI and Hindustan Cables Ltd; Fujitsu of Japan is also in negotiation with ITI to establish 
collaborative fibre optic production; 
- AT&T-Phillips is collaborating with ITI in the production of digital coaxial transmission 
systems; 
- Equatorial (USA) is collaborating with ITI in the manufacture of low cost earth satellite 
stations. This latter deal, though small, is expected to set an example for a wide range 
of subsequent transmission collaborations because Equatorial has taken out a 40 per 
cent equity share and given a commitment to effect full technology transfer; 
- The DOE has recently organized the importation of 1.5 micron technology from VLSI 
Technology Inc of the U.S. to allow ITI to manufacture ASICs for telecommunications 
and defense purposes. 
While the above listing indicates the gradual emergence of substantial opportunities for 
foreign collaboration in transmission and peripherals, information from our interviews also 
suggested that once things settle down vis the C-OOT controversy, there may be 
substantial opportunities for further European involvement in local production and transfer 
of digital exchange technology. 
Whether the Community can or should play a role in exploiting these possibilities is an open 
question. What is certain is that some form of public sector support will strengthen the 
hand of European suppliers (either individually or collectively) and that in order to be 
effective this support must be wielded with tact and with an understanding of the recent 
events surrounding Indian telecommunications equipment supply policy as depicted above. 
Sast Project 1 Report on India - Page 77 

ANNEX 2 : THE ELECTRONICS SECTOR IN INDIA: CONTRASTING 
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBIUTIES FOR.COLLA-
BORATI.ON.IN .HARDWARE .AND SOFTWARE 
The Indian electronics industry moved rapidly onto a high growth path during the 1980s 
due to major government policy initiatives, the rapid entry of the private sector into 
production in a major way and fortuitous conditions in international, particularly software, 
markets. Between 1980-85, output and exports grew respectively at 25 per cent and 27 
per cent annually while between 1985 and 1989 the respective rates of growth increased 
to 35 per cent and 37 per cent annually. Table 29 shows the sector and productwise 
breakdown of the growth of the industry and exports during 1985-1990. As can be seen, 
part of the high growth rate is due to the low starting point while the 1990 output and 
export totals of some $5.6 billion and $105 million respectively are still very modest 
compared to India's size and the performance of other economies. Nevertheless these 
growth rates have given both the public and the private sector good reason to have great 
optimism for the future. 
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TABLE 29 : Sector and product breakdown of electronics production, 1985-1990 
1985 1988 1990* 
(A) Consumer electronics 901.6 1589.0 1976.1 
- Radio receivers 102.5 120.1 107.8 
- TV receivers 
Black & white 319.6 511.6 613.8 
Colour 348.3 604.6 718.6 
- Tape recorders 73.8 155.0 191.6 
-Others 57.4 197.7 344.3 
(B) Industrial electronics 323.8 523.3 832.2 
- Instruments 65.6 104.7 125.7 
- Process control eqpt 98.4 124.0 167.7 
- Power electronics 94.3 135.7 323.3 
- Medical electronics 20.5 27.1 35.9 
- Other inc office eqpt 45.0 131.8 179.6 
(C) Professional equipment 525.6 849.8 1167.6 
(i) Communication & broadcasting 
-Broadcast 29.6 62.0 77.8 
- Telecommunication 299.1 515.5 760.5 
- Two-way comm. 16.4 23.2 29.9 
(ii) Strategic electronics 180.5 249.1 299.4 
(0) Computer systems (including 147.5 328.7 449.1 
microprocessor systems) 
(E) Components 360.7 600.8 958.1 
Sub-total 2259.2 3891.6 5383.1 
(F) Free-trade zones (hardware) 65.6 85.9 110.8 
(G) Software for export 28.7 62.0 104.8 
Total 2353.3 4039.5 5598.7 
Source : Adapted from data provided by the The Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion 
Council 
• 1990 data is estimated based on returns from January-April. 
The industry, of course, faces many problems which particularly private sector producers 
and external agencies such as the World Bank have been assiduously highlighting in recent 
years, not least of which is the lack of an IC production base and large segments of 
uncompetitive producers in the public and private sectors, particularly in the area of 
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computers, and limited R&D expenditure.39 Not surprisingly, excessive government 
regulation is one of those criticisms that came up frequently in our interviews. 
Two other serious problems caused by past protectionist policies and constraints on 
technology import are demonstrated in Tables 30 and 31 which document the problems of 
small scale compared to world best practice and excessive import dependence - which 
totalled Rs 16 billion in 1988 and accounted for 40 per cent of total production in 1988. 
What is interesting about these two problems is that they also highlight opportunities for 
European firms to establish linkages with Indian producers as the government is keen to use 
foreign collaboration to overcome these obstacles to growth - provided genuine technology 
transfer occurs and the net foreign exchange costs are limited. 
Apart from bearing in mind the criticisms of the Indian electronics industry as mentioned 
above, three aspects of the structure and evolution of the Indian electronics industry and 
its future prospects for collaboration emerged during our interviews as being of specific 
interest to our concerns. First, the Department of Electronics, which is the main body 
responsible for planning, policy and administrative of public sector R&D and production, will 
necessarily be a key player in any major initiative that the EC seeks to launch in relation to 
Information Technology in India- the private sector alone will not be a suitable partner.40 
Second, the emergence of Silicon Valley-like agglomerations of electronics firms in certain 
urban areas such as Bangalore that feature extensive foreign participation and point the 
way towards possible growth areas for European collaboration; the third aspect relates to 
the possibilities (and problems) for collaboration being generated by the development path 
currently being followed by India's software industry. These last two aspects are discussed 
below. 
The emergence of India's Silicon Valley and new models for foreign collaboration. One of 
the more intriguing electronics sector-related developments of recent years has been the 
evolution of Banglaore as a center for the Indian electronics industry with most of the 
leading hardware snd software houses (foreign and domestic) now already in place or soon 
to arrive. However, unlike similar developments in other developing countries where 
government has attempted to create a Silicon-Valley clone, the electronics agglomeration 
in Bangalore is, uniquely, built upon a firm foundation of pre-existing capabilities and 
infrastructure in the public sector and is being driven by the competitive drive of the private 
sector rather than government incentive. In the opinion of many, this pedigree gives 
Bangalore a significant comparative advantage as the locus for the continued rapid growth 
of the Indian electronics industry in the future. 
Quite apart from the relatively recent arrival of the electronics industry, Bangalore boasts 
a strong industrial base consisting of more than 130 medium and heavy scale 
technology-intensive private sector industrial enterprises, plus some 45-50,000 small scale 
38 See for example S. Mahalingam, "Computer Industry in India : Strategies for Late-comer Entry", Economic 
and Political Weekly, October 21, 1989. See also E.J. Girdner "Economic Uberalization in India : The New 
Electronics Policy" Asian Survey, November, 1987. 
00 This will be particularly the case if the projects involve a major R&D component. Though there are other 
agencies involved in electronics R&D, particularly in the defence sectors, the DOE is the main source of R&D funds 
and manages the public sector production enterprises. Among the major R&D centers under the DOE are the 
Center for the Development of Advanced Computing currently concentrating on the development of an indigenous 
supercomputer; the Council for the Development of Materials for Electronics; the Society for Applied Microwave 
Electronics Engineering and Research and the Advanced Technology Programme in Computer Networking. 
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units engaged in subcontracting. Its R&D credentials are impressive as well with many of 
the countries best high tech R&D labs located in Bangalore such as those of the Indian 
Space Research Organization, the Central Power Research Institute, the Defense Research 
Development Organization, the National Aeronautics Laboratories, the Indian Institute of 
Astrophysics, the Raman Institute and the Indian Institute of Science. 
On the electronics side, Bangalore began building up a production base in 1 948 when 
Indian Telephone Industries started its manufacturing activities, followed in 1955 by Bharat 
Electronics Ltd and the subsequent establishment of specialized defense electronics 
contractors and research institutions such as the Electronics and Systems Division of BHEL. 
With these establishments providing the infrastructure and pool of human resources, it is 
not surprising that the civilian electronics industry was strongly attracted to the Bangalore 
area and is likely to stay for the longer term. 
The most recent evidence of this is the establishment of an "Electronics City" outside of 
Banglaore (one of four in India) consisting of an integrated complex of large, medium and 
small scale electronics industries constructed around an impressive technical infrastructure 
including training institutes (one financed by the Swiss government) and service facilities. 
Beginning with its establishment in 1985, more 125 letters of intent were issued to firms 
planning to set up manufacturing facilities there. Among the leading Indian electronics firms 
established in the complex are United Telecom, Tatas, Blue Star, Hindustan Computers Ltd 
and Khautonics 
Among the international electronics firms who have recently established production and in 
some cases design and research facilities in Bangalore, there are European (such as Sinclair, 
Siemens and Asea) and Japanese firms but U.S. producers predominate including Intel, 
Texas Instruments, Motorala, DEC, Sun Microsystems, Kodak, Hewlett Packard, Control 
Data Corporation, Digital Equipment Corporation and Unisys. While much attention has 
been given to the Bangalore-based Texas Instruments software tie-up (discussed below) 
Bull of France has embarked on a new joint venture in computer production that is 
indicative of the new perspective that foreign electronics firms now have towards 
collaboration in India and of the difficulties that need to be overcome to make such 
ventures a success. 
Bull, after trying to get into India for some time via a link up with the state-run producer, 
ECIL, has now taken a 40 per cent stake in PSI Ltd, one of India's best known computer 
firms. It has gone into India with three objectives - production of its DPS 7000 mainframe 
to gain a 30 percent share in India's mainframe market (now growing at 30-35% a year); 
becoming a market leader in developing hardware and software packages for use in banking 
and finance, industrial production control and telecommunications; and subcontracting a 
considerable share of component and software production for export back to France for 
which there are significant buyback arrangement in place already - $30 million in the case 
of software. 
PSI was initially chosen as a partner by Bull because of the high calibre of its technical staff 
of 430 (of whom one-third are research engineers) and its system and component 
production capabilities. However extensive technology transfer activities are now 
underway with engineers flowing in both directions and PSI constructing a new facility to 
make the DPS 7000. Bull has had to sustain PSI over a few difficult years while also 
putting the company through a painful rationalization process. However, Bull is committed 
to India over the long term and its commitment is already beginning to show a return with 
production, market share, exports and new product development all moving in the right 
direction. 
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Selected possibilities for software collaboration. One of the expressed interests of the 
Community in S& T collaboration with advanced developing countries is the possibility of 
forming alliances on projects that are skill and manpower intensive in sectors where Europe 
suffers from manpower shortages. Software development is clearly one of those areas and 
India alone among the NICs being studied in the SAST project appears to have the requisite 
manpower and institutional resources to support such initiatives. 
Though estimates vary there is a stock of approximately 200,000 engineers and software 
programmers at work in India scattered across some 600 software firms, numerous 
hardware manufacturers and in the 25 or so public sector institutions extensively involved 
in software related development and research projects. 41 This stock of manpower is 
being added to at fairly rapid rate via government training initiatives such as the Generation 
of Manpower for Computers programme under which 250 institutions have launched 
government sponsored advanced software and systems design courses, the output of 
approximately 1 00 new university level programming degree courses that have been added 
each year since 1 988, and the large number of lower level trained personnel being turned 
out by thousands of technical institutions and private sector training courses. 
Though the pool of software manpower suffers from some weaknesses and shortages, by 
and large Indian programmers and software developers are rated very highly internationally. 
They are usually trained on UNIX which is a great advantage and are conversant with all 
major computer systems- IBM, CDC, DEC, UNISYS, ICL, Wang, HP and others. Indian 
engineers are acknowledged to be capable of carrying out the whole variety of technical 
activities from routine and conversion programming through highly specialized jobs such 
as developing UNIX kernel networking applications and X-Windows-related job assignments 
where skills are extremely scarce in the West. 
Coupled with this combination of skilled manpower with experience in the most advanced 
computer systems as well as proficiency in English, the Indian software sector can also 
offer tremendous cost and considerable productivity advantages. Indian software 
professionals cost about 1/8 to 1/1 0 less than British or US professionals with comparable 
experience levels and at least four times less than Southeast Asian professionals. 
This wage differential makes Indian software engineers attractive to overseas companies 
in their own right (as we shall see below) and also means Indian companies can be 
extremely competitive in the marketplace - one interviewee claimed his company was able 
to consistently provide tailored software solutions to British clients that are 4Q-50 per cent 
cheaper than anything else on offer, while also achieving productivity levels as high as 150 
per cent better than their counterparts in the UK. 
On top of these advantages, the software sector is one of the sectors where the Indian 
government has gone furthest in its attempt to stimulate the expansion of private supply 
and encourage foreign investment. In addition to its training initiatives, Indian government 
policies are oriented to the establishment of infrastructure, streamlining investment 
procedures and promoting exports. An important part of recent infrastructure investments 
have been the establishment of four software technology parks in Bangalore, Pune, 
Bhubaneshwar and Chandigarh. These parks provide facilities such as satellite links and 
dedicated data lines while import license requirements are waived and do not attract any 
duties. 
41 For example the National Informatics Centre alone has over 1600 post graduate trained programmers at work 
on 50 different projects. 
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Some qualifications. All of this suggests there are great possibilities for the development 
of major collaborative initiatives in the software area between the Community, European 
firms and India. However our interviews brought out four important points that need to be 
borne in mind in assessing these possibilities. 
First, there is already considerable competition for access to India's software manpower 
resources. U.S. firms in particular have reacted quickly to the possibilities and a large 
number have already established software development facilities and collaborative 
arrangements in India. As a result, sales to the U.S. accounted for nearly 70 per cent of 
India's estimated $1 00 million worth of software exports in 1989.42 Nevertheless, 
despite the competition from the U.S., European and particularly U.K. firms are beginning 
to establish links with India but more on a subcontracting basis rather than via direct 
investment. 43 In most cases, most of the work being done by the Indian side tends to 
involve the preparation of low level routine or conversion software. 
Second, our information suggests that while there are many Indian software firms willing 
to engage in this sort of low level software subcontracting work, it is beginning to attract 
some strongly negative comment within the government. This is because the bulk of Indian 
export income, possibly as much as 80-95 per cent, comes from forms of subcontracting 
that have come to be known as "bodyshopping" that either involves the operation of 
software "sweat-shops" in India or the actual export of Indian software personnel to carry 
out the contract work overseas. 
From the Indian perspective this practice is of questionable value because it does little to 
upgrade the technical skills of its professionals who are often assigned tasks requiring 
relatively limited skill input. Nevertheless, the number of Indian professionals working on 
overseas assignments is high. One estimate we were given is that about 3000 
programmers in India are working in the export sector and perhaps another 1500 are 
currently working abroad developing software for clients. While no one expects the 
government to intervene directly in this situation, it is certain that they will not respond 
favourably to any proposals coming from the EC for collaboration on similar projects. 
Thirdly and related, there is, as mentioned in Part I, considerable unhappiness over the 
permanent loss of high level Indian software manpower to foreign countries, again 
particularly to the U.S. This is not surprising since the thousands of expatriate Indian 
software engineers currently working in the U.S. account for perhaps the top 10 per cent 
of India's most highly skilled IT manpower resources. Also not surprisingly, actions such 
as those by Microsoft, who advertised in India for programmers to join its headquarters in 
Washington and hired 50 top-flight engineers away from Indian companies, or those of 
42 Among the firms already well established are Ashton-Tate, Bellsouth, Citibank and, of course, Texas 
Instruments. The Tl link is via a subsidiary in Bangalore staffed with 50 software specialists who are in turn 
connected to Tl's Dallas headquarters via an earth station satellite link on the top of the building. Costs were 
recovered in less than two years and the company is planning a 200 per cent expansion in its software activities 
in India. Citibank is using engineers to write financial software programmes in the Bombay free trade zone; while 
in an operation to be launched by 1992, the government of the State of Massachucetts is co-operating with the 
DOE to set up two software technology parks linked by satellite to allow small-medium sized specialized software 
firms can collaborate on programma development. 
43 Among the projects identified during our research is one involving Tate Consultancy Services of Bombay, 
liS of Delhi and Britannia Building Society in the joint development of a $1.5 million specialized loan programme 
whereby the Indian programmers work on Britannia's computers via a satellite link; another involves the Computer 
Maintenance Corporation of Delhi carrying out a $400,000 project to develop an enhanced Computer-aided 
Railway Time-tabling system. 
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specialized U.S. based recruitment firms who headhunt in India, have attracted very 
considerable resentment. 
Some of this official "anger" is directed specifically at the U.S. government who seems to 
be encouraging such practices. For evidence of this, those interviewed pointed to the fact 
that U.S. immigration regulations have recently been amended so that professionals with 
'distinguished merit or ability' qualify for permission to work in the US in a fraction of the 
time it normally takes thus allowing U.S. firms to take only the cream of Indian expertise. 
These concerns lead to suggestions, discussed further in Part I, that any collaborative 
proposals which could be structured so as to entice NRI (non-resident) Indian software 
personnel back to India would be very favourably considered. 
Finally, it needs to be noted again that the private sector segment of the Indian software 
industry is plagued by a number of weaknesses. Principal among these is small size and 
lack of financial resources. For example, while there are over 360 firms specializing solely 
in software only the top three had annual revenues in 1 989 of over $1 0 million while 
approximately 75 per cent had revenues of less than $100,000. Such low turnovers and 
the still limited availability of venture capital seriously constrains their ability to expand and 
develop internationally competitive skills, tools and products. 
This aspect has two implications for our concerns. First, it means that collaboration with 
the private sector on major projects, unless these are carried out with the handful of large 
firms already present, will require the injection of considerable resources to create an 
institutional base capable of supporting the available manpower; and second, it may be 
therefore that in the shortrun the public sector institutions are likely to be the best place 
to look for large scale EC-India collaboration possibilities because they have the manpower 
and the resources to support such projects. 
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TABLE 30 ~ Scale of component production in fndia compared to worJd scale 
Electronic component World scale Typical 
capacity in 
India 
B/W picture tube 2-5M 0.5-1 M 
Colour picture tube 1.5-2 M 0.5 M 
Discrete semiconductor devices - 50 M 
IC's (bipolar) SSSI/MSI 
- WO/wafer tab 50 M 10M 
- WI wafer tab 600 M -
Medium power devices 50-100M 10M 
PCB' s double sided 20,000 10,000 
sq.mts sq.mts 
Film resistors 1000 M 100-200 M 
Film capacitors 500 M 50 M 
Tantalum capacitors 50 M 1 M 
Ceramic capacitors (disk) 5000 M 50 M 
Multi-layer ceramic 1000 M -
VCR W/tape deck and head 1 M -
DC micromotors 10M 1 M 
Tape deck mechanism 5M 0.5 M 
Soft ferrite 5000 M 500 M 
Hard ferrite 10000 M 1000 M 
Loudspeaker 50 M 1 M 
Connectors 10-20 M 1 M 
Video tapes 500-10000 MRM 500 MRM 
Source : Adapted from data provided by the The Electronics and Computer Software Export Promotion 
Council 
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TABLE 31 :· Materi<d content in electronic components (as 
percentage of ex-factory value of components) 
Component type Raw materials • 
Imported Indigenous 
B/W & Colour picture tubes 40 10 
Hybrid circuits 30 8 
Power semiconductors 40 8 
Potentiometers 20 30 
Plastic Film capacitors 25 2 
Electrolytic capacitors 40 10 
B/WTV 20 45 
Colour TV 30 10 
Crystals 10 3 
Magnetic tapes 45 5 
Floppy diskettes 15 3 
Tape deck mechanisms 25 20 
Connectors 20 10 
Relays 15 10 
Hard Ferrites - 12 
Transformers & Coils 15 40 
Metalised films 40 4 
Source : Adapted from data provided by the The Electronics and Computer 
Software Export Promotion Council 
Annex 2 
Duty 
25 
19 
22 
8 
13 
25 
10 
33 
6 
20 
10 
20 
15 
7 
-
10 
30 
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ANNEX 3 : INDIAN'S GROWING STRENGTHS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN 
EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL PLANNING 
While many cnttctsms can be made of Indian S& T planning with regard to industrial 
innovation, it is also the case that one of the great strengths of the S& T planning 
mechanism has been its ability to channel financial and manpower resources into tackling 
priority problem areas. This has most recently been done via the technology missions and 
the identification of what are called "thrust areas" for R&D and skill creation. A good 
example of this approach at work in an area offering important opportunities for EC 
collaboration is the efforts of the Indian government over the last decade to create 
substantial national capabilities in the field of biotechnology. 
The first moves in this direction were taken in the early 1 980s via the work of the National 
Biotechnology Board which in 1983 issued a long term plan for biotechnology (one of the 
first by any developing country). Strong emphasis was placed on the need for major 
programmes of manpower development, the launching of basic research programmes in a 
variety of areas of direct relevance to India's needs and the creation of a research 
infrastructure and incentive system to promote the development of industrial 
applications. 46 
These recommendations were accepted by the government and via DST a variety of 
programmes and actions have been taken since 1985 that have greatly accelerated India's 
forward movement into biotechnology. Chief among these was the establishment of a 
separate Department of Biotechnology, with independent funding to oversee and 
co-ordinate the planning and implementation of numerous programmes and projects being 
pursued by the DBT and other agencies. 
Apart from these activities, which includes being the nodal point for bilateral and 
multilateral collaboration, DBT has three main sets of activities - directing and support of 
national R&D projects focussed on specific problems; manpower creation and infrastructure 
development. On the research side the DBT operates in two modes - via the 
recommendations of scientific committees to identify and fund basic research in 9 topics 
at institutions throughout India; and through "mission mode" projects which involve applied 
R&D.4s 
The strategy adopted by DBT (in co-operation with the UGC, ICAR, ICMR and the 
Department of Ocean Development) for developing trained manpower in biotechnology 
centers around the creation of "model" systems of world class post-graduate and 
post-doctoral teaching in selected universities and institutions. The best students at these 
institutions are offered DBT studentships while the Department also makes major 
contribution for specialized research facilities and buildings, for expanding and upgrading 
u These areas of research interest were genetic engineering, photosynthesis, tissue culture, enzyme 
engineering, alcohol fermentation and immunology and all have received considerable attention through the 1980s. 
06 The mission mode projects for which DBT has responsibility are in the areas of prawn and fish production, 
poultry production, production of immunodiagnostics and immunological approaches to fertility control. 
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faculty positions, for visiting professors and overseas travel, etc. Over twenty higher 
educational institutions are now either affiliated with this programme or have started their 
own specialized courses generating already perhaps 2000-3000 highly trained young 
researchers. In addition to this core exercise, the DBT has launched an impressively wide 
variety of other training initiativesY 
In addition, DBT has embarked on a major programme of infrastructure creation to support 
biotechnology R&D. Selected institutions such as liS, the National Institute of Nutrition, 
the Centre for Biochemicals, and JNU have been provided with the financial support 
necessary to upgrade their research facilities to world class standards while at the same 
time some entirely new institutions with specific research and training mandates have been 
created as well. Among these are the Institute of Microbial Technology48, three Genetic 
Engineering Units; the National Facility for Oligonucleotide Synthesis; the National Facility 
for Blue Green Algae Collection, the National Facility for Plant Tissue Culture; the National 
Animal Facility; and the Biotechnology Information System. Other infrastructural facilities 
are also being established such as facilities for the import and distribution of fine 
biochemicals; for the production of enzymes and biochemicals; and for biochemicals 
engineering research and process development. 
In addition to the activities of the DBT, both the DST and the CSIR, as a result of 
government decision to target biotechnology, increased substantively their allocation of 
resources to biotechnology R&D projects and to strengthening institutions carrying out 
biotechnology related research. DBT is also actively involved in providing financial support 
and co-ordination to these units. 
For example, the DST became the lead agency for negotiating the citing of the U.N. funded 
International Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnolgy, a major new international 
training and R&D institution focussing on developing country problems whose location in 
India will enormously enhance India's own biotechnology capabilities. The CSIR greatly 
increased resources going to the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, established in 
1977, and now recognized as one of the best equipped biotechnology laboratories in the 
world. With 150 Ph.D. researchers distributed into eleven multidisciplinary groups, the 
Centre is capable of carrying out leading edge research projects in diverse areas such as 
primary culture and cell biology, the synthesis and structural analysis of biomolecules, and 
47 Among these mechanisms is a placement unit for post-graduate students, Biotechnology National and 
Overseas Associates hips, Visiting Scientists from Abroad Programme, technician training programmes and training 
courses for industrial R&D personnel. 
48 Though its main facilities are still under construction, the Institute has already developed a simplified process 
for purification of urukinase from human urine; an improved yeast strain for ethanol production that gives 14.5 
per cent (v/v); a rapid method for identifying rifamicin B producing colonies of Nocardia medirranei; and techniques 
for the selective delivery of antileishmanial drugs to macrophages. In addition IMTECH has a variety of major 
projects planned or underway in which it is looking for international collaboration. These projects include the 
construction of expression vectors inS. cerevisae; the development of antifibrin monoclonal antibody; the isolation 
and purification of streptokinase; the development of DNA probes for detecting microflora; the diagnosis of oil-
bearing formations and the mass production of monoclonal antibodies. The institute also plays host to three 
national facilities - Microbial Type Culture Collection; the Biochemical Engineering Research Centre and the 
Distributed Centre for Enzyme Engineering. 
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the investigation of biomolecular structures using techniques such as optical rotatory 
dispersion, circular dichroism and NMR.49 
Similarly, the ICMR established the National lnsitute of Immunology which in a few short 
years of work has generated significant breakthroughs, some of which are commercially 
applicable. One area that the Nil concentrates on is immunocontraception where its work 
is oriented towards the production of vaccines for controlling human and animal fertility. 
It has recently developed a product for animal birth control under the trade name TALSUR. 
The vaccine is being successfully used for castration of stray dogs and of cattle. Another 
important product that has already undergone the first phase of clinical trials is a vaccine 
against pregnancy hormone, the human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG). In addition, Nil has 
already produced diagnostic kits for pregnancy, amoebic liver abscess, brucellosis, typhoid, 
and a DNA probe for M. tuberculosis as well as a genetically engineered vaccine against 
rabies. 
Another major research area is embryobiotechnology. Here, its main research themes are 
embryo transfer in buffaloes; the maturation of buffalo oocytes invitro; the microinjection 
of human growth hormone; gene constructs in fish embryos; and the purification of 
genetically engineered human growth hormone. 
Nil also has several collaborative programmes with institutions abroad. It collaborates for 
example with the Institute of Protein Research in the USSR in peptide chemistry, gene 
expression using invitro translation system; protein crystallization in space; and structural 
studies on macromolecular complexes and has a collaborative programme with the Pasteur 
Institute under which a monkey model for hepatitis non-A and non-B has been developed. 
It is still relatively early days and there is much to be done particularly compared to the 
scale of India's needs and problems where biotechnology will have an impact. But there 
can be little doubt that as a result of the focussed efforts of the government, India has 
begun to generate skilled manpower resources on a substantial scale; it is building up an 
in-depth knowledge base that makes it a world leader in several specific fields; and it is 
gradually laying down an impressive research infrastructure. All of these accomplishments 
are on top of the formidable manpower and research resources that have already been 
created in areas such as agriculture and health via 40 years of generous state support. 
Taken together, these scientific resources already provide the base for India to participate 
in a wide array of more than 20 international collaborative R&D programmes in 
biotechnology, including some major research and commercialisation activities with the 
U.S., France and Germany. Nevertheless there is still great scope for further collaboration 
in research and genuine interest was expressed during the interviews in expanding 
collaborative activities with the EC. 
However, while there is great confidence in Indian capabilities on the research and science 
side, there are, from India's perspective, many more questions over the country's industrial 
capabilities in biotechnology. Our expectation, and that of some of the Indian experts 
interviewed, is that the expansion of industrial capacity will for quite some time yet take 
"" Major projects are concerned with the mechanisms of cell division and malignant transformation; the 
molecular basis of sex determination; the structure and confirmation of proteins and nucleic acids and their 
interactions; the secretion and transport of protein ribonucleases; protein degradation; micelles and membrane 
active proteins; molecular evolution and proteins sequence data analysis; mathematical modelling of genetic and 
metabolic processes; the genetics of osmoregulation in E Coli; the initiation of transcription in yeast; the use of 
Lanthanium in scanning electron microscopy; and the flow sorting of mammalian chromosomes. 
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place on the basis of imported technology - though a few of the biotechnology start ups 
funded with venture capital look promising. 60 This situation also offers possibilities for 
EC collaboration but ones that would differ significantly from the more straightforward 
areas of research collaboration between labs. Here the attractions of developing and 
producing biotechnology-based products destined for India's enormous agricultural market 
are significant. The present government could be expected to look with favour on proposals 
for industrial collaboration in biotechnology that had agriculture and rural problems as a 
focus. 61 The problem of course is that for obvious reasons, foreign biotechnology firms 
· have not signalled their interest in moving into this area. It would be a major and long term 
challenge for the Community to launch a biotechnology initiative combining research and 
production activities and aimed at the Indian agricultural sector but the returns to Europe 
and to India could be enormous. 
60 For example, Biocon is a highly successful start-up financed by venture capital and involved in the production 
of enzymes for the brewing, distiing, dairy baking and animal feeds industry as well as for the pharmaceutical 
sector. The company exports 50 percent of its turnover and has recently developed a new, 110 percent export-
oriented product (for the food industry) that is already attracting considerable advance orders from Asia and Latin 
America. 
61 Interestingly, one of the key factors that prevented the Janata government from cancelling the Rajiv Gandhi-
agreed Pensacola project was the fact that Pepsi had committed itself to investing in export-oriented agricultural 
projects. 
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ANNEX 4 : VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVES IN JNDIA:. CREATING THE 
RIGHT CONDITIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPANSION 
IN HIGH TECH 
During the late 1980s, as part of the liberalization process, the Indian government 
permitted the first steps to be taken in the creation of new sources of finance to support 
the emergence of innovative, start-up firms and risk-taking, technology development 
projects within established firms. While still small, these initiatives are an important 
indicator of the changed business environment in India and thus merit close monitoring. 
They also indicate possibilities of combining European financial assistance with 
collaborative technology development projects. 
Domestic resource mobilization in India has been a notable success with national savings 
rates during the 1980s being in the 22-24 per cent and household savings in the 15-17 per 
cent range. This occurs via a wide range of savings mechanisms linked to the formal 
financial sector and the spread of banking offices (from 8300 in 1970 to 65,000 currently) 
under the control of mainly state-owned commercial banks. Until recently (see Part II), this 
has allowed India to finance its declining public sector savings rate and the growing central 
deficit with low inflation and little effect on private investment. 
The development finance sector consists of national and state level banks and investment 
institutions. The premier national development banks - the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (lOBI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and the 
Industrial Rnance Corporation of India (IFCI) - among other functions, concentrate on 
channelling long-term finance to large private and joint (public/private) sector companies. 
The State Finance Corporations (SFCs) and the State Industrial Development Corporations 
(SIDCs) are promotional agencies of state governments who extend loans and take equity 
shares to fund the start up and expansion projects of medium sized companies. 
This system of financing has evolved primarily to support industrial projects carried out by 
existing firms in the large and medium scale category. Some of the national and state level 
banks have begun to offer a wider array of services in response to the delicensing policy 
of the Government. Yet despite these more liberal lending policies, the development 
finance system found that during the 1980s it was not able to respond adequately to the 
capital needs of the small, technology intensive, start-up firms that began to emerge in that 
period. 
To a certain extent, India's capital markets were able to act as an alternative financing 
mechanism for these firms. Based on 14 regional stock exchanges, the capital market 
system is one of the largest in the developing world, has over 4000 companies listed (more 
than any other country except the U.S.) with a market capitalization similar to Spain or 
Denmark and more than double that of Korea and Mexico. The latter part of the 1980s 
saw a boom in these markets and more scope was provided for financing start ups via new 
issues. However there are still many problems associated both with the as yet 
underdeveloped nature of India's capital markets and with the classic problems that high 
technology start-up firms have always faced when looking solely to the capital markets as 
a source of growth financing. 
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In response to this gap, a number of national and state institutions began in the late 1980s 
to create funds for technology development and venture financing using their own 
resources, those of institutional investors, and from bilateral and multilateral sources 
provided by agencies such as the World Bank, U.S. AID, the Asian Development Bank, IFC 
and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. Among the main institutions now 
actively involved in venture capital and technology development financing are ICICI, IDBI, 
IFCI, the State Bank of India, Canara Commercial Bank (3rd largest in India), Andhra 
Pradesh Development Corporation and Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation. 
The efforts of ICICI to enter into this area of financing are worthy of note since ICICI has 
earned a reputation as one of the most professionally managed and effective development 
finance institutions in the developing world. It offers a wide range of services, recently 
diversifying into areas such as merchant banking, leasing, hire purchase and credit rating 
while, in addition to its operational activities, it also advises the government on industrial 
issues and generates new ideas for improving the financial markets. 
In 1988, after a very successful involvement with an innovative U.S. funded project 
designed to foster U.S.-Indian high technology joint ventures62 , ICICI decided to develop 
a major capability to promote and finance advanced technology development in Indian 
industry. It is now doing this through two mechanisms. The first involves direct support 
to technology development within existing firms via the activities of a specialized 
Technology Group and a high-powered Technology Board presided over by ICICI's 
chairman. This Group advises firms where to look for technology and joint venture partners 
in India and abroad, structures finance for R&D projects and acts as a conduit for directing 
commercially promising ventures and ideas to ICICI's venture capital arm. 
The Technology Development and Information Company of India (TDICI), based in 
Bangalore is ICICI's venture capital arm and was created in 1988 to provide venture 
financing to commercial, market oriented technology ventures. It does this by managing 
a series of venture capital funds subscribed to by domestic and international financial 
institutions as well as corporate and private investors. Presently it has three such funds in 
operation and planned with a subscribed value of Rs 105 crores ($65 million) and has 
already supported more than 60 projects with another 50 in the pipeline. As Table 32 
shows, the projects cover a wide range of innovative products and services with niche 
market potential (both domestic and export) ranging from alloys and fine chemicals to 
advanced engineering products, biotechnology, software and services, with an average 
value (in 1989) of $500,000, projected sales of between $750,000 to $4 million and 
royalties of between 1 per cent and 7 per cent of sales. 
Collectively, Indian venture capital initiatives have probably supported already more than 
1 00 new start-up, technology-intensive firms, with another 300-400 projects in the pipeline 
or expected to emerge over the next few years. While these may be small numbers 
compared to the venture activities in the industrially advanced countries, they are 
nonetheless significant in the Indian context. Indian and foreign financial sources are 
increasingly willing to support innovative technology development projects and there seems 
to be no shortage of entrepreneurially minded young Indian scientists willing to try 
commercializing their ideas into marketable products. These developments, along with the 
moves toward liberalization and the proliferation of other initiatives to promote innovation, 
underline the much more upbeat nature of the changing business climate in India and the 
62 This programme, called PACT, is sponsored by AID and finances joint ventures between Indian and U.S. 
firms for the development of technology-intensive products and process with major commercial possibilities. 
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considerable potential for greater European private sector involvement individually or 
collectively via some form of EC sponsored project. 
TABLE :32 : Selected start-up high tech ventures assisted by TDlCI 
Technology area and project description Level of 
support ( $m) 
Computer hardware 
- Dev and mfr of intelligent notepads 2.76 
- Commercialization of data system for dairy applications 1.47 
Computer integrated manufacture 
- Dev of CAD/CAM system for mfr of garments 2.36 
Computer software 
- Dev and commercialization of expert system for structural 2.12 
engineering 
- Dev of integrated software package for UNIX 2.94 
Telecommunications 
- Dev and mfr of miniature sensitive relays 1.02 
- Dev and mfr of terminals for fibre optic communication 3.53 
systems 
Environmental engineering 
- Dev of distillery effluent treatment system 2.64 
Chemicals and polymers 
- Dev of immobilized enzyme used in mfr of 6 APA 2.06 
- Dev of engineering polymers coatings 1.88 
Special Materials 
- Dev of filament wound FRP tubes 0.65 
- Dev of heat resistant synthetic rubber lining compounds 0.10 
Biotechnology 
- Dev of restriction enzymes and allied molecular biologicals 1.53 
- Dev of ornamental flower, vegatable and fruit micro-plants 5.18 
- Dev of fungal enzymes such as pectinase 0.47 
- Dev of bioprocess vaccines and immunodiagnostics for 2.47 
poultry 
- Dev of blood platelet aggregation measurement kits 0.94 
Source : Adapted from information provided by TDICI 
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ANNEX 5 : INDIA-USA S& T RELATIONS: LONG-TERM NEGATIVE SIDE 
EFFECTS FROM THE CONFUCT OVER INTELlECTUAl 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A brief analysis of the evolution and current state of U.S.-Indian S& T relations provides a 
valuable insight into the somewhat jaundiced attitude of segments of the Indian S& T elite 
that we encountered towards the value to India of "mutually beneficial" international S&T 
collaboration. It also offers a mechanism for exploring aspects of contentious issues such 
as intellectual property rights where India and the EC have yet to resolve their differences. 
U.S.- Indian political relations have always been subject to tensions that have sometimes 
spilled over into the commercial technology arena but have not until very recently affected 
scientific collaboration. 53 A recent example is that in the early 1980's, Indian-US private 
sector co-operation and technology transfer arrangements came under the shadow of US 
Export Administration Regulations. During that period, the US (driven by Reagan's 
anti-Soviet rhetoric) imposed restrictions on the transfer to India (and 14 other countries) 
of an ever widening range of "dual purpose" technologies that they feared would find their 
way to the USSR. India's 12 year attempt to acquire a $12 million Cray XMP 14 
supercomputer for meteorological, health, agriculture and physics research purposes got 
tangled up in this impasse54 while a good deal of suspicious and unwanted attention was 
paid by the U.S. to India's nuclear and space programmes for the same reason. 
Yet throughout these years, India and the U.S. carried on, via the joint commission 
mechanism, an active programme of scientific exchange and collaboration in the context 
of a very sizeable foreign aid programme. This is a positive aspect of relations between the 
two countries - though some of the policy makers interviewed now wonder how beneficial 
this past S& T co-operation was to India. They argue that whatever short-term benefit 
these programmes may have generated, they are believed to have helped create the 
"demand" conditions that lead to the large, and now much criticised, outflow of Indian 
scientists and engineers to the U.S. during the 1980s. 
In 1982, politics played a major role in leading the U.S. (under Reagan) and India (under 
Indira Gandhi) to launch the Science and Technology Initiative (STI) and agree its renewal 
in 1985. This programme provided an umbrella for a wide ranging set of "mutually 
beneficial" S& T collaborations (of a traditional nature) in fields such as agriculture, health, 
energy and the weather. It also set the stage for a distinct warming of technology relations 
during Rajiv Gandhi's reign when India made certain concessions to the U.S. in order to 
acquire dual purpose technology as part of its measured (arguably cynical) response to an 
03 This pattern can be traced back at least until the early 1960s when the U.S. pulled out of an aid 
commitment to supply India with steel making technology because it was going to a public sector (e.g. "socialist") 
enterprise- at which point the Indians promptly turned to the Russians to supply the technology. Similar problems 
crept in as a result of the U.S. pro-Pakistan tilt in the 1970s and early 1980s; over U.S. irritation towards Indian's 
non-aligned posturing during the same period; and towards US TNCs as a result of the Bhopal disaster. 
So& For example, although the sale of the Cray to India was finally agreed certain restrictive conditions were 
attached such as the Pentagon's insistence that U.S. personnel be assigned to it to prevent leakage of the 
technology I 
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American strategy that sought to wean the country away from the Soviet Union through 
a diet of military technology. 
However since 1988, the Indian-U.S. STI and wider scientific collaborations have been 
negatively affected by U.S. policy on IPR. In April1987, the President issued an executive 
order to the effect that the U.S. government must take into account whether countries 
adequately protect IPRs, while negotiating science and technology agreements. After much 
hesitation on the Indian side, the STI was renewed in October, 1988 but the atmosphere 
within which the different projects went forward became increasingly acrimonious. The 
U.S. first tried to use co-operation via STI to get India to change its patent policies by 
offering various inducements such as inclusion of high technology areas in the STJ.1"; 
When this was resisted and India carried its opposition into the multilateral Uruguay-round 
trade talks, the U.S. significantly widened the scope of its demands to include reforms of 
India's treatment of foreign investment and domestic competition in manufacturing and 
services. This culminated in the placing of India on the Super 301 "priority watch" list in 
1989 (along with 8 other nations who were all subsequently removed) and the public 
insistence that India accede to a set of what most Indians felt were grossly unfair 
demands.66 After months of impassioned negative reaction in India, the threat of 
sanctions against India was not actually removed until June 15, 1990 - when the action 
by the U.S. was suspended pending the outcome of the Uruguay round talks. 67 
The net impact of this sustained period of controversy on STI collaboration was very 
negative as several of the projects became extremely controversial. Fierce criticisms were 
56 The U.S. (and for that matter EC) opposition is focussed on the Indian Patents Act of 1970 and is criticised 
because : (a) it has broadened considerably the grounds for compulsory licensing; (b) allowed unrestricted use of 
patented inventions by the government for its own purposes; (c) allowed the use of patented inventions for 
purposes of experiment; research and teaching; and (d) resulted in greatly revenue flows to the original inventors. 
In fact, the India Patent Act has not transformed Indian industry into a tiger which poaches on world intellectual 
property rights. Nr has it resulted in any marked decline in foreign patenting activity in India or in the willingness 
of foreign firms to transfer technology. Data on patent applications between 1980-1985 show that in aggregate 
terms the total number of Indian patents has experienced a decline, while those by foreign countries has shown 
a steady increase. This is particularly so in the case of the US. its applications increased from 570 in 198Q-81 to 
968 in 1985-86 and constitute more than two-thirds of total applications by foreign countries. Other countries 
active in patenting in India are Germany, UK, France, Japan and Switzerland. 
From the Indian side strong patent regimes are regarded as fostering the abuse of monopoly rights by those with 
patents, especially by MNCs, who tend to abuse these monopoly rights which result in a decrease of social utility. 
India has catalogued some of these abuses. See Government of India, "Standards and Principles Concerning the 
Availability, Scope and Use of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights", Mainstream (New Delhi), August 5, 
1989, pp.25-31. 
56 India was among the 8 and has been required to : m assure improved and adequate patent protection for 
all classes of inventions, (ii) eliminate discrimination against the use of foreign trade marks, (iii) register service 
marks, (iv) improve access and distribution for US motion pictures, (v) improve enforcement against piracy, (vi) 
include an intellectual property annexe to the bilateral science and technology agreements, and (vii) participate 
constructively in multilateral intellectual property negotiations. 
57 Not surprisingly it is a matter of some debate within India as to whether U.S. pressure on IPR and other 
issues had any impact on the Government's recent continued moveroent towards greater liberalization on the 
industrial policy front. This is hotly denied by the government. However the reality is that India was in a very weak 
bargaining position on these issues at the national level. The US is India's leading trade partner with the two-way 
trade exceeding $ 5.5 billion in 1988. It accounts for 19 per cent of India's exports and 11 per cent of its imports, 
many of the imports being of technically advanced items, such as Cray computers; while India accounts for under 
1 per cent of US trade and is in surplus to the tune of around $ 800 million. 
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(and still are) voiced in India that the agreement was biased in favour of the U.S. so that, 
for example, data generated during the health and meteorological research projects would 
only benefit U.S. commercial interests. Thus STI has come to be seen by large parts of the 
Indian S& T policymaking and scientific establishment as a typical example of one-sided, 
exploitative S& T collaborations that the west usually imposes on developing countries . 
From the U.S. side, interest in STI definitely waned during the 1988-June 1990 period as 
only projects without any IPR implications were undertaken. It is also argued that recent 
reductions in U.S. aid commitments to India (down to $400 million) are linked to the 
IPR/STI conflict. Indian scientists now feel that the programme was never genuinely 
mutually beneficial and only lasted as long as a semblance of symmetry and reciprocity 
could be maintained - a charade that was dropped as soon as wider political pressures were 
brought to bear by the U.S. side. 
Given that the 301 decision was just taken, it is difficult to gauge the future effect on STI 
and wider scientific collaboration with the U.S. (such as the formal collaborative 
arrangements now in place with DBT and the Department of Space) but there is certain to 
be a cooling of relations and little real collaboration until after the completion of the 
Uruguay round. 
There seem to be fewer problems on the technology and investment front. Interviews 
indicated that except for narrow segments of U.S. (and European) industry, most firms 
were not put off making investments due to Indian IPR restrictions. During the period from 
1987 to 1989 when the IPR conflict was at its height, the U.S. remained a major source 
of investment funds and technology with new equity investments recording a dramatic 
increase between 1987-1988 alone from Rs 290.5 million to Rs 970 million. And 
interestingly, U.S. AID has maintained its commitment (begun initially through the PACT 
programme described above) to support the venture capital initiatives of ICICI and lOBI to 
the tune of $30-35 million per year over the next three years. 
As far as the EC initiative is concerned, the relevance of this situation was brought home 
during a number of interviews where it was made very clear that India's sensitivities 
towards outside pressures of the sort applied by the U.S. have been greatly exacerbated. 
The Community needs to note this fact in the formulation of its strategy to pursue greater 
S& T collaboration with India. This issue is discussed in detail in Part I. 
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ANNEX 6 : SOME ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ON NEW FORMS OF 
INDUSTRIAL DYNAMISM IN ·THE 
INDIAN CONTEXT 
The thrusting, dynamic entrepreneur and dedicated production manager willing to work all 
night in order to meet a deadline are common characters in the Asian NICs and lay behind 
much of their economic success. However such actors have historically been in very short 
supply within the Indian industrial scene. However there can be little doubt that during the 
1980s, the landscape of the Indian manufacturing and service sectors began to sprout, in 
ever greater numbers, new growths of entrepreneurial and managerial dynamism that fit 
the Asian NIC model. 
As we indicated in Part I, there are many who dismiss the significance of these new 
industrialists, attributing their meteoric rise to the consumer-and debt led boom of the 
Gandhi administration. In the eyes of these perennial critics, Indian industrialists (and the 
bureaucrats who still manage and control large parts of the economy) continue to operate 
within the same mercantilist/protection-oriented mentality that has stifled innovation and 
competitiveness among Indian industry for the last four decades. 
Undoubtedly there is more than a little truth in these charges. However, our research and 
interviews also generated clear, if still anecdotal evidence, that the changed business 
environment created by liberalization has begun to foster an industrial class with a 
progressive outlook towards technology, quality and competition that bodes well for 
industrial development in India - and implies a much more fertile ground for European 
collaboration than has previously existed. 
A number of features of this new environment and the different actors involved are worthy 
of note. First, the conditions are pervasive and there are cases of this new dynamism to 
be found in many areas - not just the high-tech start up firms supported by the venture 
capital initiatives outlined in Annex 4. 
For example, there have been some highly successful start-ups in the service sector such 
as the "Skypak" group who, linked in with DHL, generated a number of innovative services 
tied to the rapid delivery concept in a number of market niches such as banking (where 
overnight inter-city clearances were offered) and is now turning over $20 million annually 
as largest courier service in India. Another is the Apollo Group operating 3 specialty 
hospitals (with 14 more planned) managed on a corporate basis, funded by private venture 
capital and profitable enough to keep 30 per cent of hospital capacity available for free 
treatment of the poor - a strategy that has lead to generous government treatment in 
relation to customs and import duties. 
Second, similar dynamism has been shown by the colossal industrial houses that grew 
sprawling and cumbersome under conditions of protection, and by tradtional industries such 
as garments which had never performed anything like their counterparts in the NICs. The 
Tata Group is one such industrial house with widespread interests in engineering goods, 
chemicals, commodities and hotels who at the beginning of the decade was largely 
assumed to be a moribund colossus unable to overcome a long period of stagnation and 
destined for dismemberment. 
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Yet in the space of five years, the Tatas have become major players in the competitive, 
fast moving worlds of computers (Tata-Unisys) and software (Tata-Consultancy); are in the 
midst of a massive multi-billion dollar programme of investment and technological 
refurbishment in their core engineering and refining activities; and are poised to enter 
telecommunications, financial services and aerospace. These plans are underpinned by a 
strong emphasis on exports and by signs that the Group for the first time is willing to forge 
links with foreign firms in order to achieve an international presence. They, and the other 
large industrial houses, retain significant influence within government and could be 
expected to be powerful partners in any collaborative project they thought would meet their 
interests. 
In the garments industry, Indian clothing firms have suddenly discovered just how lucrative 
and fast growing exports markets can be - and not just in low wage products but in design 
intensive, higher value-added garments. The industry increased its exports by many orders 
of magnitude during the 1980s to reach $1 .4 bn in 1989 with this expected to rise to $5.1 
bn by 1994. One firm visited specialized in high fashion clothes designed under contract 
for it by French, German, Italian and American designers and exported 75 percent of its 
$1 5 million turnover to high fashion shops elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East. A 
technology and design tie-up with a European or Japanese firm leading to even greater 
production and exports is on the cards. 
This may not be the sort of commercial success the EC wants to hear about. Nevertheless, 
there are many more such Indian firms, operating in the traditional and low technology 
segments of the market, who are just beginning to mature under the new conditions, who 
are looking for innovative partnerships with foreigners and who are determined not to be 
held back by domestic or international protectionist barriers. 
Third, while the Indian public sector boasts more than its fair share of inefficient, 
technologically stagnant and uncompetitive enterprises, it is also the case that a number 
of Indian public sector enterprises began, during the 1 980s, to behave very much like 
private sector firms in seeking to be nationally and internationally competitive in their 
engineering, production and management activities. They have now developed both R&D 
and product/process engineering capabilities and, by seeking and winning a large number 
of international contracts, have not only proved their international competitiveness but have 
built up valuable overseas project management experiences. 
Among those who fit this bill are the Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC) Ltd, Rail 
India Technology and Engineering Services (RITES), Engineers India in the petrochemicals 
sector, Walcend Industries of Bombay in advanced civil engineering, UPTRON, the Uttar 
Pradesh State electronics corporation and Hindustan Aeronautics. There was a strong 
sense given during the interviews that these companies could play a key role as "gateway" 
companies for any major technology intensive EC collaborations involving integrated R&D, 
engineering and production activities (in India or abroad) that would also require sizeable 
state investment from the Indian side. 
Another category of dynamic public sector agencies that could play a role in Community 
projects are those that act as development promotion or development finance institutions 
such as the SDICs mentioned earlier. There are 26 in total and many of them are 
unprofitable and poorly run. However, some of these agencies such Andhara Pradesh 
Industrial Development Corporation, the Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation, and 
those from Maharastra, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana state have performed very well in recent 
years in their main task of extending risk and development finance to small and medium 
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sized firms and to joint sector enterprises for specific, increasingly technology-intensive 
projects. 
These agencies have developed cadres of competent and professional managers who 
operate within an internal culture that is highly business and entrepreneurially oriented. 
With their links to both the more dynamic actors in the productive sector and with state 
R&D institutes, some of which are of high quality, they could prove to be very useful 
partners for the Community. 
Fourth, particularly during the latter part of the 1980s, a number of medium-to-large Indian 
enterprises (though not as large or as sleepy as the big houses) who had developed within 
the comfortable context of a highly protected industry, began to court and be courted by 
large, mass production oriented foreign enterprises seeking an Indian base that would 
provide access to the domestic market, allow significant cost savings on any re-exports 
back to the home market and provide a launching pad for exports to the East. This is an 
entirely new form of foreign linkage for Indian firms because it gives access to technology, 
marketing and distribution on an international level that these previously inward looking 
firms had not been previously interested in acquiring. 
It is a pattern that seems to be carrying on into the 1990s. For example there have been 
recent indications by large European food and cycle manufacturers of plans to form equity 
tie-ups with large Indian producers in the same sectors. In both cases, a good deal of 
marriage brokerage was required to cement the attraction and this was provided by 
specialized agencies of the European countries involved - suggesting an obvious angle for 
EC involvement in the future. 
Finally, we found considerable evidence that a wide range of Indian enterprises have begun 
to grapple with challenges posed by the new emphasis on quality as a determinant of 
international competitiveness and the current worldwide fascination with the new 
management and production practices emanating from Japan. To those familiar with the 
traditional, rather cavalier attitudes to quality of many Indian firms, this may come as a 
surprise but there is little doubt that concepts such as JIT, TOM, kaizen and TPM have 
begun to be understood and embraced by Indian industry. These ideas are entering into 
the industrial sector via different routes. 
Japanese motor vehicle, cycle and component firms who were permitted to establish 
subsidiaries or joint ventures in the mid 1980s are all now well into the programmed 
transfer of their indigenous management practices to their local production affiliates and 
component suppliers. The effects on productivity of using these techniques in Indian 
conditions are impressive. One firm we visited that was producing Yamaha motorcycles 
under license was using their production approach to manufacture 6000 bikes monthly 
using 640 employees while in the same group, production of an indigenous bike using old 
methods required over ten times as many workers (8000) to turn out less than twice as 
many bikes (1 0,000)!. 
Similarly, western TNCs who have adopted these practices in their domestic plants have 
begun to introduce the new techniques in their Japanese subsidiaries as well. One such 
U.K. firm has found that its Indian subsidiary has achieved the best productivity gains of 
all its plants world-wide using a kanban system of component delivery via ox-drawn carts! 
The demonstration effects of these examples of successful organizational change have 
been very important in terms of alerting more progressive Indian firms to the competitive 
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advantages inherent in adopting the new practices. This fact, and their appreciation of the 
growing importance of quality certification at the international level (e.g.ISO 9000) have 
lead to escalating demands for technical assistance in these areas. As a result, many 
industrial associations, including the national bodies such as the Confederation of 
Engineering Industries, FICCI and Assocham have either regular conferences and workshops 
where managers and entrepreneurs are introduced and trained in these practices, or as in 
the case of CEI have actually set up a TOM division working full time on spreading the 
gospel. While some of this demand is being met from local experts, there is a a 
considerable shortfall in availability, opening up possibilities for foreign consultancy 
services. 
So far this demand is still limited and is being met in only an ad-hoc and partial fashion by 
foreign consultancy firms. Not surprisingly, Japan seems to be the only country willing to 
provide any sizeable measure of technical assistance in the management training and 
quality improvement areas via JUSE sponsored seminars and OECF funded training 
programmes. One such seminar was held in April 1990 and was attended by more than 
1 00 senior executives from leading Indian engineering firms. 
It is still early days yet in the JIT!TOM movement in India. Nevertheless, three points can 
be noted. First if it does take off at anything like the scale that it has done in the U.S. and 
parts of Europe, the market for these "producer services" will be enormous. Second the 
nature of the Japanese involvement in the provision of technical assistance in this area so 
far suggests it may be part of an attempt by the Japanese government to establish a 
bridgehead in India for Japanese DFI in the future. This is standard practice as far as Japan 
is concerned, and has certainly happened throughout the ASEAN countries with the net 
results that are well documented in the Thailand case study. Thirdly, the possibility of the 
EC developing a programme of technical assistance in the area of quality, standards and 
new management practices through the participation of European consultants and European 
firms was raised in our interviews and is worthy of further exploration. 
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AND THE PURSUIT Of· SEtf .. RELIANCE 
It is inherently difficult to formulate any kind of informed assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Indian R&D system because of its scale and complexity and because 
of the limits of the SAST research format. Nevertheless, our research has generated some 
general and specific insights and information that are worthy of note. 
As noted earlier there is a widespread consensus among S& T policy analysts inside and 
outside of India, among Indian industrialists and confirmed to a certain extent by our 
interview findings, that the country's sizeable R&D system has not yet made a significant 
contribution to . the country's industrialization effort. The evidence supporting this 
contention is substantial and relates to the poor quality of the basic research and scientific 
education being carried out in its universities and labs, the very limited success of CSIR labs 
in developing and transferring technologies of use to Indian industry, and the inability of the 
massively well funded defense and space related research systems to meet many of the 
technological development targets set for them. 68 Needless to say, these problems pose 
enormously difficult challenges for Indian science policy. 
However, from the perspective of the EC, any interpretation of this damaging assessment 
of Indian R&D capabilities needs to be tempered by an appreciation of two other facets of 
the state of science in India that were also brought out by our interviews. First, there is 
equally widespread agreement and evidence that the Indian science and R&D systems also 
exhibits a number of pockets of excellence where the country, if not a world leader, is 
certainly capable of state of the art, internationally competitive research in basic and 
applied science. 
We have already noted the country's growing capabilities in software and biotechnology, 
its long established expertise in space technology and the premier positions that many 
Indian scientists and engineers hold abroad. In addition to these, the following is a small 
sampling of the other evidence that emerged during our interviews and research attesting 
to India's impressive, if selective, S&T credentials. 
The country, in the context of institutes such as the National Physical Laboratory, the 
National Remote Sensing Agency, the National Geophysical Research Institute and Anna 
University possesses outstanding capabilities in natural resource assessment involving 
ground and air observation, pattern recognition and extending to highly sophisticated 
satellite-based remote sensing and imagery reconstruction. 
68 For example, CSIR recently reviewed standards in Indian basic research and scientific education and 
concluded that only 2 percent of basic research was relevant and in 80 percent of India's universities, Ph.D 
supervisors met with their students less than once a year; a recent study of CSIR institute, the Central Mechanical 
Engineering Research Institute, showed that in the last decade only 5 products or processes were released 
annually to industry and most were not used-this parallels the performance of other CSIR labs where research has 
shown that between 1955 and 1980, eight labs had put forward only 295 processes for commercial exploitation, 
only 50 were actually released and production started in less than 15 percent of the cases. See •Indian Science 
:Rotten to the Core•, Nature, Vol 345, June 1990, p.651; Govindarajulu, 1990, Economic and Political Weekly, 
June 4, 1988. For a critique of the accomplishments of India's defense and space research programmes see 
•Technological Self-Reliance: Systemic Constraints•, Economic and Political Weekly. June 11, 1988. 
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Indian oceanography capabilities, particularly as manifest in its research vessels such as the 
Sagar Kanya and its National Institute of Oceanography are recognized as world class and 
have resulted in many invitations for research collaborations with Germany and other 
countries. The wind testing and model building capabilities at the National Aeronautical 
Laboratory as well as its instrument fabrication skills have allowed it to win a number of 
internationally tendered contracts in these areas. 69 The National Chemical Laboratory has 
recently made major breakthroughs in catalyst technology that have lead to joint ventures 
and lucrative licensing agreements with international firms. 60 
The Central Leather Research Institute, in collaboration with the TNO of the Netherlands 
have won global contracts for the risk analysis of chemical plants based on the work 
carried out on the Bhopal disaster by CLRI researchers. And finally, ample evidence was 
provided, via the existence of international collaborations, of India's outstanding reputation 
in pure and theoretical science in such fields as astrophysics and particle physics; pure and 
applied mathematics; surface studies and fast kinetics; and even superconductivity where 
researchers at a number of Indian institutes and universities (such as the IITs at Madras and 
Bombay, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, NPL and the Tata lnsitute of Fundamental 
Research) were able to quickly duplicate and then advance the superconductivity 
breakthroughs that were actually announced by C.M.Verma (an NRI) of ATT labs in the 
U.S. at the International Conference of Valence Fluctuations held in Bangalore in January 
1987. 
From our perspective, such examples, and the considerable body of additional evidence that 
could be marshalled, do unquestionably attest to the strengths of Indian science in certain 
areas and indicate that whatever the overall weaknesses of the Indian S& T and R&D 
systems, there is certainly ample room for mutually beneficial collaboration with this system 
at the level of basic and applied R&D - probably more so than with any other SAST 
country. During our interviews, a number of proposals were put forward for co-operative 
projects related to these strengths. 
Third, and directly related to the above, the science establishment, and the elite group of 
advisers and policy makers who direct the Indian science enterprise, despite acknowledging 
the country's R&D weaknesses, are fiercely proud of what they have accomplished so far 
and are passionately committed to the ideal of Indian self-reliance. This commitment does 
not extend blindly to autarchy, of course, but does mean that they are ready to accept the 
higher costs and lower benefits attached to the long struggle to build an independent 
scientific and technological competence in certain critical areas in order to avoid 
dependence on other countries. Such attitudes go to the heart of the nation's sense of 
self-esteem and identity for that reason must be respected. 
These perceptions are deeply ingrained and without a doubt directly influence policy 
decisions vis resource allocation and international co-operation. For example, one of our 
interviewees pointed out that fairly recently India had rejected the opportunity of 
58 One example involved NAL winning a European contract to design and fabricate Ught Combat Aircraft 
models for wind tunnel testing because its costs were four times less than those quoted for by European labs and 
its accuracy and quality were an order of magnitude better; in another NAL was awarded an international contract 
for the design and fabrication of multiplexing and demultiplexing satellite filters which they provided in half the 
time required and at a fraction of the cost. 
110 These have involved NCL developed catalysts for - the conversion of pyrolysis gasoline to aromatics; the 
manufacture of zeolite catalysts for hydrocracking; and catalyst technology for the manufacture of chlorphthalic 
anhydride, a plastics intermediate. 
Paga 106 - Sast Project 1 Report on India 
Annex 7 
participating in a major co-operative R&D and production effort in aerospace precisely 
because they could not see how participation would contribute to Indian self-reliance. This 
is not an isolated example the same thing happened when Rolls Royce wanted to 
collaborate with NPL in the development of titantium powder. 
The Indian science policy elite wears its national pride boldly and, in our opinion, with 
considerable justification, given the pockets of excellence identified above and the positive 
effect of Indian S&T accomplishments on the national character. Any attempt to involve 
India in a major S& T collaborative effort particularly in fields or sectors considered critical 
to their development effort will need to take careful account of the strength of Indian 
feeling about such issues. 
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